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Preface 
Each year, the Directorate-General for Regional Policies of the Commission of the European Communities 
launches a number of studies in the field of regional policy and regional planning. These studies mainly 
aim at providing a basis for policy formulation internally, as well as the preparation of programmes and 
initiatives and a basis for analysing the impact of current or planned activities. The most interesting or 
innovative of these will now be published in a series entitled Regional development studies. With this series 
the Directorate-General hopes to stimulate discussion and action in a wider sphere on the research results 
received. The publication of the studies is addressed to politicians and decision-makers at European, 
regional and local level, as well as to academics and experts in the broad fields of issues covered. 
It is hoped that by publicizing research results the Commission will enrich and stimulate public debate and 
promote a further exchange of knowledge and opinions on the issues which are considered important for 
the economic and social cohesion of the Community and therefore for the future of Europe. 
Readers should bear in mind that the study reports do not necessarily reflect the official position of the 
Commission but first and foremost express the opinion of those responsible for carrying out the study. 
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Introduction 
This report presents the findings of the study of urbanization and the functions of cities in the European 
Community commissioned by Directorate-General XVI of the European Commission in 1990. It is based 
on primary field work conducted in 24 cities throughout the Community in 1990-91, ranging from 
Copenhagen in the north to Seville in the south, from Dublin in the west to Thessaloniki in the east. The 
case-study cities are identified in the interleaved maps. The primary field research was complemented by a 
series of thematic studies on the following issues: the role of networks and linkages between cities in the 
Community; the impact of reunification upon the urban system in Germany; the role of four capital cities 
in the Community; the roles and prospects of smaller cities in the European Community; the 'third Italy' 
model of regional development and the contribution of cultural policy to urban regeneration in European 
cities. 
The study was led by the European Institute for Urban Affairs at Liverpool John Moores University, 
formerly Centre for Urban Studies at the University of Liverpool. Professor Klaus Kunzmann and 
Professor Michael Wegener of the Institut für Raumplanung, University of Dortmund, conducted a major 
review entitled 'The pattern of urbanization in Western Europe, 1960-90' as the first phase of this report. 
The results of that review have been substantially incorporated into this report but particularly in Chapter 
2. Research teams from the following institutions also conducted some of the original research and 
contributed to the development of the report: the University of Hamburg, the Centre national de recherche 
scientifique in Paris and in Marseille, the Observatoire sociologique du changement in Paris, the University 
of Barcelona, the University of Valencia, the Institute of Demography in Madrid, Ellconsult in Athens. 
The Institute wishes to acknowledge the contributions made to this study by the following individuals in 
particular: Dr Jens Dangschat, Professor Edmond Preteceille, Dr Andre Donzel, Dr Patrick Le Gales, Dr 
Soledad Garcia, Dr Constanza Tobio, Mr Juan Ramos Morales, Dr Harry Cocossis and Ms Aurora 
Markopoulou. The Institute also wishes to thank the officials in DG XVI of the European Commission 
who so freely gave their helpful advice and support throughout this project — Dr Marios Camhis, Mr 
Stephen Fox and Dr Jürgen Siebeck. 
The aim of the study was to assess the contribution that cities have made to the changing Europe during 
recent decades and identify the broad implications for cities within the European Community during the 
1990s. The approach taken in the study was essentially qualitative, rather than quantitative. Its primary 
database was that created by the individual city case-studies which were carefully selected to represent the 
different types of change that have been occurring in the different regions of Europe. The purpose of the 
study was not to compile a superficial set of indicators of urban conditions across all the urban areas of 
Europe. Rather it was to understand in depth the dynamics of the economic, social and environmental 
changes at work in European cities which would allow us to evaluate their consequences for the European 
urban system, anticipate future changes and assess their policy implications. This means that the reader 
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should not expect this study to provide comprehensive data sets for all cities in Europe. However, we 
believe the careful use of selective data to illustrate larger processes provides a deeper understanding of the 
current and future conditions of cities in the European Community. 
Cities have traditionally been the source of much of the economic and cultural dynamism, as well as 
tensions, in Europe. In recent years they have undergone massive economic and physical transformation 
which has presented them with many opportunities and challenges. During the next decade, as Europe 
moves towards greater economic and political integration, cities will be even more crucial players in a 
dynamic European economic space. They will also be the focus of many acute problems in the 1990s which 
will require substantial investment of public and private resources. The future of Europe will substantially 
reflect that of its cities. Their enormous economic, social and cultural energy must be harnessed to promote 
social and economic cohesion throughout the European Community. Cities demand a prominent place on 
its future agenda. 
The report could not have been written without the help of the many colleagues mentioned above. 
Nevertheless, responsibility for the contents of the report, and for any errors of fact or omission, lie solely 
with the European Institute for Urban Affairs. This report has been prepared for use within the European 
Commission. It does not necessarily represent the Commission's official position. 
Professor Michael Parkinson 
Franco Bianchini 
Jon Dawson 
Richard Evans 
Alan Harding 
European Institute for Urban Affairs, 
Liverpool John Moores University 
(formerly Centre for Urban Studies, 
University of Liverpool) 
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Executive summary 
Introduction 
1.1. Section 1 (Chapters 1 to 3) examines the 
patterns of economic restructuring that have taken 
place in Europe during the past three decades and 
assesses their spatial implications. It considers 
whether there is a single urban hierarchy 
developing in Europe but rejects it in favour of a 
model of overlapping hierarchies emerging in 
three broad areas of the European Community — 
the 'old core', the 'new core' and the 'periphery'. 
It assesses the likely impact of growing 
competition or collaboration upon the economic 
futures of different kinds of cities in the 
Community. It identifies changing patterns of 
inter and intra regional and urban growth and the 
related patterns of urbanization, suburbanization, 
deurbanization and reurbanization. It describes 
the process of convergence taking place in the 
Community as the major trends in the cities in the 
peripheral regions begin to more closely resemble 
those occuring in the new and old core cities. The 
section suggests the European urban system is 
becoming more demographically stable than it was 
during the 1950s to the 1980s but that it 
nevertheless remains vulnerable to both external 
and internal economic and social sources of 
change. It describes the emergence of a series of 
Community-wide transport and communication 
challenges which threaten the efficient functioning 
of cities. It assesses the role of the developing 
series of networks between European cities. It 
identifies the particular challenges and 
opportunities that face border, gateway and 
smaller cities in the Community as well as the role 
of cities in their wider regional context. 
1.2. Section 2 (Chapters 4 and 5) reveals a 
pattern of uneven development between and 
within cities in the Community. It identifies 
growing prosperity in many cities in both the 'old 
core', 'new core' and 'periphery' of the 
Community but also a pattern of economic 
marginalization, and spatial segregation of 
particular social groups, especially immigrants 
and ethnic minorities, within urban labour and 
housing markets. It also identifies key urban 
transport and environmental trends. The section 
describes the emergence of more entrepreneurial 
cities which have successfully developed strategic 
responses to economic change and institutional 
mechanisms to implement them. On the basis of 
their experience it identifies the factors which 
underlie future urban economic potential and the 
city choices between growth and equity that may 
be required during the 1990s. 
1.3. Section 3 (Chapters 6 to 8) identifies policy 
responses at national and European level to urban 
change. It describes the gradual emergence of 
explicit national urban strategies amongst Member 
States as those which urbanized later begin to 
imitate the responses of those States which faced 
urban problems earlier. It identifies the range of 
European Community policies that directly or 
indirectly affect cities, explores the factors that 
have encouraged the successful take up and 
impact of policies by different cities in the 
Community and identifies a series of strategic, 
organizational and funding issues the Commission 
may need to address in framing its future policies. 
Finally it identifies the outstanding challenges that 
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will face decision-makers about cities as they 
approach 2000. 
The impact of economic change upon 
the European urban system 
2.1. Rapid economic globalization in the last 30 
years has resulted in the growing interdependence 
of cities at a European as well as a national and 
regional level. This process has led to many efforts 
to develop a single hierarchy or league table of 
cities to rank them in their European context. This 
report suggests there is no single European 
hierarchy into which cities can be placed. Instead 
there are a series of overlapping hierarchies which 
are determined by the particular economic role 
and function cities perform, for example, 
manufacturing, services, transport and 
distribution, high technology, public 
administration, culture, leisure and tourism, and 
the sphere of influence — international, national, 
regional or local — in which they operate. 
2.2. In the process of economic globalization 
and restructuring that has been occurring during 
recent decades, urban areas whose economies are 
based on older heavy industrial and port sectors 
have generally fared worst. Those urban areas 
whose economies are based on manufacturing 
which is research and development-intensive or 
involves advanced assembly techniques or, 
alternatively, industries catering for specialist, 
design-intensive consumer markets have fared 
better. The highest growth rates have taken place 
in the service sector — the biggest urban employer 
— particularly in financial and related producer 
services, closely followed by consumer services. 
2.3. These processes of sectoral change in the 
international and national economies have had 
substantial impact within cities in the European 
Community by creating marked labour market 
polarization. Advanced technical and professional 
occupations in both manufacturing and service 
sectors are dominated by middle class males. The 
less skilled, less secure, often temporary or 
part-time jobs, predominantly in lower-order 
services, are disproportionately taken by women 
and ethnic minorities. 
2.4. These economic changes have had 
substantial impact on relationships between cities 
in Europe. However, their effect upon the 
distinction traditionally made between cities in the 
economic core and those in the periphery of 
Europe has been paradoxical. The changes have in 
part confirmed, but in part challenged, that 
traditional distinction. During the late 1970s and 
early 1980s there was a shift southward in 
Europe's economic centre of gravity as 
city-regions in the older industrialized centres of 
northern Europe went through a period of painful 
restructuring and growing unemployment whereas 
the areas of southern France, southern Germany, 
north-west Italy and north-east Spain experienced 
economic and population growth. 
2.5. After the general economic upturn of the 
mid-1980s, however, the pattern changed once 
again. Many — but not all — of the older 
metropolitan areas in the north experienced a 
significant economic resurgence. In recent years 
there have been two processes at work. On the one 
hand there has been some decentralization from 
the old metropolitan centres in some economic 
sectors such as high-tech industry and back-office 
functions. But there has also been a process of 
reconcentration within the older centres and their 
suburbs in other sectors such as high-level business 
services, international distribution, prestigious 
arts and cultural industries. 
2.6. Although the boundaries between them are 
not watertight, it is possible to identify three 
broad economic areas within the European 
Community: the old core, covering the older 
industrialized areas of the United Kingdom, 
Belgium, northern and eastern France, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, northern Germany 
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and Denmark; a new core, which incorporates 
southern Germany, northern Italy, south-eastern 
France and central-eastern Spain, and the 
periphery, which consists of Greece, southern 
Italy, the rest of Spain, Portugal, western France 
and Ireland. The new core has not displaced the 
old core of Europe. Rather the two areas, which 
have rather different economic, social and 
environmental characteristics, merge to form an 
extended core of Europe. 
is unlikely to disappear in the years up to 2000. 
Inequality between Europe's urban regions 
remains great and the economies of peripheral 
urban areas may be hit hardest by the increased 
competition created by the single European 
market. The improvement and expansion of the 
transport and telecommunications infrastructure 
within Europe which creates greater freedom of 
locational choice may improve the economic 
prospects of peripheral regions. 
2.7. The economic fortunes of cities within these 
three areas differ considerably. A substantial 
number of the older metropolitan cores continue 
to attract international financiers, corporate 
headquarters, producer services, research and 
development, arts and cultural industries and 
high-level public administration. By contrast, the 
newer suburbs of older urban areas, along with 
many smaller free-standing cities, have during the 
past two decades developed substantial 
concentrations of high tech, modern distribution 
and producer service industries. These areas have 
a mix of advantages which makes them more 
attractive to modern industry including better 
communication infrastructures, cleaner 
environments, cheaper land and housing, 
accessibility of technical and research institutions, 
hence skilled labour, and proximity to leisure 
opportunities. 
2.8. Many urban areas in the peripheral regions, 
with some important exceptions, have structural 
weaknesses and are characterized by poor 
infrastructure, limited inward investment — often 
of a 'branch plant' nature — and indigenous firms 
which are smaller and technologically 
underdeveloped. Nevertheless the study provides 
important examples of peripheral cities developing 
strategic responses to attempt to overcome these 
structural constraints. 
2.9. This broad economic distinction between 
the old and new core and the periphery of Europe 
2.10. The biggest change to the European urban 
system to 2000 and beyond will depend on the 
developing market economies in Central and 
Eastern Europe. The possible accession to EC 
membership by the former Comecon countries 
will have an important impact upon the European 
urban system and could ultimately generate 
intense pressure on the EC structural Funds. 
Regardless of the expansion of Community 
membership, peripheral urban areas of the EC 12 
with their low wage and low value-added 
economies especially will face competition for 
investment from the new Eastern periphery. 
2.11. The short-term casualties of the 
democratization of the East and the ensuing 
'peace dividend' are likely to be garrison cities and 
those which have relied substantially on military 
contracts for research and development. The 
short-term winners, if adjustment to market 
economies is smooth, will be cities in Germany 
and others with historic trading links to the East. 
But the same cities will suffer if adjustment is 
slow. However, the pattern of the urban system in 
Europe as a whole, and in Germany in particular, 
will be substantially affected by the impact of the 
decision to move the Federal Government from 
Bonn to Berlin. That will shift the economic 
centre of gravity to the east and will have 
substantial consequences for the economic futures 
of other cities in the now decentralized German 
urban system, particularly if Berlin joins London 
and Paris as Europe's third 'global city'. 
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Patterns of urbanization in Europe, 
1960-90 
3.1. There is evidence that the European-wide 
urban system is becoming more stable as the 
factors which changed Europe so rapidly during 
the post-war period — the shift from a 
manufacturing to a service sector based economy, 
major migratory and demographic shifts — 
appear to be slowing down. Declining fertility 
rates in peripheral regions are leading to a 
convergence of rates of natural increase 
throughout Western Europe. At the same time, 
intra-regional rural to urban migration is much 
reduced. The large inter-regional movement of the 
1960s and 1970s has slowed significantly. 
However, the service sector economy itself is 
vulnerable to internal restructuring which would 
have a major impact upon the spatial distribution 
of economic prosperity. Equally, the possibility of 
externally induced instabilities remains. Whilst its 
scale is unpredictable, there is likely to be 
increasingly intense demand from potential 
economic migrants to enter the Community and 
its cities from the countries of North Africa, 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. 
These trends will have substantial impact upon the 
border and gateway cities which serve as entry 
points for such migrants. 
3.2. During the past 45 years, Europe has 
become increasingly urbanized. By 1981, over 
two-thirds of West Europeans lived in urban areas 
with populations exceeding 300 000. Whilst 
different cities grew and declined at different 
times, a clear cycle of urban change can be 
identified — urbanization, suburbanization, 
deurbanization and reurbanization. In the 
urbanization phase central cities grew. In the 
suburbanization phase central cities declined but 
growth in their suburban areas meant that the 
total urban population continued to grow. In the 
deurbanization phase the whole urban area lost 
population. With reurbanization, however, the 
population of some large urban areas has begun to 
grow again. 
3.3. The 1950s was an era of urban growth. 
There was a large scale movement of people from 
rural to urban areas throughout Europe, 
especially into the larger cities. By the end of the 
1960s, this phase of urbanization had ceased in 
many countries. But it continued in Spain, 
Portugal, Greece and Ireland. Suburbanization 
and deurbanization were the dominant trend of 
the 1970s in north European Member States as 
larger cities, especially their centres, declined in 
population and smaller cities grew. Cities in the 
peripheral countries have increasingly followed 
this trend. Despite an important lag in the timing 
of the process, the southern and northern areas of 
Europe are not only converging in terms of 
fertility rates, they are beginning to do so in terms 
of patterns of urban development. 
3.4. During the past three decades the European 
urban system has become more balanced as it has 
become less dominated by its larger cities, and its 
medium and smaller sized cities have grown. 
Between 1960 and 1980 in all Member States 
medium and smaller cities with populations of 
under 250 000 grew substantially and larger cities 
either lost population or their rate of growth 
slowed. The growth of smaller cities was 
particularly rapid during the 1970s. Even the 
traditionally more centralized peripheral countries 
of Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece 
experienced this process. These changes reflected 
the changing economic shape of urban Europe as 
traditional economic activities either declined 
within, or relocated from, large urban areas and 
new industries developed in suburbs and smaller 
cities which were free from many of the economic, 
social and environmental problems of larger 
cities. 
3.5. During the 1980s a further trend — 
reurbanization — emerged in Europe. The process 
had two elements. In the first case the growth rate 
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of smaller cities slowed down. The second change 
was in the performance of larger cities. In many 
countries, larger cities which had declined 
consistently throughout the 1960s and 1970s began 
to grow again. The trend was particularly marked 
during the second part of the 1980s as many cities 
which had lost population in the early 1980s began 
to grow again. Reurbanization reflected a series of 
underlying trends, especially the economic 
restructuring of central cities as well as public and 
private investment to make central cities attractive 
places in which to live as well as work. 
3.6. The trend towards reurbanization confirms 
the argument that demographic and migratory 
trends reflect economic trends. The economically 
dynamic cities of the new core, and those 
developing rapidly in the periphery, are growing in 
population. Larger cities in the old core which 
experienced a degree of economic recovery during 
the second part of the 1980s are also growing. 
However, cities in all areas of the Community 
which continue to experience economic 
restructuring problems still lose population. 
3.7. The process of reurbanization brings social 
costs as well as economic benefits for cities. Low 
income residents and low value-added economic 
activities get displaced from city centres or 
squeezed into less desirable areas with fewer 
facilities. Despite such problems the trend will 
continue in many cities. During the 1990s the 
wider European system will remain more balanced 
than it was two decades ago since the gains of 
smaller towns will not be substantially reversed. 
To simplify a complex process, it may be argued 
that the 1950s and 1960s were the age of the big 
cities. The 1970s and early 1980s marked the 
flowering of smaller cities. The late 1980s and 
early 1990s could mark the beginning of the 
demographic and the economic renaissance of 
many larger cities in Europe. 
Beyond the locality: cities and 
cross-European issues 
4.1. New infrastructural development raises 
sensitive environmental, ecological and social 
issues. Road transport congestion will increase 
dramatically, as automobility is predicted to rise 
by 70% in northern Europe, 300 to 500% in 
southern Europe and 1 000% in eastern Europe by 
the year 2000. This increase in road transport, 
whose share of total energy consumption 
accounted for 85% of the total increase in Europe 
between 1973-85, will further substantially 
damage the environments of cities. 
4.2. The speed and reliability of European 
railways varies considerably, especially between 
southern and northern Europe. Peripheral cities 
face particular constraints and are increasingly 
concerned that recent investment in transportation 
infrastructure, as in the case of high speed trains 
(HST), will continue to favour cities in the old and 
new core. The growth of HST may also affect 
airports specializing in short haul flights, diverting 
traffic and economic development away from 
them. Despite the challenge of HST, air travel will 
continue its growth. An annual increase of 3 to 
5% until the year 2000 can be expected. Such 
growth is likely to reinforce the existing hierarchy 
of airports. 
4.3. The future European urban system will be 
increasingly shaped by the dynamics of economic 
competition. One response to this is that 
numerous networks have emerged between cities 
and regions to promote cooperation between 
themselves and to contain the increasing intensity 
of competition. Networks operate at a variety of 
levels — European, national, regional, and 
cross-border level. They have a variety of 
functions. Partly they provide exchanges of policy 
and best practice. Partly they promote 
collaborative development and joint ventures in a 
wide variety of areas — unemployment and 
economic development, science and technology 
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development, tourism, transport, housing. In part 
they lobby for public resources at national and 
European level. The European Commission has 
acted as a catalyst to facilitate the development of 
networks by cities and regions. To further this end 
in 1992, the Commission launched a programme 
called Recite. 
4.4. The future of smaller cities is important to 
the economic development of the EC. Smaller 
cities grew rapidly until the 1980s, encouraged by 
the diseconomies of larger cities, improvements in 
transport and telecommunications, and the 
life-style advantages they offered. Smaller cities 
vary in their economic prospects. A considerable 
number of smaller cities have growth potential 
because of their strategic location and the 
quality-of-life advantages they have over many 
larger cities. Their success will generate new 
regional infrastructure demands as a more 
dispersed settlement structure leads to pressures 
for the upgrading of transportation and 
telecommunication structures. 
also regulate the economic, legal, cultural and 
technological relations between their regions and 
the outside world. 
4.7. In the old core this model has disintegrated 
during the past three decades. The counterveiling 
economic power of suburban and regional centres 
means city centres dominate their regions less than 
in the periphery. These more complex linkages 
between cities and regions frequently lead to 
intraregional rivalries as administrations fail to 
agree on policies for regional development. 
Relations between cities and regions in much of 
the new core are often more integrated and 
complementary. The high degree of economic 
specialism within smaller discrete urban areas has 
tended to reduce inter-city sectoral competition 
and has also encouraged the easier growth of 
public sector and commercial networks. 
4.5. Other smaller cities may face more 
difficulties. Some lack the resources to counter the 
effects of peripherality, depopulation or 
dependence upon declining economic activities. 
However, the problems of peripherality may be 
partially offset by the creation of networks which 
can disseminate good practice and link the 
economic prospects of smaller cities to larger 
ones. 
4.6. Cities play a variety of roles in their regional 
contexts. Historically, cities were the natural 
regional centres, the motor force of regional 
economic development and the home to key 
regional political functions. This relationship is no 
longer wholly accurate. The model of a dominant 
city in a dependent region is more common in 
peripheral Europe where the city serves as the 
dominant centre for much manufacturing, public 
administration, the knowledge industries and 
other producer and consumer services. These cities 
4.8. Four types of economic relationships can be 
found between cities and their wider regions 
within the Community. In the first case economic 
development occurs and is evenly shared between 
the city and region. This presents no policy 
dilemma; the others do. In some cases the 
economic problems of the city at its centre 
restricts the economic development of the wider 
region. In others the city flourishes but the wider 
region fails to share in its prosperity and 
disparities between the two grow. Finally there are 
cases where the wider region develops 
economically but the city at the centre fails to 
share in that growth. Each of the three 
problematic relationships presents a challenge to 
the economic and social cohesion of the regions. 
They indicate that the economic linkages between 
cities and regions, as well as the linkages between 
policies of Member States and the Commission 
which impact upon cities and regions, should be 
better integrated. 
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The challenge of change in European 
cities 
5.1. One major challenge to cities is continuing 
high unemployment levels. They shadowed 
changes in national rates throughout the 1980s but 
typically at higher levels. In some cities the figure 
was twice the national average during the 1980s 
and considerably higher in the inner cities or in 
peripheral housing estates and amongst particular 
groups. The nature of unemployment varies 
between the old core, new core and peripheral 
cities. Unemployment problems are typically most 
severe in peripheral cities which are still adjusting 
to the consequences of rapid in-migration, 
historically high fertility rates and sluggish 
economic growth. Unemployment is a particularly 
severe problem for the large numbers of young 
people typically found in peripheral cities. 
5.2. Cities in Europe's old core regions have 
been primarily affected by the rapid decline of 
traditional manufacturing industries and the 
restructuring of those sectors which have become 
more capital intensive. Unemployment amongst 
ex-manufacturing employees and the young 
unskilled, who lack the skills needed in a modern 
economy, is a serious problem in such cities. In 
new core cities, there is high unemployment 
despite economic growth and frequently rapid 
growth in employment. In these cases 
unemployment is typically caused by a mismatch 
between the skills of the indigenous population 
and those required by skill-intensive industries 
which have moved into regions which lack a 
tradition of industrial activity. 
5.3. Over two-thirds of employees in most major 
European cities work in the service sector. 
Although many stable jobs in this sector require 
high levels of skills and provide high rewards, 
many are low skilled, insecure and low paid. This 
bifurcation of the labour market contributes to 
the economic marginalization of those trapped in 
the low skill sector. Even cities which have 
experienced economic growth during the 1980s 
face major challenges to develop adequate 
education and training policies to address this 
problem. 
5.4. In many cities labour market segregation is 
accompanied by spatial and physical segregation 
of economically marginal groups either in 
declining inner city areas or in peripheral housing 
estates. During the 1980s the difficulties of the 
former were often aggravated by the physical 
restructuring that accompanied the economic 
restructuring of many urban centres. The change 
in use of many city centres for new up-market 
commercial, cultural, retail and upper-income 
housing has displaced many original residents and 
economic activities. 
5.5. The condition and provision of social 
housing presents mounting problems in many 
cities in the Community. The problems are 
generated by a deterioration in the poorer private 
rental stock because of lack of investment, 
combined with declining levels of public support 
for social rented housing. The building rate of 
new social housing stock declined in many 
Member States in the 1980s, and in many cities 
refurbishment programmes have not met the 
needs of marginal groups. 
5.6. In old core cities, housing problems, 
primarily of standards or amenities, are 
particularly concentrated in inner cities and large 
fringe estates where tenants with the fewest 
housing options are concentrated. In peripheral 
cities the problems differ because of different 
patterns of urban development. There has been a 
lower level of State intervention in housing 
markets and a greater reliance upon the private 
sector. Combined with high in-migration and 
fertility rates this has frequently meant supply has 
been overwhelmed by demand. The result has 
been shortages, overcrowding, and high rental 
levels for inadequate housing. 
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5.7. The long post-war boom brought many 
migrants and ethnic minorities from the 
Community's peripheral regions and beyond to 
the labour markets of many of Europe's old core 
cities. Immigrants constitute 5% of the 
Community's population but up to 20% of that of 
many cities. Although immigration has slowed 
down considerably in recent years, the continuing 
process of family reunification combined with 
higher fertility rates means the numbers of ethnic 
groups living in many European cities are growing 
absolutely and relatively. Migration to the 
Community's cities from North Africa and 
Eastern Europe means the size of the ethnic 
population will grow in the future. 
5.8. Many migrants and ethnic minorities have 
not shared in the prosperity apparent in many 
cities. Racial discrimination in labour and housing 
markets means that many immigrants have been 
economically marginalized in the lower end of the 
bifurcated service sector economy, physically 
segregated in inner city or peripheral ghetto estates 
and denied the quality of basic collective services 
enjoyed by the indigenous population. The 
pattern especially in old core cities of lower 
educational achievement, fewer training 
opportunities, higher unemployment, fewer 
housing choices, and physical segregation of 
ethnic minority groups is leading to growing social 
polarization and unrest. These trends increasingly 
threaten the efficient functioning of cities and will 
restrict the contribution they make to balanced 
regional growth. 
5.9. The decentralization of employment and the 
suburbanization of population has led to fiscal 
stress in many European cities. As the more 
skilled and affluent have left many central cities 
for new employment or residential opportunities, 
more economically marginal and socially 
vulnerable groups, who are more dependent upon 
State services, have been left behind in the central 
cities. The ability of city governments to meet the 
growing service demands of their more dependent 
residents has been increasingly restricted. Cities 
relying on locally raised taxes, have been reluctant 
to tax their low income residents further or to risk 
eroding their fiscal base further by raising taxes 
which might encourage footloose local businesses 
to leave the city. 
5.10. The movement and increasing volume of 
traffic in cities creates a wide range of problems 
including congestion, pollution and degradation 
of the urban environment. Increasing car 
ownership and commuting, combined with 
declining investment by Member States in 
transport infrastructure, is worsening the 
problem. Underinvestment in public transport in 
many cities is disenfranchizing the poor and 
elderly and ghettoizing many residents of outer 
housing estates, which is compounded by the 
failure of many cities to plan transport provision 
on a strategic basis. Nevertheless, some cities have 
adopted innovative methods of addressing 
transport problems including pedestrianization, 
comprehensive public transport provision, 
additional taxation of vehicles, fuel and car 
parking policies, the provision of multimodal 
transport services, traffic calming measures and 
the encouragement of the transfer of goods from 
road to rail. 
5.11. Cities directly and indirectly are major 
environmental offenders. They consume most of 
the world's dwindling supply of non-renewable 
energy sources, are the major sources of 
carbon-dioxide emission and frequently 
externalize the costs of their environmental 
problems by exporting them to neighbouring 
communities. During the past two decades the 
emission levels of many traditional air pollutants 
have declined because of tighter regulatory 
mechanisms, the shift from oil to gas and cleaner 
industrial production methods in many northern 
cities. The position in southern cities is less 
advanced. However, the improvements have not 
been matched in the case of N02. These levels 
have worsened since the late 1970s because of 
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increased automobile usage. Many cities continue 
to be polluted because industries have failed to 
conserve energy or use it efficiently. Equally few 
cities have addressed the other side of the equation 
— energy generation. 
Strategic responses to change in 
European cities 
6.1. Although cities face continuing economic, 
social and environmental challenges, they also 
have substantial assets which many have exploited 
to respond successfully to those challenges. 
During the 1980s there emerged in many cities 
entrepreneurial urban decision-makers who 
responded innovatively to their economic 
problems. The process was encouraged by the 
limitations of national governments' regional 
policies, the decentralization of new powers and 
responsibilities to cities and the threat of increased 
competition between cities after the creation of the 
single market. 
6.2. The city leaders who generated successful 
economic redevelopment strategies in many cases 
also created innovative institutional initiatives — 
principally public — private partnership 
mechanisms — to achieve local consensus in 
favour of their implementation. In cities in the old 
core, new core and periphery of the Community 
there have been successful efforts to address the 
problems created by economic restructuring by 
implementing new economic development 
strategies. The strategies varied but a common 
feature was the attempt to modernize and 
diversify a city's base economy. 
6.3. The experience of a variety of cities 
illustrates these general points. In old core cities, 
the accent has been on restructuring older 
economic sectors and diversifying into new ones. 
Cities' experience, although different in detail, 
exemplifies several important points about the old 
core of Europe: 
(i) Those cities do have the economic and social 
resources to respond to problems by 
restructuring and diversifying their economic 
base. 
(ii) Their capacity to recover from the economic 
crisis of the 1980s has reasserted the 
traditional regional balance of power in 
Europe. The economic dominance of 
northern Europe continues despite the 
economic success of cities in the new core or 
periphery of Europe. 
(iii) Strategic choices by public and private 
leadership groups can shape the economic 
trajectory of cities and partnerships between 
them are an important factor in 
regeneration. 
(iv) The successful restructuring of urban 
economies does not guarantee that all groups 
in the city equally share the benefits. 
6.4. The pattern of economic growth in cities in 
the new core of Europe is different from the 
pattern of economic regeneration in old core 
cities, which is based on the modernization of 
traditional industries and the renewal of outdated 
physical infrastructure. New core cities in 
northern Italy, southern Germany and south-east 
France have substantial assets — freedom from 
industrial dereliction, expanding higher education 
institutions and qualified personnel, attractive 
locations and environment — which has made 
them amongst the most dynamic parts of Europe 
during the 1980s. Even though some cities in the 
north have recovered economically during the 
same period, the new core is an extraordinarily 
successful area with many dynamic cities and 
entrepreneurial leaders who have aggressively 
exploited their urban assets with sophisticated 
economic development strategies. 
6.5. The cities in the periphery of Europe suffer 
different economic, social and physical problems 
from those in the old or new core. Located in 
Greece, southern Italy, Spain, Portugal, western 
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France and Ireland they are often characterized by 
inadequate infrastructure, limited inward 
investment and dependence on technologically 
underdeveloped industries. Their regions lag 
considerably behind those of the European core 
and the cities face intractable problems caused by 
late urbanization — inadequate housing, 
education, transport, social services, planning and 
physical infrastructure. But during the past decade 
many cities in the periphery have begun to address 
successfully the problems of peripherality. 
Peripherality remains a major constraint on both 
economic development and social balance. 
Nevertheless, the success of cities like Seville, 
Valencia, Oporto or Bari underlines the dynamism 
found in many peripheral cities and regions. Such 
cities, by adopting innovative development 
strategies, have been able to limit the impact of 
structural constraints and are a guide to potential 
changes during the 1990s. 
6.6. Economic growth has been achieved during 
the later part of the 1980s by cities in all areas of 
the Community. Nevertheless there are others in 
the old core, new core and periphery of Europe 
which have yet to achieve that success. In this 
study, Liverpool, Marseilles and Naples are 
examples of cities in which administrative 
fragmentation, political instability and lack of 
public - private consensus have inhibited the 
formation of forward-looking development 
strategies. Such cities still struggle to overcome the 
difficulties of outdated infrastructure and 
technology, underqualified labour forces, poor 
communications or locational disadvantages and 
remain a challenge to the economic and social 
cohesion of the Community. 
6.7. The cities with the greatest economic 
potential in the 1990s will be those which possess a 
diverse economic base, qualified human capital, 
strong local linkages with knowledge-based 
institutions, a high quality of life, modern 
telecommunications and transport links and the 
institutional capacity to develop and implement 
future-oriented economic development strategies. 
6.8. Concerns have surfaced in some cities which 
have promoted economic development vigorously 
in the last decade about the social effects of 
development and the exclusion of some social 
groups from the benefits of growth. In many cities 
there are signs of a reorientation of strategies in 
an attempt to link economic benefits to social 
needs. 
National strategies for cities 
7.1. Since explicit urban strategies were 
introduced to counteract urban decline, the most 
comprehensive national urban policies are found 
in those countries in the old core of Europe which 
industrialized and urbanized first and whose cities 
declined first. Hence, Britain, France and 
Germany were the first to develop extensive — if 
sometimes modestly funded — national urban 
policies and programmes. Italy and the 
Netherlands have national urban strategies but 
they have been more narrowly defined. In 
Portugal, Spain, Greece, Belgium, Ireland, 
Luxembourg and Denmark there is little explicit 
urban policy. Nevertheless, there is a perceptible 
trend in the Community towards policies targeted 
specifically at urban areas. 
7.2. Despite the diversity of intergovernmental 
relations throughout Europe, common trends 
have emerged in recent years. There has been a 
trend towards the decentralization of powers and 
responsibilities. A decentralized system of 
government, with strong regional tiers has been 
either developed or consolidated in Germany, 
France, Spain, Italy and Belgium. In the 
Netherlands and Denmark, the counterbalance to 
central government has remained at the urban 
rather than the regional level. However, in 
Britain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece the 
tendency towards decentralization was much less 
marked. Indeed, in Britain, city governments lost 
powers and responsibilities during the 1980s. 
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7.3. Regional policies and national planning 
strategies have an important impact upon national 
urban systems. In most European countries a 
consistent policy pattern can be seen. National 
planning strategies, often supported by regional 
policies, were biased against the economically 
successful major cities in favour of peripheral 
urban and rural areas throughout the 1960s and 
early 1970s. Economic and physical growth in 
capital cities especially was restricted to encourage 
decentralization. But during the economic crisis 
after the mid-1970s balanced growth became a 
lower priority. In most Member States, 
encouraging the growth of a limited number of 
cities in an effort to revitalize the national 
economy was given priority over the goal of 
regional balance. In particular, growth in the 
capital cities was encouraged. 
7.4. The emergence of national urban policies 
reflects a growing recognition of the problems 
faced by many cities. However, explicit national 
urban policies remain in their infancy and limited 
in scope and resources. National policies for 
housing, transport, education and training, as well 
as macroeconomic management, still exert a 
greater influence on cities. Whatever form 
national urban policies take in the 1990s, they will 
be most effective where working partnerships 
between central and local government, the private 
sector and local communities are created. 
Community policies and urban 
Europe 
8.1. The extent to which cities have made use of 
EC policies and programmes varies. It is affected 
by such factors as the presence of well developed 
internationalization strategies, cooperation 
between national and local government, dynamic 
public sector leaders, units of specialist staff, 
strategic awareness of 'playing in Europe', a 
private sector prepared to engage in transnational 
cooperation agreements and also linkages with the 
Commission's administration in Brussels. 
8.2. Despite the impact of Community 
programmes a number of issues emerge about 
priorities, funding and organization. For example, 
the targeting of regions, as opposed to cities, 
creates inconsistencies and anomalies. Cities 
which are in targeted regions — especially 
Objective 1 regions which obtain up to 80% of 
regional funds — can benefit from Community 
intervention. However many cities in the old core 
which lie outside Objective 2 areas, but experience 
substantial problems, do not benefit. Equally a 
number of problems that are experienced even in 
eligible cities are not covered in the Community 
support framework. 
8.3. In recent years the Commission has been 
reorienting its priorities from physical 
infrastructure towards programmes which 
contribute more obviously to the development of 
regional economic infrastructure. The importance 
of that trend is confirmed by the experience of 
many cities. Infrastructure projects which have 
dominated especially in the periphery have in 
many cases been necessary but suffer from a 
variety of disadvantages. Undue emphasis on 
infrastructural development can widen existing 
social and spatial disparities. Failing to build up 
productive capacity throughout a region is likely 
to bias future growth to already relatively 
successful areas. 
8.4. Current Community policies which 
primarily have a regional focus are less able to 
address systematically the interrelated issues which 
are central to urban economic competitiveness and 
to the quality of life within urban areas. The 
fragmentation of administrative responsibility 
within the Commission for the variety of 
programmes which impact upon cities discourages 
them from pursuing coordinated strategies which 
integrate social, economic, environmental and 
cultural initiatives. 
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Urban challenges towards 2000 — 
Implications for spatial policy in 
Europe 
9.1. A key process taking place in Europe is 
increasing competition between and within cities. 
At a European-wide level, increasing the 
competitiveness of cities is an important way of 
strengthening the European economy. National 
decision-makers increasingly recognize the 
economic significance of cities for national 
economic competitiveness. City decision-makers 
focus on gaining comparative economic advantage 
over their competitors at regional, national and 
international level. 
9.2. Many cities have sought economic growth 
as a solution for social and environmental 
problems. However, growth strategies have not 
only failed to achieve this in many cities, but in 
some cases they have deepened the social and 
environmental problems. A new social and 
environmental agenda is emerging in many cities 
in the light of growing evidence of the uneven 
distribution of economic and social benefits, the 
deterioration of the social housing stock, 
industrial and domestic pollution of the 
environment and the declining efficiency of 
transport infrastructures. The central challenge 
facing European urban decision-makers in the 
1990s will be to reconcile the process of increasing 
competition and the pursuit of economic growth 
with wider social and environmental goals. The 
risk is that short-term economic success may 
destroy the attraction of living and working in 
cities and create long-term economic 
vulnerability. 
9.3. These trends will present increasing 
challenges to national, regional and local 
governments, as well as to the Commission, 
during the 1990s. How each level will respond will 
primarily be determined within Member States. 
Even though many of the problems are found 
throughout Europe, it cannot be assumed that the 
Commission could, or should, accept 
responsibility for addressing them. The principle 
of subsidiarity means that national and city 
governments in the Member States will continue to 
play the major role, and the Commission a more 
limited role, in responding to urban problems. 
9.4. Nevertheless, to achieve its goal of increased 
regional cohesion the Commission could develop 
the urban dimension of its current regional 
policies by addressing the dysfunction this study 
found in the relations between regions and cities. 
The Community's regional policy has not 
addressed some of the intractable problems of 
economic and social marginalization and 
deteriorating environments which prevent some 
urban areas playing a major role in the economic 
development of the regions. Article 10 projects 
have developed some creative, albeit limited, 
actions by increasing economic opportunities in 
housing estates with high unemployment, 
improving the urban environment and 
encouraging the restoration of historic city 
centres. These kinds of actions could be developed 
as an adjunct to those traditionally supported by 
the regional fund. This would require adjustment 
in future priorities unless extra resources were 
made available. 
9.5. The spatial level at which policy operates is 
vital. This study has identified three spatial levels 
where problems of development can be found: 
European-wide, regional and urban level. In the 
first case, there are substantial differences in the 
economic and social performance of different 
cities within the Community with major 
inequalities between them. Equally, there are 
problems in the relations between cities and their 
surrounding regions and the growing social and 
economic disparities between many of them. 
Within cities there are also substantial economic, 
social and physical inequalities between different 
social, occupational and ethnic groups. 
Governments in the Member States already 
intervene at these three levels. 
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9.6. Such issues are already important within the 
Commission's regional policy. For example, the 
eligibility criteria used to determine which regions 
qualify for Commission programmes are 
consistent with the aim of reducing interregional 
imbalances. But they mean that urban areas which 
experience similar problems are treated differently 
because of their geographical location. The 
current eligible areas exclude a number of cities 
which have experienced substantial decline in their 
port-related or heavy manufacturing sectors and 
have suffered a variety of economic, social and 
environmental problems. 
9.7. An increased urban dimension for regional 
policy would present data demands and 
difficulties. There is enormous variation between 
and within Member States in their definition of 
urban areas, the type and volume of data which is 
routinely kept on these areas and the frequency 
with which it is gathered. The data which is 
available often measures different things and is 
out of date. As a result, it is extremely difficult to 
assemble reliable, comparative data about cities, 
or groups and areas within them, which measure 
change over time. Substantial efforts are required 
to improve the European urban database to allow 
policy-makers to understand and respond to 
change. 
9.8. The range and variety of urban problems 
and issues faced in the Community is large and 
complex. Primary responsibility for responding to 
many of them will inevitably remain with 
national, regional and local governments in 
Member States. However, the Commission's goal 
of increasing the economic and social cohesion of 
the regions could lead it to a greater concentration 
on urban problems and opportunities which 
shape, and are shaped by, the economic and social 
performance of the regions. The fates of cities and 
regions are inextricably interconnected. The wider 
search for a more economically dynamic and 
socially balanced Community suggests that 
support for cities should become a greater priority 
for, and make a greater claim on the resources of, 
the European Community. 
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Résumé 
1. Introduction 
1.1. La première partie étudie les modèles de 
restructuration économique qui ont été réalisés en 
Europe au cours des trois dernières décennies et 
évalue leurs implications dans l'espace. Elle envi-
sage le possible développement en Europe d'une 
hiérarchie urbaine unique, mais rejette cette idée 
au profit d'un modèle de hiérarchies imbriquées 
émergeant dans trois vastes zones de la Commu-
nauté européenne : l'«ancien pôle», le «nouveau 
pôle» et la «périphérie». Elle évalue l'impact 
possible de la concurrence ou de la collaboration 
croissantes sur l'avenir économique de différents 
types de villes de la Communauté. Elle distingue 
les modèles d'évolution inter- ou intraregionale de 
la croissance urbaine et les modèles d'urbanisa-
tion, de développement suburbain, de désurbani-
sation et de réurbanisation. Elle décrit le processus 
de convergence, en cours dans la Communauté, 
comme étant la tendance principale de villes des 
régions périphériques, tendance qui s'apparente de 
plus en plus à celle que l'on constate dans les villes 
situées dans des zones d'urbanisation ancienne ou 
nouvelle. Cette première partie laisse supposer que 
le système urbain est actuellement plus stable, du 
point de vue démographique, qu'il ne l'était entre 
les années 50 et 80, mais qu'il reste vulnérable aux 
sources internes et externes de changement écono-
mique et social. Cette partie décrit l'apparition, à 
l'échelle de la Communauté, d'une série de défis 
dans le domaine des transports et des communica-
tions, défis qui menacent le bon fonctionnement 
des villes. Elle évalue le rôle des séries de réseaux 
qui se développent entre les villes européennes. 
Elle reconnaît les difficultés et les opportunités 
auxquelles sont confrontées les villes frontières, 
les villes de pénétration et les petites villes de la 
Communauté ainsi que le rôle des villes dans leur 
contexte régional plus large. 
1.2. La deuxième partie révèle l'existence d'un 
modèle de développement inégal entre certaines 
villes de la Communauté et à l'intérieur de cel-
les-ci. Elle constate une prospérité croissante dans 
de nombreuses villes, à la fois dans l'«ancien 
pôle» et le «nouveau pôle» ainsi qu'à la «périphé-
rie» de la Communauté, mais également une mar-
ginalisation économique et une ségrégation spa-
tiale de groupes sociaux donnés, en particulier des 
immigrants et des minorités ethniques, dans le 
cadre des marchés urbains du travail et du loge-
ment. Elle reconnaît également des tendances clés 
en matière de transport urbain et d'environne-
ment. Cette deuxième partie décrit l'émergence de 
villes plus actives en matière d'entreprises, qui, en 
réponse aux changements économiques, ont déve-
loppé avec succès des stratégies et des mécanismes 
institutionnels pour les mettre en application. Sur 
la base de leur expérience, ce volet de l'étude 
examine les facteurs sous-jacents d'un potentiel 
économique urbain futur et les choix que les villes 
pourraient être amenées à faire, au cours des 
années 90, entre croissance et équité. 
1.3. La troisième partie reconnaît les politiques 
élaborées en réponse au changement urbain aux 
niveaux national et européen. Elle décrit l'émer-
gence progressive de stratégies urbaines nationales 
explicites au sein des États membres, puisque ceux 
qui se sont urbanisés plus tard commencent à 
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imiter les réponses des États confrontés avant eux 
à ces problèmes urbains. Elle identifie la gamme 
des politiques communautaires européennes 
affectant directement ou indirectement les villes, 
reconnaît les facteurs ayant encouragé l'adoption, 
réussie par plusieurs villes, de certaines politiques 
ainsi que leur impact et reprend toute une série de 
problèmes en matière d'organisation et de finance-
ment auxquels la Commission peut avoir affaire 
lors de la conception de ses politiques futures. 
Enfin, elle identifie les défis que les décideurs 
devront encore relever à propos des villes à l'ap-
proche de l'an 2000. 
2. L'impact des changements 
économiques sur le système 
urbain européen 
2.1. Une globalisation économique rapide au 
cours des trente dernières années a débouché sur 
l'interdépendance de certaines villes tant au niveau 
européen qu'aux niveaux national et régional. Ce 
processus avait demandé de nombreux efforts 
pour arriver à une hiérarchie unique ou à un 
tableau relationnel de villes permettant de les 
classer dans leur contexte européen. Ce rapport 
considère qu'il n'existe pas de hiérarchie euro-
péenne permettant de situer les villes les unes par 
rapport aux autres. Au contraire, on constate 
l'existence d'une série de hiérarchies qui, se recou-
vrant partiellement, sont déterminées par le rôle 
économique et la fonction que les villes assurent, 
(par exemple: industrie, services, transports et 
distribution, haute technologie, administration 
publique, culture, loisirs et tourisme) ainsi que la 
sphère d'influence — internationale, nationale, 
régionale ou locale — dans laquelle elles opèrent. 
2.2. Dans le processus de globalisation économi-
que et de restructuration qui s'est poursuivi au 
cours des dernières décennies, des zones urbaines 
dont les économies sont basées sur des secteurs 
d'industries lourdes plus anciennes ainsi que des 
secteurs portuaires ont connu la plus mauvaise 
évolution. Les zones urbaines dont les économies 
sont basées sur la manufacture, qui nécessite une 
recherche et un développement intensifs, ou, éven-
tuellement, des techniques d'assemblage avancés, 
et sur des industries approvisionnant des marchés 
de consommation spécialisés à haute technicité ont 
connu un meilleur sort. Les taux de croissance les 
plus élevés se sont produits dans le secteur des 
services — le principal employeur urbain —, en 
particulier dans le domaine financier et des servi-
ces apparentés, suivi de près par les services au 
consommateur. 
2.3. Ces processus de changement sectoriel au 
niveau des économies tant internationales que 
nationales ont eu un impact substantiel dans les 
villes de la Communauté européenne en créant une 
polarisation marquée du marché du travail. Les 
emplois, techniquement et professionnellement 
avancés, tant dans le secteur des fabrications que 
dans celui des services, sont principalement occu-
pés par des hommes de la classe moyenne. Les 
emplois les moins qualifiés et les moins stables, 
souvent temporaires ou à temps partiel, principa-
lement dans des services de niveau inférieur, sont 
massivement occupés par des femmes et des mino-
rités ethniques. 
2.4. Les changements économiques ont eu un 
impact significatif sur les relations entre les villes 
d'Europe. Cependant, leur effet sur la distinction 
traditionnelle faite entre les villes du noyau écono-
mique et celles de la périphérie de l'Europe a été 
paradoxal. Les changements survenus ont, à la 
fois, partiellement confirmé et mis en cause cette 
distinction traditionnelle. Vers la fin des années 70 
et au début des années 80, on a assisté à un 
glissement du centre de gravité de l'économie 
européenne vers le Sud, alors que des villes-
régions dans les anciens pôles industrialisés du 
nord de l'Europe allaient traverser une période 
pénible de restructuration et de chômage crois-
sants, les zones du sud de la France, du sud de 
l'Allemagne, du nord-est de l'Italie et du nord-est 
de l'Espagne connaissant une croissance économi-
que et démographique. 
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2.5. Après le bouleversement économique géné-
ralisé du milieu des années 80, cependant, le 
modèle changea une fois de plus. De nombreuses 
zones métropolitaines anciennes du Nord — mais 
pas toutes — ont connu un relèvement économi-
que significatif. Au cours de ces dernières années, 
deux processus se sont déroulés concurremment. 
D'une part, on a assisté à une certaine décentrali-
sation dans quelques secteurs économiques, à par-
tir des anciennes zones métropolitaines, tels que 
l'industrie de haute technicité et des fonctions de 
logistique administrative; d'autre part, on a égale-
ment assisté à un processus de reconcentration, 
dans les anciens pôles et leur périphérie, d'autres 
secteurs tels que les services commerciaux de haut 
niveau, la distribution internationale, les indus-
tries des arts de prestige et de la culture. 
2.6. Bien que les frontières entre celles-ci ne 
soient pas imperméables, on peut distinguer de 
vastes zones économiques au sein de la Commu-
nauté européenne: l'ancien pôle couvrant les zones 
industrialisées, les plus anciennes du Royaume-
Uni, du nord de la Belgique et de l'est de la 
France, du Luxembourg, des Pays-Bas, du nord 
de l'Allemagne et du Danemark; le nouveau pôle, 
qui comprend le sud de l'Allemagne, le nord de 
l'Italie, le sud-est de la France, le centre et l'est de 
l'Espagne, ainsi que la périphérie, qui comprend 
la Grèce, le sud de l'Italie, le reste de l'Espagne, le 
Portugal, l'ouest de la France et l'Irlande. Le 
nouveau pôle industriel européen n'a pas remplacé 
l'ancien. Au contraire, les deux zones qui présen-
tent des caractéristiques économiques, sociales et 
environnementales assez différentes se combinent 
plutôt pour former un centre industriel européen 
élargi. 
2.7. Le succès économique des villes situées dans 
ces trois zones diffère sensiblement. Un nombre 
considérable d'anciens centres métropolitains 
continuent à attirer les financiers internationaux, 
les sièges sociaux de sociétés, les services de pro-
duction, la recherche et le développement, les 
industries des arts et de la culture ainsi qu'une 
administration publique de haut niveau. Par 
contre, les banlieues les plus récentes des anciens 
pôles urbains ainsi que de nombreuses villes iso-
lées, plus petites, ont développé, au cours des deux 
dernières décennies, des concentrations importan-
tes d'industries de haute technologie, de distribu-
tion moderne et de production de services. Ces 
zones possèdent un mélange d'avantages qui les 
rendent plus attrayantes pour l'industrie moderne, 
par exemple de meilleures infrastructures de com-
munication, un environnement plus propre, des 
terrains et des logements moins chers, une facilité 
d'accès aux institutions techniques et de recher-
che, une main-d'œuvre qualifiée et la proximité de 
lieux de loisirs. 
2.8. De nombreuses zones urbaines des régions 
périphériques — à quelques importantes excep-
tions près — présentent des faiblesses structurelles 
et se caractérisent par une infrastructure défi-
ciente, des investissements internes limités — sou-
vent sous la forme d'usines filiales — et des firmes 
locales plus petites et techniquement peu dévelop-
pées. Néanmoins, l'étude fournit des exemples 
importants de villes périphériques mettant au 
point des stratégies pour tenter de surmonter ces 
contraintes structurelles. 
2.9. Cette large distinction économique entre 
pôles anciens, pôles nouveaux et périphérie en 
Europe ne disparaîtra vraisemblablement pas d'ici 
à l'an 2000. Une grande inégalité subsiste entre les 
pôles métropolitains d'Europe et les économies de 
zones urbaines périphériques qui peuvent être les 
plus durement touchées par la concurrence crois-
sante née du marché unique européen. L'amélio-
ration et l'extension de l'infrastructure de trans-
port et de télécommunications en Europe, qui crée 
une plus grande liberté de choix d'implantation, 
peuvent donner de meilleures perspectives écono-
miques aux régions périphériques. 
2.10. Le changement le plus important que 
puisse connaître le système urbain d'ici à l'an 2000 
et au-delà dépendra du développement d'écono-
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mies de marché en Europe centrale et en Europe 
de l'Est. L'accession possible de pays de l'ex-
Comecon à la qualité de membre de la Commu-
nauté européenne aura un impact important sur le 
système urbain européen et pourrait finalement 
générer une intense pression sur les fonds structu-
rels de la Communauté européenne. Sans tenir 
compte de l'extension de la qualité de membre de 
la Communauté, les zones périphériques de la 
Communauté des Douze, avec leurs économies de 
bas salaires et de faible valeur ajoutée, devront 
faire face à la concurrence venant de la nouvelle 
périphérie de l'Est. 
2.11. Les perdants à court terme de la démocra-
tisation de l'Est et les «dividendes de la paix» 
seront vraisemblablement des villes de garnison et 
celles qui dépendent fortement des contrats mili-
taires dans le domaine de la recherche et du 
développement. Les gagnants à court terme, si 
l'adaptation à l'économie de «marché» se fait sans 
heurts, seront des villes allemandes et d'autres qui 
entretenaient avec l'Est des relations commerciales 
historiques, mais ces mêmes villes vont souffrir si 
l'adaptation est lente. Cependant, le modèle du 
système urbain européen dans son ensemble et en 
Allemagne en particulier subira, de manière sensi-
ble, l'impact de la décision de transférer le gouver-
nement fédéral de Bonn à Berlin. Ce transfert fera 
glisser le centre de gravité économique vers l'Est et 
entraînera des conséquences très importantes pour 
l'avenir économique d'autres villes du système 
urbain allemand actuellement décentralisé, en par-
ticulier si Berlin rejoint Londres et Paris en tant 
que troisième ville mondiale de l'Europe. 
3. Modèles d'urbanisation en Europe: 
1960-1990 
3.1. Il apparaît que le système urbain à l'échelle 
européenne se stabilise au fur et à mesure que 
les facteurs qui avaient changé si rapidement l'Eu-
rope durant l'après-guerre — le glissement d'une 
économie basée sur l'industrie vers une économie 
fondée sur les services, de très importants flux 
migratoires et démographiques — semblent ralen-
tir. Le déclin du taux de fécondité dans certaines 
régions périphériques conduit à une convergence 
des taux d'augmentation naturelle de la popula-
tion en Europe occidentale. Dans le même temps, 
la migration intraregionale rurale vers les villes est 
fortement réduite. Le large mouvement interrégio-
nal des années 60 et 70 s'est ralenti de façon 
significative. Cependant, l'économie du secteur 
tertiaire est elle-même vulnérable à une restructu-
ration interne qui aurait un impact très important 
sur la distribution spatiale de la prospérité écono-
mique. De même, des causes d'instabilité venues 
de l'extérieur demeurent. Tandis que l'importance 
de ce flux est imprévisible, il est probable qu'il y 
aura une demande toujours plus forte de la part 
d'immigrants économiques potentiels pour entrer 
dans la Communauté et dans ses villes, immi-
grants provenant des pays d'Afrique du Nord, de 
l'Europe de l'Est et de l'ex-Union soviétique. Ces 
tendances auront un impact substantiel sur les 
villes frontières et de pénétration, qui servent de 
porte d'entrée à ces immigrants. 
3.2. L'Europe s'est de plus en plus urbanisée au 
cours des 45 dernières années. En 1981, plus des 
deux tiers des Européens de l'Ouest vivaient dans 
des zones urbaines de plus de 300 000 habitants. 
Bien que certaines villes aient connu, à différentes 
époques, des périodes de croissance et de déclin, 
un cycle de changement urbain peut être identifié: 
urbanisation, extension suburbaine, désurbanisa-
tion et réurbanisation. Au cours de la phase 
d'urbanisation, les villes de localisation centrale se 
sont agrandies. Lors de la phase d'extension 
suburbaine, les villes de localisation centrale ont 
décliné, mais l'extension de leurs banlieues signifie 
que leur population urbaine totale a continué à 
croître. Lors de la phase de désurbanisation; toute 
la zone urbaine a perdu une partie de sa popula-
tion. Cependant, durant la phase de réurbani-
sation, les chiffres de population de quelques 
grandes zones métropolitaines ont recommencé à 
monter. 
3.3. Les années 50 ont été une période de crois-
sance urbaine. On assistait, en Europe, à un vaste 
mouvement de population des zones rurales vers 
les zones urbaines, en particulier vers les villes les 
plus importantes. Vers la fin des années 60, cette 
phase d'urbanisation avait cessé dans de nom-
breux pays, mais elle se poursuivait en Espagne, 
au Portugal, en Grèce et en Irlande. Le développe-
ment suburbain et la désurbanisation ont été les 
tendances des années 70 dans les États membres 
du nord de l'Europe, étant donné que des villes 
importantes, en particulier leur centre, se dépeu-
plaient et que des villes plus petites s'étendaient. 
Certaines villes des pays périphériques ont de plus 
en plus suivi cette tendance. En dépit d'un impor-
tant retard dans le déroulement du processus, les 
zones sud et nord de l'Europe ne se retrouvent pas 
seulement en termes de taux de fécondité, elles 
commencent à le faire également en matière de 
développement urbain. 
3.5. Au cours des années 80, une nouvelle ten-
dance, la réurbanisation, se faisait jour en Eu-
rope. Cette évolution comportait deux éléments. 
Dans le premier, le taux de croissance des petites 
villes s'est ralenti. Le second changement concer-
nait les performances des grandes villes. Dans de 
nombreux pays, des grandes villes qui avaient 
constamment décliné au cours des années 60 et 70 
ont recommencé à croître. La tendance était parti-
culièrement évidente dans la seconde moitié des 
années 80, puisque de nombreuses villes qui 
avaient perdu une partie de leur population au 
début de la décennie se retrouvaient en expansion. 
La réurbanisation reflétait une série de tendances 
sous-jacentes, en particulier la restructuration éco-
nomique des villes centrales en même temps que 
les investissements privés faits dans le but de 
rendre les villes centrales plus attrayantes, d'en 
faire des endroits où l'on puisse à la fois vivre et 
travailler. 
3.4. Au cours des trois dernières décennies, le 
système urbain européen est devenu plus équilibré 
et a été moins dominé par les villes les plus 
grandes; en outre, ses villes de moyenne et de 
petite dimension se sont développées. Entrç 1960 
et 1990, dans tous les États membres, les villes de 
moyenne et de petite dimension, peuplées de 
moins de 250 000 habitants, ont grandi considéra-
blement, et les villes les plus grandes ont soit 
perdu une partie de leur population, soit vu leur 
taux de croissance se ralentir. La croissance des 
petites villes a été particulièrement rapide dans les 
années 70. Même les pays périphériques, tradition-
nellement plus centralisés, comme l'Espagne, le 
Portugal, l'Irlande et la Grèce, ont connu cette 
évolution. Ces changements reflétaient la structure 
économique de l'Europe urbaine en mutation, 
puisque des activités économiques traditionnelles y 
déclinaient ou se déplaçaient, quittant les vastes 
pôles urbains pour se développer, avec de nouvel-
les industries, dans les banlieues et les villes de 
plus petite dimension, qui ne connaissaient pas 
encore les nombreux problèmes économiques, 
sociaux et environnementaux des grandes villes. 
3.6. La tendance à la réurbanisation confirme 
l'argument selon lequel les flux démographiques et 
migratoires reflètent les tendances économiques. 
Les villes dynamiques du point de vue économique 
situées dans le nouveau pôle et celles qui se 
développent rapidement dans la périphérie voient 
leur population augmenter. Des villes plus impor-
tantes de l'ancien pôle, qui ont connu un certain 
degré de renouveau économique au cours de la 
seconde partie des années 90, croissent également. 
Cependant, des villes, dans toutes les zones de la 
Communauté, qui rencontrent encore des problè-
mes de restructuration économique continuent à 
voir baisser leur population. 
3.7. Le processus de réurbanisation entraîne des 
coûts économiques ainsi que des gains économi-
ques pour les villes. Les résidents à revenu mo-
deste et les activités économiques à faible valeur 
ajoutée se voient relégués hors des centres-villes, 
coincés dans des zones moins attrayantes, dotées 
de moins de facilités de tous ordres. En dépit de 
ces problèmes, cette tendance perdurera dans de 
nombreuses villes. Au cours des années 90, le 
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système européen au sens le plus large restera plus 
équilibré qu'il ne l'était il y a vingt ans, étant 
donné que les gains des petites villes ne seront pas 
fondamentalement remis en cause. Pour simplifier 
un processus complexe, on pourrait dire que les 
années 50 et 60 ont été l'âge d'or des grandes 
villes. Les années 70 et le début des années 80 ont 
marqué l'épanouissement des petites villes. La fin 
des années 90 pourrait marquer le début de la 
renaissance démographique et économique de 
nombreuses grandes villes en Europe. 
4. Au-delà de la localisation: 
les villes et les problèmes 
transeuropéens 
4.1. Le développement de nouvelles infrastructu-
res soulève des réactions sensibles des points de 
vue environnemental, écologique et social. Les 
embouteillages routiers vont augmenter de façon 
dramatique, puisqu'on prévoit que les transports 
automobiles vont augmenter de 70 % en Europe 
du Nord, de 300 à 500 % dans le sud de l'Europe 
et de 1 000 % en Europe de l'Est pour l'an 2000. 
Cette augmentation du transport routier, dont la 
part dans la consommation d'énergie totale repré-
sentait 85 % de l'augmentation totale en Europe 
entre 1973 et 1985, endommagera considérable-
ment l'environnement des villes. 
4.2. La vitesse et la fiabilité des chemins de fer 
européens varient considérablement, en particulier 
entre le sud et le nord de l'Europe. Les villes 
périphériques sont toutes confrontées à des 
contraintes particulières et sont de plus en plus 
soucieuses du fait que les investissements récents 
en matière d'infrastructures de transport, comme 
les trains à grande vitesse (TGV), vont favoriser 
les villes de l'ancien et du nouveau pôle économi-
que de l'Europe. L'extension des TGV peut égale-
ment affecter des aéroports spécialisés dans les 
transports de fret à courte distance, détournant 
d'eux le trafic et le développement économique. 
En dépit du défi que représente le TGV, le trans-
port aérien poursuivra sa croissance, et on peut 
s'attendre à une augmentation annuelle de 3 à 5 % 
jusqu'en l'an 2000. Une pareille croissance est 
susceptible de renforcer la hiérarchie actuelle des 
aérodromes. 
4.3. Le futur système urbain européen subira de 
plus en plus l'influence de la dynamique de la 
concurrence économique. Une des réactions à ce 
fait est que de nombreux réseaux se sont formés 
entre les villes et les régions pour promouvoir la 
coopération entre elles et contenir l'intensité crois-
sante de la concurrence. Les réseaux opèrent à 
différents niveaux: européen, national, régional et 
transfrontière. Ils remplissent différentes fonc-
tions. D'une part, ils permettent des échanges de 
politiques et de bonnes pratiques. D'autre part, ils 
permettent de promouvoir le développement d'as-
sociations à risques partagés dans des domaines 
très variés — chômage et développement économi-
que, développement scientifique et technologique, 
tourisme, transport, logement. Ils font aussi pres-
sion pour obtenir des ressources publiques aux 
niveaux national et européen. La Commission 
européenne a agi comme catalyseur pour faciliter 
le développement de réseaux par ville et par 
région. Pour atteindre cet objectif en 1992, la 
Commission a lancé un programme nommé 
«Recite». 
4.4. L'avenir des petites agglomérations est 
important pour le développement de la Commu-
nauté européenne. Elles ont grandi rapidement 
jusque dans les années 80, encouragées par les 
déséconomies des villes plus grandes, par l'amélio-
ration des transports et des télécommunications et 
par les avantages qu'elles pouvaient offrir quant 
au mode de vie. Les perspectives d'avenir des 
petites agglomérations sont très variables. Un 
grand nombre d'entre elles ont une potentialité de 
croissance en raison de leur localisation stratégi-
que et de la meilleure qualité de vie qu'elles 
peuvent offrir par rapport aux villes plus impor-
tantes. Leur succès engendrera de nouvelles 
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demandes en matière d'infrastructures régionales, 
puisqu'une structure d'habitat plus dispersé ré-
clame une modernisation des structures de trans-
port et de télécommunication. 
4.5. D'autres petites villes peuvent être confron-
tées à des difficultés plus nombreuses. Certaines 
d'entre elles n'ont pas les moyens de contrer les 
effets de l'éloignement en périphérie, de la dépo-
pulation ou de la dépendance par rapport à des 
activités économiques en déclin. Cependant, les 
problèmes dus à la situation en périphérie peuvent 
être partiellement annulés par la création de 
réseaux aptes à favoriser la dissémination de la 
clientèle et à lier les perspectives économiques 
des plus petites agglomérations à celles des plus 
grandes. 
4.6. Les villes remplissent un grand nombre de 
fonctions dans leur contexte régional. Tout au 
long de l'histoire, les villes ont été les centres 
régionaux naturels, la force motrice du développe-
ment économique régional et le lieu d'ancrage des 
fonctions politiques régionales. Cette relation 
n'est plus entièrement exacte. Le modèle d'une 
ville dominante dans une région dépendante est 
plus commun à la périphérie de l'Europe, où la 
ville sert de centre dominant pour une grande 
partie de la production industrielle, de l'adminis-
tration publique, des industries du savoir-faire et 
d'autres entreprises de services aux producteurs et 
aux consommateurs. Ces villes règlent également 
les relations économiques, légales, culturelles et 
technologiques entre leur région et le monde exté-
rieur. 
4.7. Dans l'ancien pôle, ce modèle s'est désinté-
gré au cours des trois dernières décennies. Le 
pouvoir économique de la banlieue et des régions, 
capable de contrebalancer celui des centres-villes, 
signifie que ceux-ci dominent moins leur région 
que dans la périphérie de l'Europe. Ces liens plus 
complexes entre villes et régions conduisent géné-
ralement à des rivalités intraregionales, vu que les 
administrations n'arrivent pas à se mettre d'ac-
cord sur des politiques de développement régional. 
Les relations entre villes et régions dans une 
grande partie du nouveau pôle européen sont 
souvent plus intégrées que complémentaires. Le 
haut degré de spécialisation économique dans des 
zones plus petites et plus discrètes tendait à réduire 
la concurrence sectorielle intervilles et a également 
encouragé une croissance plus aisée des réseaux 
des secteurs publics et commerciaux. 
4.8. Il existe au sein de la Communauté quatre 
types de relations économiques entre les villes et 
leur région. Dans le premier cas, le développement 
économique a lieu et est partagé de façon égale 
entre la ville et la région. Cette situation ne 
présente aucun dilemme du point de vue politique, 
les autres cas si. Il arrive que les problèmes 
économiques de la ville en tant que centre de la 
région, plus large, restreignent le développement 
de celle-ci. Dans d'autres cas, la ville est floris-
sante, mais la région ne partage pas sa prospérité, 
et les disparités entre les deux vont croissant. 
Enfin, dans certaines situations, la région se déve-
loppe du point de vue économique, mais la ville 
qui en est le centre ne partage pas cette croissance. 
Chacune de ces trois relations problématiques 
présente un défi à la cohésion économique et 
sociale des régions. Elles indiquent que les liens 
économiques entre villes et régions ainsi que les 
liens entre les politiques des États membres et la 
Commission, qui ont un impact sur les villes et les 
régions, devraient être mieux intégrés. 
5. Le défi du changement 
dans les villes européennes 
5.1. L'un des défis majeurs est le haut niveau de 
chômage qui persiste dans certaines villes. Les 
chiffres ont suivi les changements des taux natio-
naux au long des années 80, mais à des niveaux 
plus élevés. Dans certaines villes, le chiffre était 
égal à deux fois celui de la moyenne nationale au 
cours des années 80 et considérablement plus élevé 
dans les villes de l'intérieur ou dans les cités 
I 
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périphériques ainsi qu'au sein de groupes particu-
liers. La nature du chômage varie selon qu'il s'agit 
de l'ancien ou du nouveau pôle ou de villes de la 
périphérie. Les problèmes de chômage sont typi-
quement plus sévères dans les villes de la périphé-
rie qui sont encore en train de s'ajuster aux 
conséquences de la rapide immigration, au taux 
historiquement élevé de la fécondité et à une 
croissance économique paresseuse. Le chômage 
est un problème particulièrement crucial pour un 
grand nombre de jeunes que l'on rencontre princi-
palement dans les cités périphériques. 
5.2. Les villes d'Europe situées dans les zones 
anciennes ont surtout été affectées par le rapide 
déclin des industries manufacturières traditionnel-
les et la restructuration de ces secteurs qui exigent 
de plus en plus de capitaux. Le chômage parmi le 
personnel des anciennes manufactures et les jeunes 
non qualifiés, qui n'ont pas le profil requis dans 
une économie moderne, constitue un sérieux pro-
blème pour ce genre de villes. Dans les villes du 
nouveau pôle, le chômage est élevé en dépit d'une 
certaine croissance économique et d'une crois-
sance souvent rapide de l'emploi. Dans ces cas, le 
chômage résulte surtout d'une inadéquation entre 
les qualifications des populations locales et celles 
que requiert une industrie de haute technicité qui 
s'est installée dans des régions où n'existait pas de 
tradition d'activité industrielle. 
5.3. Plus des deux tiers du personnel employé 
dans la plupart des villes européennes travaillent 
dans le secteur des services. Bien que dé nombreux 
emplois stables dans ce secteur requièrent un haut 
niveau de qualification et soient très valorisants, 
d'autres emplois y sont souvent à faible qualifica-
tion, précaires et sous-payés. Cette modification 
du marché de l'emploi contribue à la marginalisa-
tion économique de ceux qui se retrouvent pris 
dans le secteur à faible qualification. Même des 
villes qui ont connu une croissance économique au 
cours des années 80 sont confrontées à des défis 
majeurs pour développer des politiques d'éduca-
tion et de formation adéquates, afin de remédier à 
ce problème. 
5.4. Dans de nombreuses villes, la ségrégation 
du marché du travail s'accompagne d'une ségréga-
tion spatiale et physique de groupes économique-
ment marginaux, soit dans les centres-villes en 
déclin, soit dans les cités ou lotissements périphéri-
ques. Au cours des années 80, les difficultés des 
premières ont souvent été aggravées par la restruc-
turation physique qui accompagnait la restructu-
ration économique de nombreux centres urbains. 
Le changement d'affectation de nombreux cen-
tres-villes pour le marché en expansion du com-
merce de luxe, des infrastructures culturelles, du 
commerce de détail et des logements de «haut 
standing» a déplacé de nombreux résidents locaux 
et certaines activités économiques. 
5.5. L'état du logement et la construction de 
logements sociaux présentent des problèmes crois-
sants dans de nombreuses villes de la Communau-
té. Les problèmes sont engendrés par la détériora-
tion du parc des logements privés donnés en 
location à cause du manque d'investissements 
combiné au déclin de l'aide publique au logement 
social de location. Le taux de construction du 
nouveau parc de logements sociaux a diminué 
dans de nombreux États membres au cours des 
années 80 et, dans de nombreuses villes, des 
programmes de réhabilitation n'ont pas pu faire 
face aux besoins des groupes marginaux. 
5.6. Dans les villes de l'ancien pôle, les problè-
mes de logement consistent principalement en pro-
blèmes de normes ou d'agréments particulière-
ment sensibles dans les centres-villes et les grands 
ensembles de banlieues où sont concentrés les 
locataires possédant le moins de possibilités de 
choix en matière de logement. Dans les aggloméra-
tions de la périphérie européenne, le problème 
change à cause du modèle différent de développe-
ment urbain. L'État est intervenu dans une bien 
moindre mesure sur les marchés du logement et a 
laissé plus de liberté au secteur privé. La combi-
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naison d'un important flux d'immigration et de 
taux de fécondité plus élevés a fréquemment eu 
pour conséquence que l'offre a été submergée par 
la demande. Le résultat: trop peu de logements, 
surpopulation et des loyers élevés pour des loge­
ments inadéquats. 
5.7. Le long «boom» de l'après­guerre a amené 
de nombreux immigrants et des minorités ethni­
ques, en provenance des régions périphériques de 
la Communauté et au­delà, vers les marchés du 
travail de nombreuses villes de l'ancien pôle de 
l'Europe. Les immigrants constituent 5 % de la 
population de la Communauté, mais jusqu'à 
20 % de ceux­ci se concentrent dans de nombreu­
ses villes. Bien que l'immigration se soit ralentie 
considérablement au cours de ces dernières 
années, le processus continu de réunification fami­
liale combiné à des taux de fécondité supérieurs 
signifie que le nombre de groupes ethniques vivant 
dans de nombreuses villes européennes continue 
de croître de façon absolue et relative. Les migra­
tions vers les villes de la Communauté, provenant 
d'Afrique du Nord et de l'Europe de l'Est, signi­
fient que l'importance des populations d'origines 
ethniques différentes va croître encore à l'avenir. 
5.8. Beaucoup d'immigrants et de minorités eth­
niques n'ont pas partagé l'apparente prospérité 
qui règne dans de nombreuses villes. La discrimi­
nation raciale sur les marchés du travail et du 
logement signifie que de nombreux immigrants 
ont été marginalisés du point de vue économique 
dans la branche inférieure du secteur des services, 
physiquement séparés dans des ghettos situés soit 
au centre­ville, soit dans les grands ensembles de 
la périphérie, et se voient dénier l'accès aux servi­
ces collectifs élémentaires dont jouit la population 
locale. Le modèle qui prévaut en particulier dans 
des villes de l'ancien pôle urbanisé — résultats 
scolaires inférieurs, moins de possibilités de for­
mation, chômage plus élevé, moins de choix en 
matière de logement et ségrégation physique de 
groupes ethniques minoritaires — conduit à une 
polarisation et à un malaise social croissants. Ces 
tendances menacent toujours plus le fonctionne­
ment efficace des villes et finira par restreindre 
leur contribution à une croissance régionale équi­
librée. 
5.9. La décentralisation de l'emploi et la migra­
tion de la population vers la banlieue ont conduit, 
dans la plupart des villes européennes, à l'alour­
dissement de la fiscalité. Puisque les plus qualifiés 
et les plus aisés ont quitté le centre­ville pour de 
nouvelles opportunités d'emploi ou de résidence, 
ce sont des groupes marginalisés du point de vue 
économique, socialement vulnérables et plus 
dépendants de l'assistance de l'État qui sont res­
tés. L'aptitude des administrations urbaines à 
faire face à la demande croissante en matière 
d'assistance de la part de leurs résidents les plus 
dépendants a diminué de plus en plus. Les villes 
qui comptaient sur les taxes locales étaient peu 
désireuses de taxer davantage leurs résidents à 
faible revenus ou de risquer d'eroder encore plus 
leur base fiscale en levant des taxes qui pourraient 
encourager les commerces locaux à quitter la 
ville. 
5.10. Le mouvement et le volume sans cesse 
croissants de la circulation dans les villes créent 
une large série de nuisances, dont les embouteilla­
ges, la pollution et la dégradation de l'environne­
ment urbain. L'augmentation du nombre de véhi­
cules personnels et de ceux des navetteurs combi­
née à la réduction des investissements des États 
membres dans l'infrastructure de transport com­
pliquent encore le problème. Le sous­investisse­
ment dans les transports publics dans de nombreu­
ses villes cause la marginalisation des pauvres et 
des personnes âgées ainsi que la formation de 
ghettos pour de nombreux résidents des cités péri­
phériques, situation amenée par l'incapacité de 
nombreuses villes à établir des plans stratégiques 
de base concernant les transports. Néanmoins, 
quelques villes ont adopté des méthodes novatrices 
pour attaquer les problèmes de transport, y com­
pris la transformation de rues en voies piétonnes, 
la réalisation de moyens de transport publics glo­
35 
■ 
baux, la taxation supplémentaire sur les véhicules 
et le carburant, les politiques de parking, la réali-
sation de services de transport multiples coordon-
nés ainsi que des mesures visant à «calmer» la 
circulation et à encourager le transport des mar-
chandises par le rail plutôt que par la route. 
5.11. Directement et indirectement, les villes 
sont des sources majeures de nuisances pour l'en-
vironnement. Elles consomment la plus grande 
partie des ressources mondiales — en forte dimi-
nution — des sources d'énergie non renouvelables, 
soit des sources très importantes d'émission de gaz 
carbonique, et font fréquemment supporter à 
d'autres le coût de leur problèmes environnemen-
taux en les exportant vers les communautés voisi-
nes. Au cours des deux dernières décennies, le 
niveau d'émission de plusieurs polluants tradition-
nels de l'air a diminué, grâce à des mécanismes de 
régulation plus stricts, au passage, comme carbu-
rant, de certains produits pétroliers vers le gaz et 
aux méthodes de production industrielles, plus 
propres, appliquées dans beaucoup de villes du 
Nord. Dans les villes du Sud, la situation est 
moins avancée. Cependant, les améliorations 
n'ont pas été égalées dans le cas du N02; ces 
niveaux se détériorent depuis la fin des années 70 à 
cause de l'utilisation croissante de l'automobile. 
De nombreuses villes continuent à être polluées 
parce que des industries n'ont pas su conserver 
l'énergie ou l'utiliser efficacement. De même, peu 
de villes ont pris l'équation par l'autre bout: 
comment générer de l'énergie? 
6. Les stratégies 
de réponse au changement 
dans les villes européennes 
6.1. Bien que les villes soient sans cesse confron-
tées à des défis économiques, sociaux et environ-
nementaux, elles possèdent aussi des atouts subs-
tantiels que plusieurs d'entre elles ont exploités 
pour répondre avec succès à ces défis. Au cours 
des années 80, des «décideurs» d'entreprises 
urbaines ont répondu de manière novatrice à leurs 
problèmes économiques. Le processus a été encou-
ragé par les limitations imposées par les politiques 
régionales des gouvernements nationaux, par la 
décentralisation de nouveaux pouvoirs et respon-
sabilités données aux villes ainsi que par la menace 
d'une concurrence accrue entre elles après la créa-
tion du marché unique. 
6.2. Les dirigeants des villes qui ont créé avec 
succès des stratégies de redéveloppement économi-
que ont, dans de nombreux cas également, été à 
l'origine d'initiatives institutionnelles novatrices 
— principalement des mécanismes d'association 
entre les secteurs public et privé — pour atteindre 
un consensus local en faveur de leur mise en 
vigueur. Les villes de l'ancien pôle, du nouveau 
pôle et de la périphérie de la Communauté ont 
heureusement réussi dans leurs efforts pour 
contrer les problèmes créés par la restructuration 
économique par la mise en application de nouvel-
les stratégies de développement Les stratégies pou-
vaient varier, mais elles avaient un trait commun: 
une tentative de modernisation et de diversifica-
tion de l'économie de base de la ville. 
6.3. L'expérience d'une série de villes illustre ces 
points d'ensemble. Dans les villes de l'ancien pôle, 
l'accent a été mis sur la restructuration de secteurs 
économiques vieillis et leur diversification en nou-
veaux centres. L'expérience des villes, bien que 
différant dans les détails, peut servir d'exemple en 
ce qui concerne cet ancien noyau de l'Europe: 
1) ces villes possèdent en effet les ressources 
sociales et économiques leur permettant de 
réagir aux problèmes par la restructuration et 
la diversification de leur base économique; 
2) leur capacité de récupération après la crise 
économique des années 80 a réaffirmé l'équili-
bre régional du pouvoir en Europe. La domi-
nation économique de l'Europe du Nord conti-
nue, en dépit du succès économique de certai-
nes villes situées dans le nouveau pôle ou à la 
périphérie européenne; 
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3) les choix stratégiques faits par des groupes 
sous la direction des secteurs publics et privés 
peuvent imprimer un mouvement à la trajec-
toire des villes et à leurs associations entre 
elles, et ils sont un facteur important de régé-
nération; 
4) la restructuration réussie des économies urbai-
nes ne garantit pas que les groupes de la cité 
partageront les bénéfices de façon équitable. 
6.4. Le modèle de croissance économique des 
villes du nouveau pôle européen diffère du modèle 
de régénération économique des villes de l'ancien 
pôle urbain basé, lui, sur la modernisation des 
industries traditionnelles et la rénovation d'infras-
tructures vieillies. Les villes du nouveau pôle du 
nord de l'Italie, du sud de l'Allemagne et du 
sud-est de la France possèdent des atouts essentiels 
— elles ne sont pas encombrées de vestiges indus-
triels; elles ont des instituts d'instruction supé-
rieure en expansion, du personnel qualifié, une 
situation et un environnement attrayants — qui les 
ont classées parmi les régions les plus dynamiques 
de l'Europe au cours des années 80. Même si 
certaines villes du Nord ont récupéré leur potentiel 
économique durant cette même période, le nou-
veau pôle est une zone qui réussit extraordinaire-
ment bien, qui compte de nombreuses villes dyna-
miques et des chefs d'entreprises ayant exploité à 
fond leurs atouts urbains à l'aide de stratégies 
sophistiquées de développement économique. 
6.5. Les villes de la périphérie européenne souf-
frent de problèmes économiques, sociaux et physi-
ques différents de ceux des anciens ou des nou-
veaux pôles. Situées en Grèce, en Italie méridio-
nale, en Espagne, au Portugal, dans l'ouest de la 
France et en Irlande, elles se caractérisent par une 
infrastructure inadéquate et des investissements 
internes limités, et elles dépendent d'industries 
technologiquement peu développées. Les régions 
qui les abritent ont un retard considérable par 
rapport au pôle européen, et les villes sont 
confrontées à des problèmes insolubles nés d'une 
urbanisation tardive — infrastructures inadéqua-
tes de logement, d'éducation, de transport, de 
services sociaux, de planification, etc. Mais, au 
cours de la dernière décennie, de nombreuses villes 
de la périphérie ont commencé à s'attacher avec 
succès à résoudre les problèmes liés à leur localisa-
tion périphérique. Cette localisation en périphérie 
reste une contrainte majeure à la fois quant à leur 
développement économique et à leur équilibre 
social. Néanmoins, le succès de villes telles que 
Seville, Valence, Porto et Bari souligne le dyna-
misme que l'on peut trouver dans de nombreuses 
villes et régions périphériques. Ces villes, en adop-
tant des stratégies de développement novatrices, 
ont été en mesure de limiter l'impact des contrain-
tes structurelles et constituent un guide vers des 
changements potentiels au cours des années 90. 
6.6. La croissance économique a été réalisée, au 
cours de la seconde moitié des années 80, par des 
villes de toutes les zones de la Communauté. 
Cependant, il y a d'autres villes, dans l'ancien et le 
nouveau pôle ainsi que dans la périphérie de 
l'Europe, qui n'ont pas encore atteint ce résultat. 
Cette étude cite Liverpool, Marseille et Naples 
comme exemples de villes où la fragmentation 
administrative, l'instabilité politique et l'absence 
de consensus entre les secteurs publics et privés 
ont donné un coup d'arrêt à la formation de 
stratégies de développement tournées vers l'avenir. 
Ces villes continuent à lutter pour surmonter les 
écueils que constituent des infrastructures et des 
technologies vieillies, une main-d'œuvre sous-
qualifiée, de mauvaises communications ou une 
localisation défavorable; elles restent un défi à la 
cohésion économique et sociale de la Commu-
nauté. 
6.7. Les villes qui disposeront du potentiel éco-
nomique le plus important au cours des années 90 
seront celles qui posséderont une base économique 
diversifiée, un capital de main-d'œuvre qualifiée, 
des liens locaux étroits avec les institutions de 
recherche ou de formation, une haute qualité de 
vie, des télécommunications et des transports 
modernes ainsi que la capacité institutionnelle à 
37 
mettre en vigueur des stratégies de développement 
économique orientées vers l'avenir. 
6.8. Dans certaines villes, qui ont vigoureuse-
ment promu le développement économique au 
cours de la dernière décennie, des inquiétudes ont 
vu le jour en ce qui concerne les effets sociaux du 
développement et l'exclusion de certains groupes 
sociaux du bénéfice de la croissance. Dans de 
nombreuses villes, on perçoit des signes de réo-
rientation des stratégies en une tentative pour lier 
progrès économique et besoins sociaux. 
7. Les stratégies nationales 
et les villes 
7.1. Étant donné que des stratégies urbaines 
explicites ont été mises en place pour faire échec 
au déclin urbain, les politiques urbaines nationales 
les plus complètes se retrouvent dans les pays de 
l'ancien pôle de l'Europe qui ont été industrialisés 
et urbanisés les premiers et dont les villes ont, par 
conséquent, été les premières à connaître le déclin. 
Il s'ensuit que le Royaume-Uni, la France et 
l'Allemagne ont été les premiers à mettre au point 
des politiques et des programmes urbains natio-
naux étendus — même si leur financement était 
parfois modeste; l'Italie et les Pays-Bas ont des 
stratégies urbaines nationales, mais celles-ci ont 
été plus étroitement définies. Au Portugal, en 
Espagne, en Grèce, en Belgique, en Irlande, au 
Luxembourg et au Danemark, il n'y a guère de 
politiques urbaines explicites. Cependant, au sein 
de la Communauté, il existe une tendance percep-
tible vers la mise au point de politiques spéciale-
ment orientées vers les zones urbaines. 
7.2. En dépit de la diversité des relations inter-
gouvernementales à travers l'Europe, des tendan-
ces communes se sont fait jour ces dernières 
années. On a constaté une tendance à la décentra-
lisation des pouvoirs et des responsabilités. Un 
système de gouvernement décentralisé avec des 
niveaux régionaux puissants a été ou mis en place 
ou consolidé en Allemagne, en France, en Espa-
gne, en Italie et en Belgique. Aux Pays-Bas et au 
Danemark, le contrepoids du gouvernement cen-
tral est resté plus au niveau urbain qu'au niveau 
régional. Cependant, au Royaume-Uni, au Portu-
gal, en Irlande et en Grèce, la tendance à la 
décentralisation a été beaucoup moins marquée. 
En effet, au Royaume-Uni, les autorités municipa-
les ont perdu des pouvoirs et des responsabilités 
au cours des années 80. 
7.3. Les politiques régionales et les stratégies de 
planification nationales ont un impact important 
sur les systèmes urbains nationaux. Dans la plu-
part des pays européens, on trouve un modèle de 
politique cohérent. Les planifications nationales, 
souvent soutenues par des politiques nationales, se 
faisaient au détriment des principales villes, éco-
nomiquement performantes, en faveur de zones 
rurales et urbaines périphériques au cours des 
années 60 et au début des années 70. La croissance 
économique et physique des capitales a été tout 
spécialement restreinte pour encourager la décen-
tralisation. Mais au cours de la crise économique 
de la seconde moitié des années 70, une croissance 
équilibrée n'était plus considérée comme aussi 
prioritaire. Dans la plupart des États membres, 
priorité a été donnée à l'encouragement de la 
croissance d'un nombre limité de villes, en une 
tentative de revitalisation de l'économie nationale 
au détriment de l'objectif d'équilibre régional. La 
croissance des capitales, en particulier, a été 
encouragée. 
7.4. L'apparition de politiques urbaines nationa-
les reflète une reconnaissance croissante des pro-
blèmes que rencontrent beaucoup de villes. Cepen-
dant, les politiques urbaines nationales explicites 
en sont encore aux balbutiements et restent limi-
tées des points de vue étendue et ressources. Les 
politiques nationales du logement, des transports, 
de l'éducation et de la formation ainsi que la 
gestion macro-économique exercent une influence 
toujours plus grande sur les villes. Quelque forme 
que revêtent les politiques urbaines nationales 
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dans les années 90, elles seront surtout efficaces là 
où des associations opérationnelles mixtes auront 
été créées entre les gouvernements central et local, 
le secteur privé et les communautés locales. 
8. L'impact 
des politiques communautaires 
sur l'Europe urbaine 
8.1. Les villes ont mis à profit les politiques et 
programmes de la Communauté européenne dans 
des mesures très variables. Ces différences sont 
affectées par des facteurs tels que l'existence de 
stratégies d'internationalisation bien développées, 
de coopération entre gouvernements locaux et 
nationaux, de dirigeants dynamiques du secteur 
public ou d'équipes spécialisées, de la conscience 
de «jouer européen», d'un secteur privé prêt à 
s'engager dans des accords transnationaux de coo-
pération et, enfin, des liens avec l'administration 
de la Commission à Bruxelles. 
8.2. En dépit de l'impact des programmes de la 
Communauté, un certain nombre de questions se 
posent à propos de priorités de financement et 
d'organisation. Par exemple, cibler des régions 
plutôt que des villes crée des inconséquences et des 
anomalies. Des villes situées dans des régions 
ciblées — en particulier des régions classées «ob-
jectif n° 1», qui obtiennent jusqu'à 80 % des 
fonds régionaux — peuvent bénéficier d'une inter-
vention communautaire. Cependant, de nombreu-
ses villes de l'ancien pôle, situées en dehors de 
zones classées «objectif n° 2», mais qui rencon-
trent de sérieux problèmes, n'en bénéficient pas. Il 
en va de même pour un certain nombre de problè-
mes rencontrés dans des villes même éligibles pour 
recevoir une aide, mais qui ne se qualifient pas 
directement. 
8.3. Au cours de ces dernières années, la Com-
mission a réorienté ses priorités, passant de l'in-
frastructure matérielle à des programmes contri-
buant de façon plus évidente au développement de 
l'infrastructure économique régionale. L'impor-
tance de cette tendance est confirmée par l'expé-
rience de nombreuses villes. Des projets d'infras-
tructure, qui ont prévalu surtout à la périphérie 
européenne, ont, dans bien des cas, été nécessai-
res, mais souffrent d'une série de désavantages. Le 
fait d'accorder une importance trop grande au 
développement infrastructurel peut élargir les dis-
parités sociales et spatiales existantes. Échouer 
dans la construction d'une capacité de production 
pour toute une région est susceptible de faire 
dériver la croissance à venir vers des régions déjà 
relativement prospères. 
8.4. Les politiques communautaires courantes 
qui sont axées en priorité sur les régions sont 
moins à même d'attaquer systématiquement les 
problèmes très liés se trouvant au centre de la 
compétitivité économique urbaine et de la qualité 
de la vie à l'intérieur de ces zones. La fragmenta-
tion des responsabilités administratives, au sein de 
la Commission, pour la diversité des programmes 
ayant un impact sur les villes freine la poursuite de 
stratégies de coordination comprenant des initiati-
ves économiques et sociales, culturelles et environ-
nementales. 
9. Les challenges urbains 
vers l'an 2000: 
implications sur la politique 
spatiale en Europe 
9.1. L'un des processus clés actuellement en 
marche en Europe est la concurrence croissante 
entre les villes et à l'intérieur de celles-ci. Au 
niveau européen, augmenter la compétitivité des 
villes est un moyen important pour renforcer 
l'économie européenne. Les décideurs nationaux 
reconnaissent de plus en plus l'importance écono-
mique des villes dans la compétitivité économique 
nationale. Les décideurs municipaux visent à 
gagner des avantages économiques comparatifs 
sur leurs concurrents aux niveaux régional, natio-
nal et international. 
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9.2. De nombreuses villes ont cherché en la 
croissance économique une solution à des problè-
mes sociaux et environnementaux. Cependant, les 
stratégies de croissance ont non seulement échoué, 
dans beaucoup de cas, dans la réalisation de cet 
objectif; dans certaines circonstances, elles ont 
même accru les problèmes sociaux et environne-
mentaux existants. Dans de nombreuses villes, un 
nouvel agenda social et environnemental a été fixé 
à la lumière de preuves, de plus en plus précises, 
d'inégalité en matière de distribution des bénéfices 
économiques et sociaux, de la détérioration du 
parc de logements sociaux, de la pollution indus-
trielle et domestique de l'environnement ainsi que 
du déclin de l'efficacité des infrastructures de 
transport. Le premier défi auquel les décideurs 
urbains seront confrontés au cours des années 90 
sera de réconcilier le processus de concurrence 
accrue et la poursuite de la croissance économique 
avec des objectifs sociaux et environnementaux 
plus larges. Le risque est que le succès économique 
à court terme ne détruise l'attrait de vivre et de 
travailler en ville et ne crée, à long terme, une 
vulnérabilité économique. 
9.3. Ces tendances constitueront des défis de 
plus en plus importants pour les gouvernements 
nationaux, régionaux et locaux ainsi que pour la 
Commission au cours des années 90. Il faudra 
d'abord déterminer, au sein des États membres, 
comment chaque niveau devra réagir. Même si 
plusieurs de ces problèmes existent dans toute 
l'Europe, on ne saurait en conclure que la Com-
mission pourrait ou devrait accepter la responsabi-
lité de les résoudre. Le principe de la subsidiante 
signifie que les gouvernements nationaux et les 
autorités municipales des États membres continue-
ront à jouer le rôle principal et la Communauté un 
rôle plus limité en matière de réponse à donner 
aux problèmes urbains. 
9.4. Cependant, pour réaliser ses objectifs de 
cohésion régionale toujours plus étroite, la Com-
mission pourrait élargir la dimension urbaine de 
ses politiques régionales actuelles en s'attachant à 
régler le dysfonctionnement que cette étude a 
constaté dans les relations entre régions et villes. 
La politique régionale communautaire ne s'est pas 
attaquée à quelques-uns des problèmes insolubles 
de marginalisation socio-économique et de dégra-
dation de l'environnement, qui empêchent certai-
nes zones urbaines de jouer un rôle prépondérant 
dans le développement économique des régions. 
Les projets de l'article 10 ont développé certaines 
actions créatives, mêmes si limitées, en augmen-
tant les possibilités économiques dans les cités 
pèriurbaines à taux de chômage élevé, en amélio-
rant l'environnement urbain et en encourageant la 
restauration du centre historique des villes. Des 
actions de cette nature pourraient être développées 
en complément de celles que le Fonds régional 
soutient traditionnellement. Cela exigerait un 
ajustement des priorités à l'avenir, à moins que 
des ressources supplémentaires ne deviennent dis-
ponibles. 
9.5. Le niveau spatial auquel la politique euro-
péenne opère est vital. Cette étude distingue trois 
niveaux spatiaux où des problèmes de développe-
ment peuvent se présenter: les niveaux européen et 
régional et le niveau urbain dans son ensemble. 
Dans le premier cas, les performances sociales et 
économiques de diverses villes de la Communauté 
présentent des différences sociales et des inégalités 
considérables. On constate également des problè-
mes de relations entre les villes et la région qui les 
entoure ainsi que des disparités sociales et écono-
miques entre plusieurs de ces villes. A l'intérieur 
de ces zones urbaines, il existe également des 
inégalités économiques, sociales et physiques, très 
fortes entre différents groupes sociaux, profes-
sionnels et ethniques. Les gouvernements des 
États membres interviennent déjà à ces trois 
niveaux. 
9.6. Ces questions sont déjà considérées comme 
importantes par la politique régionale de la Com-
mission. Par exemple, les critères d'éligibilité 
employés pour déterminer quelles régions se quali-
fient pour les programmes de la Commission sont 
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en conformité avec l'objectif de réduction des 
déséquilibres interrégionaux. Mais cela signifie 
que les pôles urbains qui connaissent de sembla-
bles problèmes sont traités différemment selon 
leur localisation géographique. Les zones actuelle-
ment éligibles excluent un certain nombre de villes 
qui ont connu d'importants déclins dans les sec-
teurs liés à l'activité portuaire ou à l'industrie 
lourde et qui souffrent de toutes sortes de problè-
mes économiques, sociaux et environnementaux. 
9.7. Une plus large dimension urbaine des politi-
ques régionales entraînerait d'importantes deman-
des de données et des difficultés. Il y a des 
différences énormes entre les États membres et à 
l'intérieur de ceux-ci en ce qui concerne leur 
définition de ce que sont les zones urbaines, le 
type et le volume de données habituellement 
conservées à propos de ces zones et la fréquence 
avec laquelle ces données sont recueillies. Les 
informations disponibles mesurent souvent des 
choses différentes et sont dépassées. Il est, par 
conséquent, extrêmement difficile de rassembler 
des données comparatives fiables concernant les 
villes ou les conurbations et les zones à l'intérieur 
de celles-ci qui mesurent le changement dans le 
temps. Des efforts substantiels seront nécessaires 
pour améliorer la base de données urbaines euro-
péenne, pour permettre aux concepteurs de la 
politique communautaire de comprendre et de 
réagir au changement. 
9.8. La série et la diversité des questions et des 
problèmes urbains qui se présentent dans la Com-
munauté sont grandes et complexes. La responsa-
bilité première en ce qui concerne la réponse à 
donner dans bien des cas restera inévitablement du 
ressort des gouvernements nationaux, régionaux et 
locaux des États membres. Cependant, le but de la 
Commission d'accroître la cohésion économique 
et sociale des régions pourrait la conduire à s'inté-
resser de plus près aux problèmes urbains et aux 
occasions qui créent les performances économi-
ques et sociales des régions ou qui sont créées par 
elles. Le sort des villes et des régions est inextrica-
blement lié. La recherche plus large vers une 
Communauté plus dynamique du point de vue 
économique et plus équilibrée du point de vue 
social suggère que le soutien accordé aux villes 
devienne une priorité plus importante pour la 
Communauté européenne et que les zones urbai-
nes puissent faire plus largement appel aux res-
sources de celle-ci. 
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1. The impact of economic change upon the 
European urban system 
1.1. Introduction 
The patterns of growth and decline which underlie 
change within Europe's urban areas are the result 
of the complex interplay between economic, 
political, social and cultural factors. None of them 
are easily isolated from the others. Each can differ 
in time and across space — between the States and 
regions of the Community. It is necessary to 
examine these factors in order to understand the 
characteristics which differentiate urban 
experiences in Europe and attempt to spell out 
implications for future development patterns. This 
chapter looks primarily at the economic factors — 
production of goods and services and trends in 
public and private employment — which affect 
Europe's urban areas in different ways. These 
factors, which are increasingly linked to decisions 
made at an international level, have a critical 
influence on political, social and cultural changes. 
But they do not determine them. This chapter 
provides the context for later examinations of 
social and cultural factors affecting urban change 
(Chapter 3) and of political factors operating at 
the local (Chapters 4 and 5), national (Chapter 6) 
and European levels (Chapter 7). 
1.2. Towards a European urban 
hierarchy? 
1.2.1. For the great majority of cities within the 
Community, historical patterns of development, 
even allowing for the important role which some 
played within national colonial regimes, largely 
reflected the outcomes of socioeconomic processes 
within the boundaries of Member States. For 
much of their history therefore, cities were 
situated within particular national urban 
hierarchies. These varied between Member States. 
Some, such as Denmark, Ireland, France, Greece, 
Luxembourg, Belgium and the United Kingdom, 
developed centralized systems in which a single 
dominant metropolitan area captured most of the 
important national political and economic 
functions and the rest of the country revolved 
around provincial urban centres serving largely 
regional markets. Others, such as Germany, Italy 
and the Netherlands, developed more 
deconcentrated systems in which the key functions 
were shared more equally between independent 
urban centres. Spain and Portugal before 
democratization were dominated by their national 
capitals. But they now occupy an intermediate 
position. The largest cities — Madrid and Lisbon 
— remain very important but do not dominate 
other urban centres like Barcelona and Oporto to 
the same degree as previously. 
1.2.2. In the period since the last world war, 
national economies have become increasingly 
integrated within a global system of production, 
distribution and exchange. This has been a 
consequence of international economic change 
and the national political responses made to it by 
Member States. Particularly significant factors 
include the liberalization of global capital 
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movements, the continued growth and influence 
of multinational corporate enterprises, economic 
advancements by previously non-industrialized 
regions of the globe, and the creation and 
reshaping of supranational trading blocks of 
which the EC is one important example. 
1.2.3. The performance of European cities' 
economic and political functions is increasingly 
affected by, and linked to, forces external to their 
national boundaries. Indeed, the process of 
economic internationalization has facilitated 
important changes in the precise mix of functions 
that cities perform. Some European cities, most 
obviously the 'global' cities of London and Paris, 
are important arenas in which many key economic 
decisions are made. Other cities must essentially 
live with the consequences of decisions made 
elsewhere. But no urban region in the Community 
can be insulated from the effects of the myriad 
individual decisions, for example on investment 
patterns, infrastructure and trade agreements, 
which are now taken on a supranational basis. 
1.2.4. The completion of the internal market 
and the abolition of internal frontiers within the 
Community is the latest important stage in the 
process of economic internationalization. As such, 
it must be viewed as an extension of long-evolving 
trends, not as a clear break with the past. 
Combined with developments in new productive 
and communications technologies and extensions 
of the trans-European transport network, the 
single market will trigger further adjustments in 
the roles and functions of cities, as national 
boundaries and interests will be less important 
than before. Increased inter-urban competition 
for development will be an important driving 
force as the key interest groups within cities, 
fearing the costs of inaction, strive to enhance 
their international competitive positions. Changes 
in national urban hierarchies will occur as some 
cities emerge onto a wider European stage, in 
addition to their national or regional one. Caution 
must however be exercised in specifying a single 
European urban hierarchy as there is no 
agreement on its shape, nor on the factors which 
underlie cities' location within it. 
1.2.5. There have been numerous attempts to 
define urban hierarchies through the ranking of 
urban regions or cities according to particular 
indicators. Amongst those used are city size, 
urban contributions to gross domestic product, 
economic performance across a range of sectors 
and unemployment levels. Each of them have 
generated different hierarchical orders at 
particular moments in time. Whilst these rankings 
are valid at a very general level, they share the 
weakness of being essentially static 'snapshots' of 
a dynamic process. They have limited value for 
decision-makers who need to relate urban 
development to wider patterns of economic 
change if they are to identify policy implications. 
Rather than add to the complexity of existing 
ranking exercises, it is more appropriate to 
identify the key global and intra-European 
economic changes which affect European cities. It 
is then possible to identify ways in which 
economic dynamics have helped reshape the 
European urban map as well as offer a guide to 
future developments. 
1.2.6. There is not a single urban hierarchy in 
Europe. Rather there are a number of overlapping 
hierarchies each of which centre on particular 
economic functions — for example, high-tech 
industry, research and development, tourism, 
financial services, cultural industries, and 
transport and distribution or public 
administration. Each urban area is in competition 
with a range of others according to the economic 
function in question and the sphere of influence 
— global, national, or regional — at which it 
performs its specialisms. This point can be 
illustrated by, for example, the experience of 
Rotterdam. It would dominate a hierarchy of 
European cities based on water-borne trading 
functions. Its geographical scope in this sector is 
global and its main European competitors are the 
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largest port cities — Marseilles, Le Havre, 
Antwerp, Hamburg. 
1.2.7. In other sectors, Rotterdam's scope is 
more limited, the competition fiercer and closer to 
home. In arts and cultural industries or airport 
trade, for example, Rotterdam has a regional 
function and lives in the shadow of nearby 
Amsterdam. In the provision of high income 
housing and top quality retailing the city's profile 
is more limited still. On the former it loses out to 
suburbs within its own region; in the latter to 
German cities. It would be possible to give 
Rotterdam a composite 'score' based on these 
indicators and a European rank position. The 
ranking exercise would have limited value though. 
It would conceal as much as it would reveal about 
the problems and opportunities the city faces and 
the policy responses that could be made to them. 
One learns more about Rotterdam's real position 
if each sector is examined in turn. 
1.2.8. This raises a further issue about efforts to 
rank individual cities in a single European 
hierarchy on the basis of, for example, economic 
importance. Cities are not internally homogeneous 
and economic 'success' or 'failure' is experienced 
in different ways by different groups within the 
city. There is no simple correspondence between a 
city's economic 'success' and the quality of life 
experienced by urban social groups. Cities can 
have very positive overall profiles on a range of 
economic indicators but still experience severe 
economic, social or environmental problems. For 
example, London might score well on its low 
overall unemployment levels, its international 
financial and tourist status and its national profile 
in public administration, culture, arts and the 
media. At the same time, many of London's inner 
areas are designated under national urban 
programmes because they are amongst the most 
problematic areas in the UK in terms of localized 
unemployment, low skill levels, poor housing, 
outmoded infrastructure and environmental 
degradation. 
1.3. Economic factors affecting 
European urban change 
1.3.1. The key global factor that European 
urban regions have had to adapt to in recent 
decades, and to which the single market is a key 
response, is the existence of the competitive 
economic blocks of the USA, Japan and the newly 
industrializing countries of the Pacific Rim and 
Latin America. Such competition is a partial cause 
of changes in international corporate profitability 
strategies and a reflection of these strategies. 
Corporate globalization and the national and 
international political responses it generated, 
along with technological advancements, created 
important consequences in the world economic 
system. Paramount among these have been: 
(a) employment shifts in the most advanced 'core' 
countries, from agriculture and manufacturing 
production to services; 
(b) within manufacturing, a concentration on 
capital — as opposed to labour-intensive 
production in the mass consumer 'Fordist' 
industries along with the development of more 
flexible, 'post-Fordist' production systems. 
Modern, technologically advanced production 
relies much more than previously on rapid 
responses to market signals, quality of design, 
subtle product differentiation and small, 
highly skilled core labour forces; 
(c) an increasing dominance by multi-product, 
oligopolistic transnational corporations, often 
formed through mergers or acquisition 
strategies. Many such conglomerates are 
European-owned. The great majority of 
non-European equivalents are also active in 
European markets; 
(d) the spatial redeployment of capital by 
transnational corporations from core to 
peripheral economic areas, in Europe and 
beyond, in the search for new markets and 
lower input costs, particularly labour. 
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1.3.2. The effects of these changes upon 
European labour markets have been threefold. 
There has been a trend toward reductions in 
traditional, male-dominated blue-collar 
manufacturing employment, paralleled by greater 
demand for highly educated, white-collar staff in 
advanced manufacturing and more 
professionalized public and private service sectors. 
As a result there has been strong labour market 
polarization between the better paid, more secure 
employment in the technical, professional and 
managerial fields, taken disproportionately by 
middle-class males, and employees in lower status, 
low-paid, less secure and often part-time service 
occupations. The latter tend disproportionately to 
be taken by women and ethnic minorities. The 
tendency towards dual labour markets, as made 
clear in Chapter 4, is increasingly apparent within 
cities and regions. Deepening divisions of labour 
also characterize differences between core and 
peripheral areas, driven by corporate strategies 
which increasingly choose different locations for 
strategic functions — control, strategic 
management, research and development — as 
opposed to more routine assembly tasks. 
economic change vary between Europe's regions, 
depending on their historical development 
trajectories. 
1.4.2. The conceptual device most often used to 
describe geographical unevenness in patterns of 
economic development has been the 
core-periphery model. It has been used to describe 
differences within Europe, particularly between 
north and south; within individual Member States 
— the 'north-south' divides in Italy, the UK, 
Spain and Germany; between Europe, the US and 
Japan and the less-developed world. The 
core - periphery analysis, usually applied to 
regions, synthesizes many of the factors which 
influence the location of economic activity. The 
most important factors are: real and perceived 
distance from markets and the factors of 
production; accessibility to these as affected by 
transportation networks; the obstacles, both 
physical and political, which can prevent market 
transactions; the diffusion of innovation and 
agglomeration — the tendency for development in 
particular locations to be self-perpetuating as a 
result of the magnetic effect which follows the 
clustering of economic activity. 
1.4. The spatial impact of economic 
change — core versus 
periphery? 
1.4.1. Labour market polarization and the shift 
in employment from manufacturing to services are 
common trends across Europe. They support the 
dominant analyses of sectoral change within the 
advanced industrial nations which suggest that 
innovation in information technologies underpins 
a transition to a new phase of industrialization. 
Information technology now performs the role in 
transforming production systems and divisions of 
labour that steam engines and railways, 
automobiles and electricity did in earlier phases of 
industrialization. However, the spatial effects of 
1.4.3. The core - periphery argument about 
Europe is that a geographical, functional and 
decision-making core which developed historically 
as a result of its superiority in the above factors, 
acts as a magnet to economic activity. The core, 
linking large metropolitan centres through 
advanced communications systems, is the area 
which is more attractive to the dominant 
international institutions, finance capital and 
modern industry at the expense of other areas in 
the periphery. The most peripheral areas include 
Europe's extreme southern and western regions: 
Greece, southern Italy, Corsica, Sardinia, 
southern Spain, Portugal, northern and western 
Spain, Ireland, and western France. Opinions 
have differed over the area contained within the 
core. Tightly drawn, it has been used to describe 
the triangle between the English West Midlands, 
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Paris and the Ruhr, incorporating the Randstad 
and industrialized Belgium. However, this area 
better describes the early pattern of European 
industrialization than contemporary reality. 
1.4.4. A recent study undertaken by Reclus for 
Datar in France fits in the core - periphery 
tradition. Based on a comprehensive collection of 
economic indicators, the study suggests, however, 
that an extended banana-shaped core now runs 
from the English West Midlands in the north, to 
Lombardy in the south, taking in the dynamic 
Munich-Stuttgart-Zurich triangle plus London, 
the Randstad, Brussels, the Ruhr, Bonn, 
Frankfurt and Milan. The Paris region is seen as 
having the same dynamism as the core but remains 
geographically separate. Reclus also identify a 
secondary belt of economic importance that has 
developed recently along the Mediterranean, 
which takes in northern Italy, southern France 
and the north-western Spanish triangle linking 
Madrid, Barcelona and Valencia. The most 
peripheral areas consist of Andalusia, southern 
Portugal, Greece, southern Italy, Corsica, 
Sardinia and Ireland/Northern Ireland. A 
mid-Atlantic arc — western France, northern and 
western Spain, northern Portugal — exhibits 
intermediate, semi-isolated status. 
1.4.5. The Reclus study is based on urban rather 
than regional data sources and offers a good, 
general guide to the contemporary economic 
geography of Europe. However it is as limited as 
city-ranking exercises are in identifying the 
dynamic trends in urban Europe which not only 
help to understand the past but to anticipate 
future trends. Our case-studies indicate that urban 
economic change in Europe is more heterogeneous 
than a core - periphery analysis suggests because 
there are significant differences between urban 
areas within the core as well as between those 
within the periphery. Location within the core is 
not economically decisive, although the benefits 
of accessibility and agglomeration derived from 
such a location remain important. Other factors 
are also important including: the liberating effects 
of new transport and telecommunications 
infrastructures for accessibility and the diffusion 
of innovation; the quality of urban life and urban 
business environments which are often eroded in 
core areas by physical problems such as lack of 
sites, high land values, traffic congestion and the 
stage that economic sectors have reached in the 
development cycle. 
1.5. Recent spatial effects of 
economic change: beyond the 
core - periphery dichotomy? 
1.5.1. In Europe in the 1970s and early 1980s 
there occurred a shift of economic gravity towards 
the south as the older, industrialized urban areas 
in the north — the UK, southern Belgium, 
northern France and the Ruhr — went through an 
economic crisis of unparalleled proportions and a 
mid-southern European belt around the northern 
Mediterranean and the Alps entered a period of 
rapid modern industrial growth. The traditional 
port and industrial cities in northern Europe 
examined in our research — Rotterdam, 
Birmingham, Liverpool, Hamburg, Dortmund, 
Copenhagen, Amsterdam and Brussels — all 
suffered heavy job losses in sectors such as coal, 
steel, shipbuilding, chemicals, glass, automobiles, 
trade and distribution. 
1.5.2. At the same time, free-standing towns and 
cities in more southern locations, lying in regions 
with a smaller industrial inheritance — 
Montpellier, Valencia, the 'Third Italy', 
Frankfurt, Munich — experienced strong 
economic growth. In some cases the driving force 
was internationally oriented services, for example, 
Frankfurt's financial sector. In others, the growth 
of indigenous industries, using more traditional 
production methods but serving new niche 
markets, was more important, for example in the 
'Third Italy'. In Montpellier, a high profile in 
high-tech industries was triggered by the arrival 
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of IBM but developed through local firms and 
higher education institutions. Valencia, with its 
buoyant network of small-to-medium sized firms 
and key corporations like IBM and Ford, is 
similar. The more peripheral cities — 
Thessaloniki, Naples and Dublin — shared 
relatively little in this growth. 
1.5.3. The information generated by the 
case-studies in this report suggests that the 
conclusion drawn from trends up to the mid-1980s 
— that Europe's economic core was shifting 
southward — does not capture the complexity of 
urban economic change. In the later 1980s there 
was a strong economic resurgence in some older 
northern cities, fuelled by the growth in private 
services and the successful restructuring of older 
industrial sectors, albeit with greater capital 
intensity and lower levels of employment. The 
bases of renewed growth vary from high-tech and 
information industries in Dortmund, through 
research and development strengths in 
Copenhagen, business services related to core 
industries like insurance and trade services in 
Rotterdam, modern, high value-added 
distribution activities particularly around ports 
and airports in Hamburg and Amsterdam, to arts 
and cultural industries in Glasgow. 
1.5.4. In internationally oriented financial 
services in particular, the older, north European 
metropolitan areas have retained their 
predominance. London, Paris and Amsterdam, 
for example, all benefited from growth in this 
increasingly deregulated sector. There is little sign 
that new telecommunications technology will 
enable high-level decision-makers, at least in the 
finance sector to dispense with the need for 
face-to-face communication within the prestigious 
metropolitan cores. Economic recovery in north 
European urban cores which relied on older 
industries is not inevitable however. In this study, 
Liverpool is an example of a city where new 
development is at a low level. It compares 
unfavourably with Glasgow whose historical 
development was similar and is even more remote 
from the European economic core. Nor are the 
problems of industrial decline and restructuring 
confined to northern Europe. Marseilles has 
struggled with the same problems which beset the 
northern industrial and port cities. The fact that 
some cities recovered more quickly than similar 
ones provides powerful evidence of the 
importance of locally targeted strategic responses 
to the process of economic change. 
1.5.5. The free-standing towns and cities in the 
Mediterranean, Alpine and southern German 
regions were not the only success stories in 
modern industrial development in the 1980s. The 
'new industrial districts' which have provoked 
much discussion in recent years are also found 
elsewhere. Some cities, like Rennes, Cambridge or 
Bristol, lie slightly outside the expanded core 
identified by Reclus but share many of the 
features of free-standing cities within that area. 
These include cleaner, less congested 
environments uncontaminated by the legacy of 
heavy industry, the presence of technologically 
orientated higher education institutions 
guaranteeing innovative capacity and highly 
skilled labour, cheaper land, good quality higher 
income housing and access to non-urban leisure 
areas. A strong sense of regional identity, allied 
with united local leadership and long-sighted 
development strategies, has also been important. 
1.5.6. Modern industrial growth is not confined 
to smaller, free-standing urban areas. The fringes 
of older established metropolitan areas have also 
benefited. They share many of the features of 
free-standing towns and cities but also offer more 
ready access to metropolitan facilities for business 
support, higher education and personal 
recreation. Southern Ile de France, the area 
around south Amsterdam and Schiphol airport, 
northern Rotterdam, the northern Copenhagen 
region and the corridor area west of London along 
the M4 motorway are good examples of such 
development. They do not always lie within 
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narrowly drawn metropolitan boundaries but 
form part of the wider metropolitan economy and 
labour markets. 
1.6. Urban Europe today 
1.6.1. To summarize the changes outlined 
above, two distinct processes have emerged. There 
has been decentralization from the established 
metropolitan areas in some sectors — back-office 
functions, high-tech industry. And there has been 
reconcentration within metropolitan centres and 
their suburbs in others — high-level business 
services, international distribution, prestigious 
arts and cultural industries. The 
Mediterranean—Alpine—southern German area, 
with few legacies of older industrialization, has 
been a major beneficiary of economic 
decentralization as a moderate shift in Europe's 
economic gravity occurred. However, economic 
reconcentration has helped some cities retain their 
overall dominance in certain economic sectors. 
Despite the shocks of the 1970s and early 1980s, 
large north European metropolitan cores, with 
internationally competitive aviation hubs, 
modernized road, rail, and waterway networks 
and advanced telecommunications systems, 
remain magnets for international finance houses, 
corporate headquarters, producer services, 
research and development, high-level public 
administration, international institutions and the 
arts, cultural and media industries. The centres of 
metropolitan areas particularly have benefited 
from the progressive abandonment by some 
Member States of programmes to decentralize 
public administration functions. Metropolitan 
fringe areas also take a significant share of 
modern industrial research and development and 
dominate in transport logistics and distributive 
sectors. 
1.6.2. A further point about metropolitan 
reconcentration needs to be stressed. Few major 
competitors have emerged to challenge the 
economically dominant cities in those Member 
States which have historically been characterized 
by economic centralization — Paris, London, 
Athens, Copenhagen and Dublin. In more 
decentralized Member States one or two dominant 
cities are outstripping their competitors — Rome 
and Milan in Italy, Brussels and Antwerp in 
Belgium, Lisbon and Oporto in Portugal and 
Amsterdam and Rotterdam in the Netherlands. 
The two partial exceptions to this trend are Spain 
and Germany. In Spain, Barcelona and, to a lesser 
extent, Valencia have enjoyed significant 
development and growing international status. 
They are joined by a resurgent Seville. But there is 
little evidence of Madrid losing its economic 
importance as a result. In Germany there remains 
a stable number of countervailing metropolitan 
economic centres. This balanced urban system 
would be threatened, though, by the potential 
development of Berlin into a dominant national 
capital and Europe's third 'global' city. 
1.6.3. These changes mean it is possible to 
identify three broad economic areas in Europe. 
First there is the old core, covering the traditional 
industrial regions of northern Europe, some of 
which have emerged successfully from the period 
of economic transformation with successful 
restructuring of older sectors and diversification 
into new ones. Second there is the new core, 
covering the traditionally more lightly 
industrialized Alpine, Mediterranean and southern 
German areas which have benefited from recent 
economic growth in more advanced sectors. 
Together, these two areas now form an extended 
core. The new core has not replaced the old core; 
rather the economic core of Europe has widened 
its boundaries. 
1.6.4. Beyond the expanded core there remains a 
periphery which is characterized by poor 
infrastructure, limited inward investment and a 
reliance on technologically undeveloped, 
vulnerable indigenous enterprises. This includes 
Greece, Portugal, southern Italy, western Spain, 
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Sardinia, Corsica, western France and Ireland. 
This schema makes it clear that location remains 
an important characteristic of economic potential 
in Europe. Indeed EC regional policies recognize 
this in distinguishing between Objective 1 regions 
in the periphery and Objective 2 regions in parts 
of the old core. 
1.6.5. The cities studied in this research offer a 
good guide to the value of the distinction between 
old core, new core and periphery. A breakdown of 
the case-study cities would be as follows. In the 
old core are Glasgow, Liverpool, Birmingham, 
Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Brussels, Copenhagen, 
Dortmund, Hamburg and Berlin. In the new core 
are Frankfurt, Milan, Barcelona, Lyons, 
Montpellier and Marseilles. The periphery 
includes Thessaloniki, Bari, Naples, Seville, 
Valencia, Oporto, Rennes and Dublin. Map 1 
locates the case-study cities in their economic 
areas. It also indicates that the transition between 
old core, new core and periphery is gradual not 
abrupt. Starkly delineated boundaries would not 
accurately reflect the realities of the European 
spatial economy. Indeed, where a city is located 
close to a border separating two of these areas, it 
often has a mixture of their key characteristics. 
Rennes is the least geographically remote of the 
peripheral cities examined. A city which is two 
hours by train from Paris is not peripheral in the 
same sense as Thessaloniki. Nevertheless, it does 
have a number of features of peripherality. Of all 
the peripheral cities, Rennes has developed most 
spectacularly in recent years. Equally Marseilles, 
Barcelona and Milan in the new core, have a 
substantial traditional industrial heritage which is 
typical of the old core. However, the old core is 
classified as such because its patterns of 
industrialization were not exclusive to, but more 
typical of northern Europe than of southern 
Europe. 
1.6.7. Figures 1 to 4 illustrate the value of the 
typology. For example, the figures reveal the 
dominance of London and Paris in terms of the 
location of private sector economic 
decision-making. They also illustrate the economic 
strength of the cities in the new core, especially 
Frankfurt and Milan. Equally, they show that 
many old core cities, such as Hamburg, Brussels 
and Copenhagen have retained a powerful role as 
economic control and command centres. By the 
same criteria, the peripheral cities of Dublin and 
Naples fare less well. 
1.6.6. This division into three areas identifies 
general economic processes and trends and 
identifies the location where they are most 
typically found. Inevitably, there are a number of 
exceptions to the typology. For example, Berlin is 
not typical of old core cities mainly because its 
post-war urban development patterns were shaped 
by the special political status of the city. 
Copenhagen, on the northern fringe of the current 
EC, is not classified as peripheral since it has more 
in common with cities in the old core. It is one of 
the old port and industrial centres of Europe 
where old sectors declined rapidly and in which 
there has been significant diversification into 
modern high-tech and service sectors. Also it is at 
the heart of a wider Nordic region which is 
economically as advanced as the European core. 
1.6.8. This study demonstrates that individual 
cities can perform better or worse than their wider 
regions. Marseilles demonstrates that economic 
development does not follow automatically from a 
location in the new core. In the old core, 
Liverpool does not seem likely to develop the 
potential of, for example, Rotterdam, Amsterdam 
or Hamburg. Some cities in the periphery are 
performing better than others. Thessaloniki, 
Dublin and Naples have fared less well than Bari, 
Rennes, Oporto or Seville. One virtue of the 
typology is that it helps identify cities which are 
performing better, or less well, than expected in 
view of their location and focuses attention on the 
internal decision-making dynamics of those cities. 
At the urban level economic success is not the 
automatic result of location. Cities are not the 
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Map 1. The case-study cities in Europe's economic regions 
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Figure 1. Headquarters of the world's top 500 banks (by total value of transactions) in selected 
case-study cities 
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Figure 2. Headquarters of top 200 European banks in case-study cities 
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Figure 3. Headquarters of Europe's top 300 commercial companies (by turnover) 
in selected case­study cities 
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Figure 4. Headquarters of Europe's top 500 industrial companies (by turnover) in selected 
case­study cities 
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passive victims or beneficiaries of impersonal 
economic forces. Decisions taken within cities can 
shape the way in which these forces work and the 
way cities develop. 
1.7. Urban economic prospects 
towards 2000: the EC 12 
1.7.1. The patterns of economic decentralization 
and reconcentration found in the 1980s will set the 
context for the years to 2000 and beyond. A 
question remains whether the expansion of the 
European economic core will continue and lead to 
a complete break down in the core — periphery 
distinction in favour of a pattern where pockets of 
urban growth and decline are found equally 
throughout Europe. The evidence from this study 
points to a conservative conclusion. The single 
market is expected to boost average Community 
employment and GDP per head which should 
result in some lessening of regional unemployment 
and income differentials. But all urban areas will 
not share these positive effects equally. 
1.7.2. The most powerful argument which 
suggests that the core - periphery distinction will 
break down is that developments in transport and 
telecommunications will make geographically 
peripheral areas more accessible by reducing the 
'friction of distance'. The traditional dominance 
of an economic core would be undermined by 
improved communications technologies which 
facilitate greater ease of interaction and diffusion 
of innovation which outweigh the importance of 
physical accessibility and agglomeration 
economies. However, while cities in the new core 
have benefited from greater locational freedom in 
investment decisions in the last two decades, there 
is less evidence to suggest that peripheral areas will 
be substantially favoured in the near future. 
1.7.3. The continuing importance of 
agglomeration effects in old core urban areas, 
particularly in corporate 'control and command' 
functions, in addition to the sheer economic 
weight of old and new core cities, suggests that 
they, not the periphery, will be favoured by 
market developments in new communications 
technology. Public sector investments can enable 
peripheral centres to 'catch up' technologically 
with those in the core. Major efforts are being 
made to improve communications in peripheral 
urban regions. The Spanish Government's 
investment in Seville, linked to the 1992 Expo is 
an obvious example. But similar government 
strategies for urban areas in the European core, 
combined with their much stronger market 
positions, means that frictional distance within the 
core areas will be reduced at a faster rate than that 
between the old and new cores and the 
periphery. 
1.7.4. The scale of regional differences in GDP 
per head during the 1980s gives an indication of 
the task facing peripheral areas in catching up 
with those in the old and new cores. Regional 
figures do not equate perfectly with urban 
circumstances but regional boundaries are 
virtually contiguous with the metropolitan areas 
around the larger European cities. Disparities in 
regional GDP per head grew up to the mid-1980s 
before levelling off in the period of renewed 
economic growth. Of the 30 regions with a GDP 
per head less than 70% of the Community average 
in 1986-88, 13 were in Greece, six in Spain, five in 
Portugal and three in southern Italy. Ireland, 
treated as a single region, also fell into this 
category. Even for the regions which performed 
best within this group, in order to reach 90% of 
the Community average, there would have to be 
an average rate of growth in regional GDP per 
head of 1.25% above the EC 12 average over 20 
years or of 1.75% over 15 years. 
1.7.5. Such unprecedented, sustained growth 
appears unlikely if the sectoral composition of 
Europe's core and peripheral areas is taken into 
consideration. The sectors most vulnerable to the 
increased competition which the single market will 
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bring — those subject to public procurement such 
as telecommunications and railway capital stock, 
plus agro-food, textiles, shoes, clothing, basic 
chemicals and mechanical and electrical 
engineering — form a higher proportion of the 
total economy of peripheral areas than of old and 
new core areas. Equally, Figure 5 shows that in 
peripheral cities the percentage of industrial 
employees working in sectors using advanced 
technologies is markedly lower than in most new 
and old core cities. To underline this point with a 
further contrasting indicator, 75% of research and 
development expenditure in the EC 12 is currently 
concentrated in three Member States — Germany, 
France and the UK. 
will begin to corner the market in new investment 
linked to their sectoral specialisms. Considerable 
barriers to entry will be faced in the future by 
cities which, although they share the 
characteristics of today's new industrial districts 
when they started on their development paths, 
have not built up the critical mass of new 
economic activity to attract further investment. 
The evidence from the USA suggests that a 
relatively small number of urban locations quickly 
become dominant in high-tech production at the 
expense of areas which have no critical mass. 
1.8. The East European question 
1.7.6. The experience of the peripheral cities in 
this study provides some support for the above 
analysis. Peripheral urban economies generally 
rely more on foreign assembly plants and 
indigenous small-to-medium sized firms which are 
in great need of technological innovation. The 
impending economic restructuring will thus affect 
cities like Dublin, Thessaloniki, Oporto and 
Seville more acutely in the medium term. 
Competition from the developing market 
economies in Eastern Europe will also be a threat. 
The restructuring process in the periphery could 
be speeded up by multinationals taking over 
enterprises with the greatest potential. However 
the negative side of that scenario would be the 
'branch plant economy' syndrome — lack of local 
control over business decisions and vulnerability 
to recession — which many manufacturing regions 
in northern Europe experienced in the 1970s. 
1.7.7. Another factor which might limit the 
development of the periphery are the 
agglomeration effects which arise from the 
concentration of investment in the modern 
industrial districts of the new core and the suburbs 
of cities in the old core. Experience of the links 
between urban development and economic change 
in earlier periods of industrial innovation suggest 
that, at a certain point, the newer industrial areas 
1.8.1. The biggest prospective change in the 
economic gravity of Europe will depend on the 
development of market economies in the former 
East European bloc. The former GDR is already 
integrated into the EC and other former Comecon 
economies may follow depending on decisions by 
current EC members about when the political and 
economic advantages of expanded membership 
outweigh its potentially destabilizing effects. 
1.8.2. A more predictable, short-term 
consequence of the economic and political 
changes in Eastern Europe is the effect which 
improved European relations will have on the 
weapons industry and the large research and 
development expenditures traditionally linked to 
it. A number of economically successful urban 
areas in the new core — Montpellier, Lyons, 
Stuttgart and Munich, as well as some in the old 
core, for example Bristol, have relied heavily on 
military contracts to sustain their R&D industries. 
Even if compensatory, non-military-related 
finance were available, these industries would 
need to redirect their efforts toward civilian 
projects if their contribution to urban economies 
were to be maintained. Cities which act as bases 
for military personnel will encounter similar 
problems and may suffer more profoundly since 
'conversion' strategies are ruled out in their case. 
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Figure 5. Industrial employees working in sectors using advanced technologies 
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1.8.3. At a more profound level, there is 
continuing uncertainty surrounding the issue of 
East European economic development and 
East—West political and economic relations. The 
strongest initial effect has been in Germany, 
whose experience may offer pointers to how the 
process may unfold in the rest of Eastern Europe. 
Two questions arise about the effect on the 
German urban system. One concerns the future of 
Berlin, the other the effect of reunification on 
cities in the former western and eastern halves. 
1.8.4. Two extreme scenarios can be constructed 
about the future of Berlin. One is that, as the 
national capital, the city will receive all of the 
functions associated with that status — 
Parliament and civil service, related lobbying and 
media activities and international agencies. On 
this scenario the city would experience explosive 
growth and quickly become a third European 
'global' city. Other urban areas in Germany would 
suffer in this process. Bonn would lose its raison 
d'être and much of its economic base, Hamburg 
and Munich some of their media concentrations 
and, on a lesser scale, Frankfurt some of its 
international finance functions. 
1.8.5. On the other hand, political determination 
within Germany to retain the country's balanced 
urban system and to limit the national functions 
entrusted to Berlin could see the city suffer 
greatly. Berlin has already been divested of many 
of the preferential federal funds it received in 
support of its former role as the 'showcase of the 
West'. On this scenario, the city could lose some 
of its symbolic and political importance and suffer 
pressure from immigration from the east. Current 
indications are that the public and private 
decisions which will determine Berlin's future 
status tend to the first scenario. This could have a 
significant impact upon the German urban system 
and the larger regional economic power balance 
within Europe. 
1.8.6. The effect of reunification on urban 
Germany can also be presented in two scenarios. 
If the transition to a market economy in the 
former GDR is relatively smooth, gains in the 
short and medium term will go mainly to the 
former FRG urban areas, particularly those near 
the old border which supply goods and services to 
the new markets in the east. Hamburg is an 
obvious example of this. The same applies to the 
historic Baltic trading partners of eastern 
Germany, pre-GDR — like Copenhagen — and to 
those areas which tend to benefit from increased 
German trade like the Randstad. 
1.8.7. In the longer term, the urban areas in the 
east which benefit from new east-west 
infrastructural development and where there is 
rapid restructuring and development, could 
compete effectively with the western cities. 
However, if economic progress in the east is badly 
stalled, the effect on all urban areas, including the 
former FRG cities, would be negative. A difficult 
transition to a market economy would see the 
eastern part of the country progressively 
demanding a growing share of national 
expenditures. This would force west German cities 
to live with the consequences of higher taxation to 
facilitate reconstruction and the redistribution of 
intergovernmental grants to the east. 
1.8.8. The other main East European-related 
issue has implications for the core-periphery 
model. Adjustment to a market economy by those 
nations seeking EC membership will be a 
long-term process. It will have immediate 
knock-on effects on both public and private 
investment patterns by taking resources which 
otherwise would have gone elsewhere. The shift to 
market economies in Eastern Europe means there 
is, in effect, a new Eastern economic periphery in 
Europe which could compete for resources with 
existing peripheral areas. Whatever the outcome 
in terms of private investment flows, the 
peripheral European urban regions which become 
the 'losers' in the competition will place demands 
on the EC structural Funds, adding to pressures 
for adjustments in EC policy. 
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2. Patterns of urbanization in Europe, 1960-90. 
2.1. Introduction 
2.1.1. Chapter 1 discussed the implications for 
urban Europe of continuing economic change and 
the emergence of the single market. This chapter 
focuses on the demographic implications of 
economic change and their spatial consequences 
for cities. It discusses the waves of urbanization 
which have characterized Europe during the past 
three decades. It describes the pattern of 
urbanization, suburbanization, deurbanization 
and reurbanization trends that have emerged 
throughout Europe. At the European level, the 
chapter identifies an urban system which is 
increasingly demographically stable as a result of 
declining fertility rates in the peripheral regions of 
Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Greece and southern 
Italy which have led to a convergence in the rates 
of natural increase throughout the European 
Community. It indicates that intraregional 
rural-urban migratory shifts, although 
continuing, have decreased. The large 
interregional movement of economic migrants of 
the 1960s and 1970s — for instance, from Ireland 
to Britain, from south to north Italy, from 
Andalusia to Catalonia — have slowed 
considerably. Indeed, in some cases, Portugal and 
Greece, for example, return migration is now a 
common trend. 
2.1.2. If the contemporary European urban 
system is internally more demographically stable, 
it will remain subject to externally induced 
instabilities. Although future migration into the 
Community from beyond its borders cannot be 
precisely predicted, there is likely to be 
continuing, intense demands from potential 
economic migrants to enter the Community, 
especially from the countries of North Africa and 
the newly democratized Eastern Europe. The scale 
and consequences of such external migration into 
the Community, and its implications for 
individual Member States and cities, is the subject 
of continuing public debate. 
2.2. Urban Europe in a global 
perspective 
2.2.1. Before discussing in detail the European 
urban experience, it is instructive to locate it in a 
wider, global context. According to UN estimates 
towards the end of this century, 50% of the world 
population and 80% of the population in 
industrialized countries will live in urban 
agglomerations. While in 1950 there were only five 
cities with a population of more than five million, 
in the year 2000 there will be 57 such mégalopoles. 
However, behind these figures are significant 
regional differences. While in most industrialized 
countries, most notably in the world's oldest 
industrial regions in North-West Europe, the 
urbanization process is approaching its end; 
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metropolitan areas in the developing countries 
continue to grow with no immediate limit in sight. 
It is estimated that in the year 2000 only three of 
the 20 largest cities in the world will be in 
industrialized countries, and none of them in 
Europe. There will be 22 cities with a population 
of more than 10 million, among them Mexico City 
with 26 million, São Paolo with 23 million and 
Calcutta, Bombay and Cairo with 16 million each. 
Another 35 cities will have a population of 
between 5 and 10 million. 
serious problems of the cities in the Community 
appear manageable. However, there is another 
good reason to place the pattern of urbanization 
in Europe into a global context. Worsening living 
conditions in Third World cities, particularly in 
regions with strong historical links and good 
transport connections to West European 
countries, may encourage or even force people to 
migrate to the gateway cities of the continent. 
Consequently, it is crucial for the future of the 
cities in Western Europe that the living conditions 
in the cities of the Third World are improved. 
2.2.2. Urbanization in the developing countries 
is by no means a replication of the earlier 
experience of the industrialized countries. 
Whereas in the industrialized countries the rapid 
growth of cities in the 19th century was a 
necessary prerequisite and consequence of 
industrialization, in the developing countries cities 
are growing partially without industrialization. 
The economy develops slowly so family incomes 
do not grow and medical care remains inadequate. 
Mortality rates remain high and many children are 
regarded as necessary to provide old-age support. 
The population continues to grow rapidly without 
a corresponding increase in food and jobs. More 
and more rural migrants come to the cities to look 
for work and social opportunity, but despite a 
large informal labour market the number of jobs 
is insufficient for their increasing numbers. The 
consequences are mass unemployment or 
underemployment, overcrowding and a growing 
underprovision in the fields of health services, 
education and transport. 
2.2.3. It is useful to be aware of this 
fundamental difference between urbanization in 
developed and developing countries. Compared 
with urban systems in other continents and 
nations, the urban system in Europe is relatively 
balanced, and compared with the average African, 
Asian or South American city even the most 
Table 1. Degree of urbanization and urban 
growth 
m 
Country 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany. FRG 
Germany. GDR 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
United Kingdom 
EC 12 
Austria 
Switzerland 
Urban population 
as percentage of 
total population 
1965 
93 
77 
67 
79 
73 
49 
48 
62 
63 
86 
24 
61 
87 
71 
51 
53 
1988 
97 
86 
74 
86 
77 
62 
58 
68 
67 
88 
32 
77 
92 
82 
57 
61 
Urban population 
mean annual 
growth rate 
1965-80 
0.4 
1.1 
1.3 
0.7 
0.2 
2 
2.1 
1 
2 
1.2 
1.7 
2.2 
0.5 
1 
0.8 
1 
1980-88 
0.2 
0.3 
0.5 
0.1 
0.1 
1.3 
1.1 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
1.9 
1.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
1.3 
Note: The growth rates are calculatedfrom World Bank 
estimates. Because of different national definitions of what is 
urban, comparisons between countries should be made with 
caution. 
Sources: World Bank, 1990; United Nations, 1987; 
Statistisches Bundesamt, 1990. 
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Figure 6. Degree of urbanization (top) and urban growth (bottom), 1965-88 
Urban population as percentage of total population 
Year 1965 
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Sources: World Bank, 1990; United Nations, 1987; Statistisches Bundesamt, 1990. 
Figure 7. Urbanization and economic development, 1988 
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2.2.4. Europe has been rapidly urbanizing. By 
1965, only Greece, Ireland and Portugal had a 
level of urbanization below 60%. Belgium and the 
United Kingdom had the highest level at 93 and 
87%. By 1988, Greece had exceeded the 60% 
mark with Ireland just behind at 58%. The most 
significant rate of growth of the urban population 
between 1980 and 1988 was in Portugal, Spain and 
Greece (Table 1 and Figure 6). These figures give 
only a broad impression of the urban situation in 
industrialized countries. Nevertheless, they 
confirm the relationship between levels of 
urbanization and economic development — low 
levels of urbanization are associated with a low 
GNP per capita, which in turn rises with the level 
of urbanization (Figure 7). 
2.2.5. Although care must be taken with 
different national definitions of urbanization, 
Table 2 and Figure 8 show that in the mid-1980s, 
Table 2. Urban population in the EC by city 
size in the 1980s. 
City size 
(population) 
> 2 million 
1-2 million 
500 000-1 million 
250 000-500 000 
100 000-250 000 
50 000-100 000 
< 50 000 
Urban population 
Rural population 
Total 
Number 
of cities 
5 
7 
25 
53 
221 
476 
approx. 
5 000 
Populatio 
(millions) 
19.1 
10 
16.1 
18 
33.1 
32.2 
139.9 
268.3 
67.1 
335.4 
EC 
12 (%) 
5.7 
3 
4.8 
5.4 
9.9 
9.6 
41.7 
80 
20 
100 
Note: Data are from 1981 (Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Portugal, UK), 1982 (France), 1983 (Belgium), 
1984 (Netherlands and Spain), 1985 (Germany, GDR), and 
1986 (Germany, FRG). 
Sources: Census data; Statistisches Bundesamt, 1988. 
90 cities in the European Community had a 
population of more than 250 000. During the last 
three decades cities in Europe have continuously 
grown beyond their administrative boundaries. 
The dismantling of walls, the continuous 
evolution of transport technologies, growing 
affluence, changing life-styles and the increasing 
costs of urban land caused suburbanization 
beyond the original city boundaries. Thus it has 
become more difficult to define the boundary 
between city and countryside. Administrative 
boundaries no longer reflect the real size of a city. 
Paris is a good example. The city of Paris has 2 
million inhabitants. However, by adding the 
municipalities of the region Ile de France, Paris 
becomes a metropolis of more than 10 million. 
Some countries, Germany for example, achieved a 
consolidation of cities by merging suburban 
municipalities with the core city forming relatively 
efficient administrative units. In other countries, 
core cities were unable to convince their suburban 
neighbours, which relied on the services of the 
core city, to join them and share their financial 
burden. 
2.2.6. If functional urban regions with a 
population of more than a million are considered, 
four out of ten Europeans live in large 
metropolitan areas, and every second European if 
all functional urban areas with a population of 
more than 330 000 are taken into account. These 
larger cities and city regions are the driving 
engines of economic development in the countries 
of Western Europe. However, the majority of 
citizens in Europe still live in small and 
medium-sized cities. These smaller and 
medium-sized cities are in danger of being relative 
'losers' in the international competition between 
cities, unless they are situated in the immediate 
hinterland of the métropoles to which they are 
increasingly functionally linked. 
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2.2.7. However, general urbanization figures do 
not show the degree of balance of an urban 
system. This is addressed in Table 3 which shows 
the relative concentration of the urban population 
in the largest city and in cities with more than 
500 000 population of selected countries. In 1960, 
for example, in Austria, Greece and Ireland more 
than half of the urban population lived in the 
largest city, i.e. in Vienna, Athens or Dublin. The 
uncontrolled growth of Athens in the following 
decades has further increased that city's share of 
the total urban population of Greece to 57%. 
Portugal and Ireland, however, during these 20 
years have experienced a slight decline of the 
concentration of urban population in Dublin and 
Lisbon. On the opposite end there are the much 
more balanced urban systems of the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Italy, Germany or Spain, where only a 
Figure 8. Urban population in the EC by city size in the 1980s 
5 cities 
7 cities 
■ > 2 million 
G 1-2 million 
Β 500 000-1 million 
Β 250 000-500 000 
ED 100 000-250 000 
D 50 000-100 000 
□ < 50 000 
D rural 
221 cities 
476 cities 
Sources: Census data; Statistisches Bundesamt, 1988. 
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Table 3. Concentration of urban population 
Country 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany, FRG 
Germany, GDR 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
United Kingdom 
EC 12 
Austria 
Switzerland 
Largest city 
Brussels 
Copenhagen 
Paris 
Berlin 
Berlin 
Athens 
Dublin 
Rome 
Luxembourg 
Amsterdam 
Lisbon 
Madrid 
London 
Vienna 
Zurich 
Percentage of urban 
popu 
in largest 
city 
1960 
17 
40 
25 
20 
8 
51 
51 
13 
36 
9 
47 
13 
24 
17 
51 
19 
1980 
14 
32 
23 
18 
9 
57 
48 
17 
33 
9 
44 
17 
20 
16 
39 
22 
ation 
in cities over 
500 000 
I960 
28 
40 
34 
48 
13 
51 
51 
46 
0 
27 
47 
37 
61 
44 
51 
19 
1980 
24 
32 
34 
45 
18 
70 
48 
52 
0 
24 
44 
44 
55 
43 
39 
22 
Sources: World Bank, 1990; United Nations, 1987; 
Statistisches Bundesamt, 1990. 
relatively low proportion of the total country's 
urban population lives in the largest city. Figure 9 
illustrates the same data for the countries of the 
European Community geographically. 
the major impulse behind changing patterns of 
urbanization. They underpin population 
movements within regions, between regions, 
between countries and even between continents. 
Most obviously, economically successful urban 
areas act as magnets for migrants. The greater the 
economic disparity between urban areas, the 
greater the pressure for migration from poor to 
rich areas. 
2.3.2. Paradoxically, economically weak, 
peripheral cities have also expanded their 
populations. In this case, however, high rates of 
natural increase and rural-urban migration, 
rather than interregional or international 
migration, have stimulated urban growth, 
reflecting the correlation between levels of 
economic development and rates of natural 
population increase. In the developed regions, low 
fertility rates ensure minimal or even negative 
natural increase. But in developing regions 
relatively high fertility rates induce higher rates of 
natural increase. Also, while migration from rural 
to urban areas has dried up in developed regions, 
there is still a pool of potential rural migrants in 
many of the Community's developing regions, 
since the transition from agriculturally based to 
modern economies is not yet complete in many 
parts of Spain, Portugal, Greece, Ireland and 
southern Italy. 
2.3. The forces shaping 
demographic and migratory 
change 
2.3.1. As Chapter 1 demonstrated, Europe has 
experienced major economic restructuring in the 
last three decades. These economic trends — the 
decline of traditional industries, the 
industrialization of agriculture and the rising 
economic importance of the 'post-industrial' 
high-technology and service sectors — have had 
major spatial implications. Indeed, they have been 
2.3.3. The trend towards smaller households, an 
ageing population structure and new patterns of 
labour force participation raises policy issues 
about local needs and the provision of urban 
services. Average household sizes have fallen 
dramatically over the last three decades 
throughout Europe. In 1960, household size in 
most European countries averaged 3 to 3.5 
persons. By 1990, the average had fallen to 2.5 to 
3 persons. But these average figures mask 
variations between different countries. In Ireland 
average household size is 3.5 persons, but in 
Denmark there are only an average 1.8 persons 
per household. Moreover, figures differ between 
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town and country. In most inner cities in Europe 
today, there are on average less than two people 
per household. 
2.3.4. In the 1990s and beyond, the challenges of 
coping with an ageing population profile will put a 
strain on urban social services as well as create 
demands for housing for older, less mobile 
citizens. Cities will be faced with the task of 
planning, providing and financing sheltered 
housing, appropriate facilities and expensive 
health services. Equally, the increasing 
participation of women in the labour force will 
increase demand for childcare facilities. Many 
cities in southern Europe have a young population 
profile which will place increased demand on the 
education and training infrastructure. It also 
exacerbates unemployment problems and imposes 
burdens on social welfare provision. 
2.3.5. The data from our case-study cities 
indicates that urban populations have increasingly 
aged, particularly in old core cities. In the 
peripheral cities, immigration and higher fertility 
rates guarantee that the population is younger 
than in old core cities. But even here the trend 
towards a more elderly population is found. 
2.3.6. The rapidly changing physical and 
telecommunication links in Europe also have 
major spatial effects. The development of 
transport and telecommunication networks will 
continue to encourage the growth of cities which 
act as major communication nodes and the decline 
of others bypassed by such networks. 
Telecommunication developments will also induce 
changes in the spatial distribution of economic 
activity, although the decentralizing impact may 
not be as great as once anticipated. Within urban 
areas, developments in communications have been 
a major factor in encouraging suburbanization 
and deurbanization. Equally, recent increases in 
the volume of road transport and resulting 
congestion in larger cities have encouraged the 
decentralization of economic activity to smaller 
less-crowded towns. The impact of 
telecommunication technologies on the spatial 
organization of work within cities is only slowly 
becoming apparent. However, early indications 
have not confirmed the anticipated substitution of 
physical travel by telecommunications. Despite the 
relocation of back-office functions outside central 
cities, high-level service activities have dispersed 
less from city centre locations. Improved 
telecommunications have not yet broken the 
dominance of central urban locations for key 
economic activities. 
2.4. Demographic and migratory 
trends 
2.4.1. The dynamics of urban growth and 
decline are determined by migration rates and 
natural population increase which are in turn a 
function of fertility and mortality rates. During 
the last three decades, cities in Western Europe 
have been through a 'demographic transition' 
involving first a decline in mortality rates followed 
by a decline in fertility rates. This phenomenon 
occurred in Member States at different times, 
depending on the stage of their economic 
development. It happened first in those countries 
which industrialized earliest in the old core of 
Europe. It emerged more recently in peripheral 
areas of Europe which have higher, if declining, 
birth-rates than the old core. 
2.4.2. Rural-urban migration, stimulated by 
restructuring economies, has also been a crucial 
component of urbanization. This varied 
regionally. The primary phase of European 
urbanization took place in the industrial cities in 
Britain in the second half of the 19th century and 
spread through the century to the remainder of the 
old core — Belgium, the Netherlands, north-west 
France and Germany. Not until the 20th century 
did the process reach the new core in northern 
Italy, southern Germany and southern France. 
Many peripheral cities are still going through this 
stage. 
69 
Map 2. The case-study cities 
2.4.3. International migration has also been 
significant. Much of the population growth of 
cities in the 1960s and 1970s was due to migration 
from States on the European periphery and from 
their ex-colonies to Britain, France and the 
Netherlands. Primarily, Afro-Caribbeans and 
Asians migrated to Britain, North Africans settled 
mainly in France but also in Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Germany. Germany also 
attracted many migrants from Turkey and 
southern Europe and the Netherlands became 
home to migrants from its former colonies in 
South-East Asia. In 1990, it was estimated that 
16 million migrants and refugees were living in 
Western Europe — more than 5% of the total 
population. 
2.4.4. International migrants typically settle in 
the larger cities where social support networks 
exist and opportunities, often in the informal 
sectors of the economy, are greatest. For instance, 
of France's 4.5 million immigrants, 40% live in 
the Paris city-region and the majority of the 
others live in Marseilles and Lyons. Immigrants 
living in the Netherlands comprise 4% of the 
national population but 15 to 30% of the urban 
population of Amsterdam, The Hague, 
Rotterdam and Utrecht. Equally, whereas 
immigrants make up 9% of Belgium's population, 
they account for 25% of people living in Brussels. 
Estimates suggest that 80% of immigrants to 
Italy, mainly coming from North Africa, have 
concentrated in the cities of Rome, Milan, Naples, 
Florence, Turin and Bologna. 
2.4.5. In the 1990s with the impulse of the single 
market, Europe's economy is likely to strengthen 
and disparities in economic wealth between the EC 
and surrounding countries grow. The widening 
economic divide is likely to raise demand for 
migration into the Community, not only from the 
countries of North Africa but also through the 
newly opened borders of Eastern Europe. The 
countries of North Africa teeter on the edge of a 
population explosion. One of the greatest 
potential sources of a new wave of migrants, and 
also one of the most unpredictable, is the former 
Soviet Union. Some estimates imply that the 
continuing economic crisis in the Commonwealth 
of Independent States could create 1.5 to 2 million 
migrants per annum. 
2.4.6. Because of ex-colonial and language links, 
the next wave of economic migrants from North 
Africa will primarily settle initially in French cities 
which have established North African 
communities and offer economic opportunities. 
East European economic migrants are more likely 
to settle in German cities with the best 
employment prospects. 
2.4.7. Although the most pronounced migration 
flows are likely to stem from outside the 
Community, international and interregional 
migration within the Community will also 
continue. Net emigration trends from Ireland to 
the United Kingdom, especially to London and the 
south-east, are one clear example. Migration will 
also continue from peripheral regions which have 
higher rates of natural population increase. 
Nevertheless, declining fertility rates are now a 
consistent feature of the peripheral regions of the 
Community which implies that interregional 
migration pressures will continue to decline in the 
1990s and beyond. 
2.5. The urbanization cycle 
2.5.1. In the last 45 years, Europe has become 
increasingly urbanized. By 1981, about 80% of 
West Europeans lived in urban areas in the 
broadest sense of the term. Moreover, the largest 
122 urban agglomerations in the European 
Community housed over 50% of its citizens. Four 
phases can be identified — urbanization, 
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suburbanization, deurbanization and, more 
recently, reurbanization. 
2.5.2. In the urbanization phase, population and 
economic activity concentrates in urban centres. 
In the suburbanization phase the growth of the 
suburbs outstrips that of the city centre and, 
eventually, there is a shift of population and jobs 
to the suburbs. In the deurbanization phase the 
wider conurbation as a whole loses population, 
smaller urban areas grow and a more 
decentralized urban system develops. In the 
reurbanization phase, cities which have been 
losing population begin to grow again. 
2.5.3. In the 1950s, urbanization was the 
dominant process — the larger the city, the more 
likely it was to experience population growth 
through immigration. The trend was found in 
every country in Western Europe. During the 
1960s, however, there was a shift towards more 
dispersed population growth, especially in cities in 
the old core. By the end of the decade, a pattern 
of deurbanization had emerged. 
2.5.4. Whilst rural-urban migration in 
developing regions continued to expand the 
population of larger cities in the 1970s, by the end 
of the decade urbanization was a dominant 
feature only in Spain and Greece. Even though 
Madrid and Athens continued to grow at a 
significant rate, the rapid growth of the Dublin 
and Lisbon metropolitan areas had tailed off by 
the end of the 1970s (see Table 4). 
2.5.5. During the 1970s, in most Member States 
in the old core of Europe — Belgium, Denmark, 
France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and 
West Germany — the relationship between 
migration and settlement size was reversed. The 
largest cities, especially their centres, lost 
population. At the same time, many smaller cities 
grew. However, cities in Spain, Portugal, 
southern Italy and Greece experienced these 
processes at a later date. Many cities in these 
countries were suburbanizing until the late 1980s 
— some years later than their northern 
counterparts — with the urban core losing 
population but the wider metropolitan area 
continuing to grow (see Figure 10). 
2.5.6. Recent trends indicate a more diverse 
pattern of urban change. There is no longer a 
simple relationship between the size of an urban 
area and its growth or decline. There is an 
important economic and regional dimension to the 
contemporary growth and decline of cities. The 
old core, new core, periphery framework 
illustrates the regional shifts in migration patterns 
and regional variation in rates of natural increase 
and their spatial impacts. 
2.5.7. There is a pattern of regional and urban 
change which corresponds to old core, new core 
and peripheral regions and the cities within them 
(Figures 11 and 12). In the peripheral regions of 
the Community and their cities, birth-rates, 
although falling, remain above mortality rates and 
migration from rural to urban areas is still 
important. As a result, despite net out-migration 
from the region, total population levels in these 
cities continue to rise. In the economically more 
prosperous cities and regions of the new core, low 
or negative rates of natural increase ensure a 
stable or declining population, despite net 
immigration. Until relatively recently, many of the 
cities in the old core of Europe not only 
experienced net out-migration, but they also 
experienced minimal natural increase and 
population decline in most of their centres. 
2.6. Towards a 'balanced' European 
urban system — the rise of 
smaller cities, 1960-80 
2.6.1. These economic, migratory and 
demographic forces have had different impacts 
upon cities of different sizes in the Community. 
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Table 4. Demographic change 
Cities in old core regions 
Amsterdam 
Birmingham 
Brussels 
Copenhagen 
Glasgow 
Hamburg 
Liverpool 
London 
Rotterdam 
Paris 
Cities in new core regions 
Barcelona 
Madrid 
Milan 
Lyons 
Marseilles 
Frankfurt 
Cities in peripheral regions 
Dublin 
Lisbon 
Naples 
in European cities 
City 
demographic change 
(x 1 000) 
1970 
820 
1098 
1 075 
725 
940 
1 794 
610 
3 031 
687 
2 591 
(1968) 
1971 
1 742 
3 146 
1 725 
520 
(1968) 
881 
(1968) 
657 
1971 
568 
782 
1 227 
1980 
712 
1 007 
1 008 
585 
774 
1 645 
510 
2 497 
579 
2 300 
(1975) 
1981 
1 755 
3 188 
1 604 
456 
(1975) 
908 
(1975) 
625 
1981 
526 
818 
1 212 
1986 
679 
970 
976 
556 
734 
1 571 
479 
2 423 
571 
2 176 
(1982) 
1986 
I 694 
3 124 
1 478 
413 
(1982) 
840 
(1986) 
592 
1986 
485 
829 
1 201 
Change 
1970-86 
-17.20 
-11.66 
-9 .20 
-23.32 
-21.91 
-12.40 
-21.47 
-20.06 
-16.89 
-16.02 
(1968-82) 
Change 
(%) 
1970-86 
- 2 . 7 
-0 .69 
-14.30 
-20.58 
(1968-82) 
-4 .65 
(1968-82) 
-9 .89 
Change 
(%) 
1970-86 
-14.60 
-6 .01 
-2 .12 
Metropolitan area 
demographic change 
( x 1 000) 
1970 
1 095 
2 793 
2 171 
1 389 
2 505 
n.a. 
1 656 
7 542 
1 064 
9 245 
(1968) 
1971 
1 095 
3 761 
3 163 
1066 
(1986) 
965 
(1968) 
1 486 
(1970) 
1971 
936 
1 781 
2 710 
1980 
1 044 
2 646 
2 212 
1 388 
2 505 
1 898 
1 513 
6 696 
1 025 
9 877 
(1975) 
1981 
1 044 
4 687 
3 227 
1 121 
(1975) 
1 074 
(1975) 
n.a. 
1981 
1 134 
2 621 
2 971 
1986 
1 024 
2 572 
2 237 
1 347 
2 359 
n.a. 
1 445 
6 536 
1 035 
10 071 
(1982) 
1986 
1 024 
4 786 
3 221 
1 101 
(1982) 
1 108 
(1982) 
1 551 
(1989) 
1986 
1 171 
2 578 
3 087 
Change 
(%) 
1970-86 
-6 .49 
-7 .90 
3.04 
-3 .03 
-5 .83 
n.a. 
-12.74 
-12.29 
-2 .73 
8.93 
(1968-82) 
Change 
(%) 
1970-86 
- 6.49 
27.25 
1.83 
3.29 
(1968-82) 
14.92 
(1968-82) 
4.37 
(1970-89) 
Change 
(%) 
1970-86 
25.11 
44.75 
13.91 
Sources: Census and Eurocities data. 
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Figure 10. Urban decline and urban growth, 1971-81 
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Figure 12. Index interregional migration effect, 1990 
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But since the 1950s the European urban system 
has become more balanced since it is less 
dominated by its larger cities and its medium-sized 
and smaller cities have grown. Between 1960 and 
1980, in all Member States, medium-sized and 
smaller cities with populations of under 250 000 
grew substantially. Larger cities either lost 
population or their growth rate slowed. However, 
there were variations within the regions. 
2.6.2. In the old core of Europe, during the 
1950s and 1960s many large cities reached the end 
of the urbanization and suburbanization phases 
and achieved their maximum population. From 
the 1970s onwards many of them lost population 
in the wider metropolitan areas and experienced 
deurbanization as Table 4 demonstrates. During 
the 1960s and 1970s, smaller towns grew in all 
Member States. 
2.6.3. In the periphery of Europe, the experience 
of large cities was different. They continued to 
grow during the 1960s and 1970s, even though 
during the early 1980s their rate of increase began 
to slow down. But in the periphery smaller cities 
also grew after the 1950s and particularly quickly 
during the 1960s and 1970s. 
Community high fertility rates and rural 
emigration rates ensured that both large and small 
cities grew until the 1980s. Tables 5 and 6 show 
that in Spain the centres of the largest cities grew 
most rapidly during the 1950s and 1960s. 
However, during the 1960s smaller cities entered a 
very rapid growth period and maintained this rate 
during the 1970s, as the growth in the centres of 
larger cities began to slow. 
2.6.6. In Portugal's two largest cities, Lisbon and 
Oporto, the central city grew steadily between 
1960 and 1984 as their metropolitan areas grew 
much more rapidly (Tables 7 and 8). There was 
relatively little growth during the 1960s amongst 
smaller towns. But they grew rapidly during the 
1970s. However, the rate of growth of smaller 
cities stabilized in the 1980s. In Ireland the 
population of the capital city Dublin grew by over 
14% during the 1970s. Smaller towns increased at 
higher rates. The greatest relative increase was in 
the very small towns of between 3 000 and 10 000 
(Table 9). In Greece the capital Athens grew 
throughout the three decades, but expanded most 
rapidly during the 1960s. Most smaller cities grew 
throughout all three decades, especially in the 
1970s (Table 10). 
2.6.4. This picture can be appreciated in detail 
by examining the data from Member States 
presented in Tables 5 to 25 below. A note of 
caution is due here. Differences in the availability 
of census data for different countries, different 
time periods and administrative boundaries make 
exact comparisons awkward. Also, where the data 
relates to central cities alone it must be treated 
with care, especially for larger cities where the 
metropolitan boundaries are wider and the 
population larger. However, the central city is a 
reasonable guide to population changes in 
medium-sized and smaller cities where the 
boundaries of central and metropolitan areas are 
more coterminous. 
2.6.5. In the peripheral regions of the European 
2.6.7. These four peripheral countries — Spain, 
Portugal, Ireland and Greece — have traditionally 
been demographically dominated by their capitals 
and have had relatively unbalanced urban 
systems. Despite the continuing importance of 
these capital cities, however, all four countries 
have developed more demographically balanced 
urban systems since the 1960s. 
2.6.8. A similar pattern of decentralized 
development occurred in the old core and new 
core regions of Europe. During the 1970s in Great 
Britain, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Denmark, Italy and France larger cities declined 
as medium and smaller sized cities grew. In Italy, 
as Tables 10 and 11 show, smaller cities grew 
between 1951 and 1981. Larger cities experienced 
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Table 5. Demographic change in principal Spanish towns and cities, 1950-86. 
Town/city 
Madrid 
Barcelona 
Valencia 
Seville 
Málaga 
Zaragoza 
Bilbao 
Murcia 
Córdoba 
Granada 
Palmas (Las) 
Palma de Mallorca 
La Coruna 
Valladolid 
Vigo 
San Sebastián 
Cartagena 
Gijón 
Jerez de la Frontera 
Alicante 
S. Cruz de Tenerife 
Oviedo 
Santander 
Cádiz 
Salamanca 
Badajoz 
Almería 
Burgos 
Pamplona 
Albacete 
Hospitalet 
Huelva 
Badalone 
León 
1950 
1 609 
1 280 
509 
377 
276 
264 
229 
218 
165 
153 
138 
137 
134 
124 
118 
114 
113 
111 
108 
104 
103 
103 
102 
100 
80 
79 
77 
75 
72 
72 
72 
64 
62 
60 
Population ( χ 
1961 
2 260 
1 558 
505 
443 
301 
326 
298 
250 
198 
157 
194 
159 
177 
152 
n.a. 
135 
124 
125 
131 
122 
135 
127 
118 
118 
90 
96 
87 
82 
98 
74 
123 
74 
92 
73 
1970 
3 146 
1 745 
654 
548 
374 
480 
410 
244 
254 
190 
287 
234 
190 
236 
197 
166 
147 
188 
150 
185 
151 
154 
150 
136 
125 
102 
114 
120 
147 
93 
242 
97 
163 
105 
000) 
1981 
3 188 
1 755 
752 
654 
503 
591 
433 
289 
285 
262 
366 
304 
232 
330 
259 
176 
173 
256 
176 
251 
191 
190 
180 
158 
167 
114 
141 
156 
183 
117 
294 
128 
228 
131 
1986 
3 124 
1 694 
739 
668 
595 
596 
378 
309 
305 
281 
372 
321 
242 
342 
264 
180 
169 
259 
180 
266 
211 
191 
188 
154 
167 
126 
157 
164 
184 
127 
277 
135 
223 
137 
Annual growth rate (%) 
1950-61 
3.14 
1.80 
-0 .07 
1.48 
0.79 
1.94 
2.42 
1.25 
1.67 
0.23 
3.14 
1.36 
2.56 
1.87 
n.a. 
1.55 
0.85 
1.09 
1.77 
1.46 
2.49 
1.92 
1.33 
1.52 
1.08 
1.79 
1.12 
0.81 
2.84 
0.25 
4.99 
1.33 
3.65 
1.80 
1961-70 
3.74 
1.27 
2.91 
2.39 
2.44 
4.39 
3.61 
-0 .27 
2.81 
2.14 
4.45 
4.39 
0.79 
5.01 
n.a. 
2.32 
1.91 
4.64 
1.52 
4.73 
1.25 
2.16 
2.70 
1.59 
3.72 
0.68 
3.05 
4.32 
4.61 
2.57 
7.81 
3.05 
6.56 
4.12 
1970-81 
0.15 
0.06 
1.56 
1.98 
3.35 
2.34 
0.61 
1.90 
1.29 
3.63 
2.74 
2.95 
2.24 
3.80 
3.09 
0.65 
1.83 
3.49 
1.79 
3.45 
2.65 
2.36 
2.05 
1.68 
3.27 
1.24 
2.39 
2.96 
2.46 
2.58 
2.19 
3.13 
3.80 
2.49 
1981-86 
-0.23 
-0 .39 
-0.19 
0.24 
1.88 
0.09 
-1.50 
0.75 
0.76 
0.78 
0.18 
0.61 
0.47 
0.40 
0.21 
0.25 
-0 .26 
0.13 
0.25 
0.65 
1.11 
0.06 
0.48 
-0.28 
0.00 
1.12 
1.20 
0.56 
0.06 
0.92 
-0.66 
0.59 
-0.25 
0.50 
Table 6. Demographic change in different sizes of Spanish towns and cities, 1970-86 
Size of towns/cities 
>500 000 
250-500 000 
100-250 000 
50-100 000 
Total 
1970 
5 947 262 
2 588 697 
3 750 630 
2 494 684 
15 781 273 
Population 
1975 
7 213 991 
3 001 789 
4 541 770 
2 889 434 
17 646 984 
1981 
7 376 107 
3 273 272 
5 162 597 
3 244 822 
19 056 798 
1986 
7 277 491 
3 373 613 
5 365 531 
3 415 149 
19 331 764 
Annual growth rate 
1970-75 
3.94 
3.01 
3.90 
2.98 
2.26 
1975-81 
0.37 
1.45 
2.16 
1.95 
1.29 
(%) 
1981-86 
-0.27 
0.61 
0.77 
1.03 
0.29 
Notes: Data derived from census; figures relate to the central city population, not the wider metropolitan area. 
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Table 7. Demographic change in principal Portuguese towns and cities, 1960­84 
Town/city 
Lisbon 
Oporto 
Vila Nova de Gaia 
Coimbra 
Setúbal 
Braga 
Amadora 
Matosinhos 
Almada 
Barreiro 
Évora 
Covilhã 
Moscavide 
Faro 
Funchal 
Queluz 
Odivelhas 
Agualva­Cacém 
Oeiras 
1960 
802 
303 
46 
45 
45 
41 
37 
33 
31 
30 
24 
23 
22 
19 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
Population ( χ 1000) 
1970 
782 
310 
46 
46 
44 
41 
36 
38 
31 
30 
24 
23 
22 
19 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1981 
818 
330 
61 
72 
77 
64 
94 
n.a. 
41 
51 
34 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
49 
41 
38 
34 
32 
1984 
808 
327 
62 
75 
78 
63 
95 
n.a. 
43 
51 
35 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
44 
42 
38 
34 
32 
Annual growth rate (%). 
1960­70 
­0 .25 
0.23 
0.00 
0.22 
­0 .22 
0.00 
­0 .27 
1.42 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1970­81 
0.41 
0.57 
2.60 
4.16 
5.22 
4.13 
9.12 
n.a. 
2.57 
4.94 
3.22 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1981­84 
­0.41 
­0 .30 
0.54 
1.37 
0.43 
­0 .52 
0.35 
n.a. 
1.60 
0.00 
0.97 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
­3 .52 
0.81 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Table 8. Demographic change in different sizes of Portuguese towns and cities, 1960­84 
Size of towns/cities 
>500 000 
250­500 000 
100­250 000 
50­100 000 
Population ( x 1000) 
1960 
802 
303 
0 
0 
1970 
782 
310 
0 
0 
1981 
818 
330 
0 
419 
1984 
808 
327 
0 
424 
Annual Growth Rate (%) 
1960­70 
­0 .25 
0.23 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1970­81 
0.41 
0.57 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1981­84 
­0.41 
­0 .30 
n.a. 
0.40 
iVofe: Figures relate to the central city population, not the wider metropolitan area. 
growth in their centres during the 1960s, but with 
the exception of Rome they declined during the 
1970s. 
2.6.9. In Great Britain, larger cities have been 
declining in population since the 1960s (Figure 
13). Their losses were particularly marked during 
the 1970s although their rate of decline slowed 
during the early 1980s. By contrast, the majority 
of smaller cities with populations of less than 
270 000 grew between 1971 and 1984. During the 
1980s, the picture for smaller cities changed (Table 
13). Between 1981 and 1991, the population in all 
large cities continued to decline. However, in 
contrast to the 1970s, in half of smaller cities the 
population also fell. Only five smaller cities had 
population increases of more than 5%. Greater 
London also declined during the 1980s. But the 
decline was much smaller than it had been in the 
previous two decades. 
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Figure 13. Population change for Great Britain, by type of district, 1971­84 
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2.6.10. In the former West Germany, between 
1975 and 1985, many of its major cities 
experienced substantial losses. By contrast, 
smaller towns and cities grew during this period 
(Figure 14 and Table 14). The former East 
Germany shows a similar pattern of 
decentralization. Many larger cities with 
populations of over 200 000 in 1950 grew between 
1950 and 1981 (Tables 15 and 16). However, many 
lost population during the 1980s. But virtually all 
the cities which were under 200 000 in 1950 grew 
until 1981 and many continued to grow through 
the 1980s. 
2.6.11. Similar decentralization trends occurred 
during the past two decades in France. From the 
early 1970s until the early 1980s smaller cities grew 
rapidly while larger cities grew more slowly 
(Tables 17 and 18). An increasingly decentralized 
urban system is also found in the Netherlands 
(Tables 19 and 20). The three largest cities 
consistently lost population from their centres 
after 1962 and their wider metropolitan areas also 
declined during the 1970s. 
2.6.12. Belgium displays a similar pattern 
(Tables 21 and 22). The centre of Brussels grew 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s but declined in 
the 1970s. By contrast, many smaller cities grew 
Table 9. Demographic change in different 
sizes of Irish towns and cities, 
1971-81. 
Size/category 
Dublin 
>50 000 
10-50 000 
3-10 000 
1 500-3 000 
Less than 1 500 
Rural 
Number 
of towns 
1 
2 
14 
32 
38 
444 
n.a. 
Populatior 
1971 
801.3 
198.9 
235.1 
177.6 
76.9 
208.3 
1 193.8 
i ( x l 000) 
1981 
915.1 
225.3 
293.6 
249.6 
97.1 
261.5 
1 282.1 
Annual 
growth 
rate (%) 
1971-81 
1.34 
1.25 
2.25 
3.46 
2.36 
2.30 
0.72 
rapidly during the 1970s and early 1980s, although 
again their population levels stabilized or declined 
during the 1980s. In Denmark, as Tables 23 and 
24 demonstrate, both the city centre and the 
metropolitan area of Copenhagen declined after 
1960. The smaller cities by contrast grew until 
1980. 
Table 10. Demographic change in principal 
Greek towns and cities, 1951-81 
Towns with over 
30 000 
inhabitants 
Athens 
agglomeration 
Salónica 
agglomeration 
Patra 
agglomeration 
Iraklion 
agglomeration 
Volos 
agglomeration 
Larisa 
Khania 
agglomeration 
Kavala 
Serres 
Agrinion 
agglomeration 
Chalkis 
Ioannina 
Kalamata 
agglomeration 
Lamia 
Trikala 
Rhodes 
Katerini 
agglomeration 
Verria 
Drama 
Alexandroupolis 
Komotini 
Corfu 
Xanthi 
Kozani 
Urban 
(over 10 000) 
Rural, semi-urban 
Total population 
Popu-
lation 
1981 
3 027 284 
706 180 
154 958 
110 958 
107 407 
102 048 
61 976 
56 375 
45 213 
45 087 
44 867 
44 829 
43 235 
41 667 
40 857 
40 392 
39 895 
37 087 
36 109 
34 535 
34 051 
33 561 
31 541 
30 994 
5 609 141 
4 131 276 
9 740 417 
Annual growth rate (%) 
1951-61 
3.00 
2.51 
1.12 
1.85 
2.22 
3.05 
3.52 
0.56 
0.86 
3.13 
0.4 
0.80 
0.31 
-0 .38 
1.45 
1.50 
0.31 
1.66 
0.88 
1.19 
-0 .47 
-0 .61 
0.26 
2.01 
2.46 
-0 .04 
0.95 
1961-71 
3.21 
3.89 
1.51 
1.93 
0.86 
2.70 
0.43 
0.38 
-0 .04 
2.30 
3.91 
1.38 
-0 .23 
5.82 
2.24 
1.60 
0.14 
1.37 
-0 .81 
2.08 
0.19 
0.59 
-0 .59 
0.76 
2.58 
-1 .47 
0.44 
1971-81 
1.77 
2.39 
2.49 
2.74 
1.98 
3.50 
1.57 
2.00 
1.26 
0.76 
2.14 
1.11 
0.68 
0.96 
1.62 
2.33 
2.72 
2.31 
1.98 
4.15 
1.66 
1.60 
2.41 
2.92 
1.95 
-0 .03 
1.06 
Source: Census, 1981. Source: Census. 
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Figure 14. Population in West German municipalities, by size category, 1975­85 
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Source: Statistical yearbook of the FRG. 
Table 11. Demographic change in principal Italian towns and cities, 1951-87. 
Town/city 
Rome 
Milan 
Naples 
Turin 
Genoa 
Palermo 
Florence 
Bologna 
Venice 
Catania 
Bari 
Messina 
Verona 
Taranto 
Padua 
Brescia 
Livorno 
Cagliari 
Reggio di Calabria 
Ferrara 
Parma 
Modena 
La Spezia 
Reggio nell'Emilia 
Bergamo 
Salerno 
Foggia 
Ravenna 
Perugia 
Prato 
1951 
1 695 
1 292 
1 027 
720 
683 
501 
391 
349 
323 
300 
273 
221 
187 
174 
173 
146 
146 
142 
139 
135 
123 
113 
112 
107 
105 
<100 
<100 
<100 
<100 
n.a. 
Population ( X 1 000) 
1961 
2 160 
1 580 
1 179 
1 019 
775 
587 
438 
441 
336 
361 
311 
251 
221 
191 
198 
174 
160 
181 
150 
151 
141 
139 
121 
116 
113 
118 
117 
115 
109 
n.a. 
1971 
2 800 
1 725 
1 234 
1 178 
812 
651 
462 
490 
364 
398 
357 
258 
264 
229 
232 
210 
174 
225 
163 
153 
174 
171 
125 
188 
127 
155 
142 
132 
129 
144 
1981 
2 840 
1 604 
1 212 
1 117 
763 
702 
448 
459 
346 
380 
371 
260 
266 
244 
235 
207 
176 
234 
173 
149 
179 
180 
115 
130 
122 
157 
156 
138 
142 
160 
1987 
2 817 
1 478 
1 200 
1 025 
722 
729 
421 
427 
328 
372 
359 
270 
258 
245 
224 
199 
173 
222 
179 
143 
175 
176 
107 
131 
118 
154 
159 
136 
148 
165 
Annual growth rate (%) 
1951-61 
2.45 
2.03 
1.39 
3.53 
1.27 
1.60 
1.14 
2.37 
0.40 
1.87 
1.31 
1.28 
1.68 
0.94 
1.36 
1.77 
0.92 
2.46 
0.76 
1.13 
1.38 
2.09 
0.78 
0.81 
0.74 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1961-71 
2.63 
0.88 
0.46 
1.46 
0.47 
1.04 
0.53 
1.06 
0.80 
0.98 
1.39 
0.28 
1.79 
1.83 
1.60 
1.90 
0.84 
2.20 
0.83 
0.13 
2.13 
2.09 
0.33 
4.95 
1.17 
2.76 
1.96 
1.39 
1.70 
n.a. 
1971-81 
0.14 
-0 .72 
-0 .18 
-0 .53 
-0 .62 
0.76 
-0 .31 
-0 .65 
-0 .51 
-0 .46 
-2 .06 
0.08 
0.08 
0.64 
0.13 
-0 .14 
0.11 
0.39 
0.60 
-0 .26 
0.28 
0.51 
-0 .83 
-3 .62 
-0 .40 
0.13 
0.94 
0.45 
0.96 
1.06 
1981-87 
-0 .14 
-1.35 
-0.17 
-1 .42 
-0 .92 
0.63 
-1 .03 
-1 .20 
-0 .89 
-0.35 
-0.55 
0.63 
-0.51 
0.07 
-0 .80 
-0.65 
-0 .29 
-0 .87 
0.57 
-0 .68 
-0 .38 
-0 .37 
-1 .19 
0.13 
-0.55 
-0 .32 
0.32 
-0 .24 
0.69 
0.51 
Table 12. Demographic change in different sizes of Italian towns and cities , 1951-87 
Size of towns/cities 
>500 000 
250-500 000 
150-250 000 
Population ( x l 000) 
1951 
5 918 
273 
755 
1961 
7 300 
1 426 
1 426 
1971 
8 400 
2 593 
2 074 
1981 
8 238 
2 530 
2 101 
1987 
7 971 
2 435 
2 071 
Annual growth rate (%) 
1951-61 
2.12 
17.98 
6.57 
1961-71 
1.41 
6.16 
3.82 
1971-81 
-0 .19 
-0 .25 
0.13 
1981-7 
-0 .55 
-0.64 
-0 .24 
Note: Figures relate to the central city population, not the wider metropolitan area. 
Source: Resident population figures, census data. 
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Table 13. Demographic change in Great Britain by type of district, 1981-91 
Category of district 
England and Wales 
Greater London boroughs 
Inner London 
Outer London 
Metropolitan districts 
Principal cities' 
Others 
Non-metropolitan districts 
Cities 
(a) Large (over 175 000) 
(b) Small 
Industrial districts 
(a) Wales and three northern regions of England 
(b) Rest of England 
Districts that include new towns 
Resort, port and retirement districts 
Other urban/mixed urban-rural districts 
(a) Outside the south-east 
(b) In the south-east 
Remoter, mainly rural, districts 
Population ( x l 000) 
1981 
49 107 
6 696 
2 497 
4 199 
11 236 
3 485 
7 751 
31 084 
4 450 
2 764 
1 686 
6 672 
3 350 
3 322 
2 172 
3 336 
9 361 
3 796 
5 566 
5 094 
1991 
48 960 
6 378 
2 350 
4 028 
10 651 
3 227 
7 424 
31 991 
4 357 
2 666 
1 691 
6 659 
3 278 
3 381 
2 305 
3 509 
9 679 
3 951 
5 728 
5 422 
Population change (%) 
1971-81 
0.5 
-10.1 
-17 .7 
- 5 . 0 
- 4 . 6 
-10 .0 
- 2 . 0 
5.3 
- 4 . 5 
- 5 . 1 
- 3 . 5 
3.1 
1.3 
5 
15.1 
4.9 
7.6 
8.8 
6.9 
10.2 
1981-91 
- 0 . 1 
- 4 . 8 
- 5 . 9 
- 4 . 1 
- 5 . 2 
- 7 . 4 
- 4 . 2 
2.7 
- 2 . 1 
- 3 . 6 
0.3 
- 0 . 2 
- 2 . 1 
1.8 
6.1 
5.2 
3.4 
4.1 
2.9 
6.4 
Annual 
growth (%) 
1981-91 
-0 .03 
-0 .49 
-0 .60 
-0.41 
-0 .53 
-0.77 
-0.43 
0.29 
-0.21 
-0 .36 
0.03 
-0 .02 
-0 .22 
0.18 
0.60 
0.51 
0.33 
0.40 
0.29 
0.63 
1 Birmingham. Leeds. Liverpool. Manchester. Newcastle upon Tyne and Sheffield. 
Source: 1991 Census.' preliminary report for England and Wales. 1991. 
Table 14. Demographic change in selected cities of the FRG, 1970-88 
Town/city 
Berlin (West) 
Hamburg 
Munich 
Cologne 
Frankfurt 
Essen 
Dortmund 
Dusseldorf 
Stuttgart 
Bremen 
Duisburg 
Hanover 
Nürnberg 
FRG 
1971 
2 084 000 
1 781 621 
1 338 432 
846 479 
657 776 
691 830 
542 396 
650 377 
632 947 
594 591 
448 791 
516 744 
480 407 
61 502 503 
Population 
1981 
1 888 700 
1 637 132 
1 291 828 
971 403 
625 352 
643 640 
605 418 
588 808 
583 001 
553 261 
554 377 
531 319 
482 552 
61 712 689 
1986 
1 897 200 
1 571 267 
1 274 700 
914 300 
592 400 
615 400 
568 200 
560 600 
565 500 
522 000 
514 600 
505 700 
467 400 
61 140 461 
1988 
2 068 300 
1 603 070 
1 206 400 
934 400 
623 700 
620 000 
584 600 
567 400 
560 100 
533 800 
525 100 
497 200 
477 000 
61 715 103 
Annual growth rate (%) 
1971-81 
-0 .98 
-0 .84 
-0 .35 
1.39 
-0 .50 
-0 .72 
1.11 
-0 .99 
-0 .82 
-0 .72 
2.14 
0.28 
0.04 
0.03 
1981-86 
0.09 
-0 .82 
-0 .27 
-1 .20 
-1 .08 
-0 .89 
-1 .26 
-0 .98 
-0 .61 
-1 .16 
-1 .48 
-0 .98 
-0 .64 
-0 .19 
1986-88 
4.41 
1.01 
-2 .72 
1.09 
2.61 
0.37 
1.43 
0.60 
-0 .48 
1.12 
1.02 
-0.84 
1.02 
0.47 
84 
Table 15. Demographic change in selected cities of the ex-GDR, 1950-89 
Town/city 
Berlin (East) 
Leipzig 
Dresden 
Chemnitz 
Magdeburg 
Rostock 
Halle 
Erfurt 
Coubus 
Zwickau 
Gera 
Jena 
Dessau 
Halle-Neustadt 
GDR 
Population 
1950 
1 189 074 
617 576 
494 187 
293 373 
266 248 
133 593 
289 119 
188 650 
60 374 
138 844 
98 576 
81 134 
91 973 
0 
18 388 172 
1971 
1 087 982 
584 412 
502 432 
299 432 
277 175 
198 713 
257 261 
196 528 
83 996 
126 988 
111535 
88 130 
98 402 
35 290 
17 063 318 
1981 
1 162 300 
559 574 
521 060 
318 578 
287 362 
236 011 
232 622 
212 012 
116 092 
121 283 
126 792 
104 949 
103 194 
91 306 
16 705 635 
1989 
1 279 212 
530 010 
501 417 
301 918 
288 355 
252 956 
230 728 
217 085 
128 943 
118 914 
132 257 
105 825 
101 262 
90 956 
16 433 792 
Annual growth rate 
1950-71 
-0 .42 
-0 .26 
0.08 
0.10 
0.19 
1.91 
-0 .55 
0.20 
1.58 
-0 .42 
0.59 
0.39 
0.32 
n.a. 
-0 .36 
1971-81 
0.66 
-0 .43 
0.36 
0.62 
0.36 
1.74 
-1 .00 
0.76 
3.29 
-0 .46 
1.29 
1.76 
0.48 
9.97 
-0 .21 
(%) 
1981-89 
1.21 
-0 .68 
-0 .48 
-0.67 
0.04 
0.87 
-0.10 
0.30 
1.32 
-0.25 
0.53 
0.10 
-0 .24 
-0 .05 
-0 .20 
Table 16. Demographic change in different sizes of ex-GDR cities, 1950-89 
Size of towns/cities 
>500 000 
250-500 000 
100-250 000 
Population 
1950 
1 806 650 
1 342 927 
461 087 
1971 
2 174 826 
833 868 
633 764 
1981 
2 242 934 
605 940 
1 252 955 
1989 
2 310 639 
843 229 
1 035 014 
Annual growth rate (%) 
1950-71 
0.89 
-2 .24 
1.53 
1971-81 
0.31 
-3 .14 
7.05 
1981-89 
0.37 
4.22 
-2 .36 
Source: Statistisches JahrbuchDeutscher Gemeinden. 
2.6.13. The pattern is clear across the Member 
States. Despite national differences in timing and 
degree, the European urban system became less 
centralized and more balanced during the 20 years 
between 1960 and 1980. In the old core, new core 
and peripheral regions of Europe many smaller 
cities grew faster than larger cities. These 
demographic shifts reflected the changing 
economic shape of urban Europe as traditional 
economic activities declined within or left large 
urban areas, and new industries developed in 
suburbs and smaller cities which had fewer 
economic, social and environmental problems 
than larger cities. 
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Table 17. Demographic change in selected 
French towns and cities, 1982-90 
Town/city 
Paris 
Lyons 
Lille 
Bordeaux 
Toulouse 
Nantes 
Nice 
Toulon 
Grenoble 
Strasbourg 
Grasse. Cannes. Antibes 
Nancy 
Tours 
Rennes 
Montpellier 
Dijon 
Mulhouse 
Reims 
Angers 
Marseilles 
Valenciennes 
Lens 
Saint-Etienne 
Clermont-Ferrand 
Le Havre 
Douai 
Population ( χ 1000) 
1982 
8 707 
1 221 
936 
640 
541 
465 
449 
410 
392 
373 
296 
307 
263 
234 
221 
216 
221 
199 
196 
1 111 
350 
327 
317 
256 
255 
202 
1990 
9 060 
1 262 
950 
685 
608 
492 
476 
438 
400 
388 
336 
311 
272 
245 
237 
226 
237 
206 
206 
1 087 
336 
323 
323 
254 
254 
200 
Annual 
growth 
rate (%) 
1982-90 
0.50 
0.41 
0.18 
0.85 
1.47 
0.70 
0.73 
0.83 
0.25 
0.49 
1.59 
0.16 
0.42 
0.57 
0.88 
0.56 
0.88 
0.43 
0.62 
-0 .27 
-0 .51 
-0.15 
0.23 
-0 .10 
-0 .05 
-0 .12 
Table 18. Demographic change in different 
sizes of French towns and cities, 
1975-90 
Size of towns/cities 
Annual growth rate 
(%) 
Rural commune 
Urban commune 
2-5 000 
5-10 000 
10-20 000 
20-50 000 
50-100 000 
100-200 000 
200-2 000 000 
Agglomeration Paris (9.1 million) 
Source: Census data. 
2.7. Urban Europe, 1980-90 — 
reurbanization and the 
renaissance of large cities? 
2.7.1. During the 1980s another trend — 
reurbanization — began to emerge in Europe. The 
process had two related dimensions. In the first 
place the rate of growth of smaller cities slowed in 
virtually all the Member States as Tables 5 to 24 
indicate. The second change was in the 
performance of larger cities. In many countries, a 
number of larger cities whose population had 
declined consistently throughout the 1960s and 
1970s began to grow again in the late 1980s. 
2.7.2. The reurbanization trend was particularly 
marked in the former West Germany, where after 
a period of decline from 1970 until 1987, all the 
largest cities began to grow again (Table 14). 
Germany is in some respects unique since part of 
the growth is attributable to immigration from the 
former East Germany and Eastern Europe after 
1987. However, the trend was not confined to 
Germany. In France, as Tables 17 and 18 
demonstrate, between 1982 and 1990, in contrast 
to the period from 1975-82, faster rates of growth 
occurred in many larger and medium-sized towns. 
Paris experienced particularly substantial growth 
during the 1980s. In Holland, both Rotterdam and 
Amsterdam, after long periods of substantial 
decline also experienced modest growth during the 
1980s. In other cases, for example the UK, the 
rate of decline of larger cities slowed down during 
the 1980s. For example, in the early 1970s inner 
London was losing almost 20 000 people a year 
and the larger provincial cities nearly 15 000. By 
the early 1980s the annual loss in both inner 
London and the larger provincial cities had fallen 
to 5 000. 
2.7.3. The scale and robustness of the 
reurbanization process which appeared during the 
1980s is difficult to determine since it is still 
emerging. However, recent evidence on trends 
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Table 19. Demographic change in principal Dutch towns and cities, 1951-87 
Municipality 
Amsterdam 
Rotterdam 
The Hague 
Utrecht 
Haarlem 
Eindhoven 
Groningen 
Tilburg 
Nijmegen 
Enschede 
Arnhem 
Breda 
Leiden 
Hilversum 
Apeldoorn 
Maastricht 
Leeuwarden 
Schiedam 
Dordrecht 
Delft 
Heerlen 
Amersfoort 
Hertogenbosch 
Emmen 
Hengelo 
Zwolle 
Velsen 
Vlaardingen 
Deventer 
Ede 
Venlo 
Zaandem 
Kerkrade 
Zeist 
Almelo 
Alkmaar 
1951 
845 
685 
572 
195 
164 
144 
138 
122 
133 
109 
106 
91 
90 
89 
89 
79 
79 
73 
72 
66 
61 
59 
58 
58 
50 
50 
48 
48 
47 
46 
46 
44 
43 
43 
42 
40 
Population ( χ 1 000) 
1962 
866 
730 
605 
258 
170 
172 
148 
140 
134 
129 
126 
111 
97 
102 
107 
92 
84 
81 
85 
75 
74 
71 
73 
68 
63 
56 
66 
69 
57 
60 
56 
51 
50 
53 
53 
45 
1972 
807 
670 
525 
275 
172 
189 
172 
155 
150 
143 
131 
122 
99 
97 
128 
112 
88 
83 
102 
87 
75 
79 
85 
82 
72 
77 
67 
82 
66 
76 
63 
69 
47 
56 
60 
51 
1982 
692 
568 
454 
234 
156 
196 
165 
154 
147 
145 
129 
118 
103 
90 
142 
111 
85 
73 
109 
85 
91 
88 
90 
91 
76 
85 
60 
78 
64 
85 
62 
n.a. 
53 
62 
63 
78 
1987 
701 
574 
444 
230 
91 
191 
168 
154 
146 
145 
128 
120 
108 
85 
146 
116 
85 
69 
108 
88 
94 
94 
90 
92 
77 
91 
57 
75 
66 
91 
64 
n.a. 
53 
60 
62 
88 
Annual growth rate (%) 
1951-62 
0.22 
0.58 
0.51 
2.58 
0.33 
1.63 
0.64 
1.26 
0.07 
1.54 
1.58 
1.82 
0.68 
1.25 
1.69 
1.39 
0.56 
0.95 
1.52 
1.17 
1.77 
1.70 
2.11 
1.46 
2.12 
1.04 
2.94 
3.35 
1.77 
2.44 
1.80 
1.35 
1.38 
1.92 
2.14 
1.08 
1962-72 
-0 .70 
-0.85 
-1 .41 
0.64 
0.12 
0.95 
1.51 
1.02 
1.13 
1.04 
0.39 
0.95 
0.20 
-0 .50 
1.81 
1.99 
0.47 
0.24 
1.84 
1.50 
0.13 
1.07 
1.53 
1.89 
1.34 
3.24 
0.15 
1.74 
1.48 
2.39 
1.18 
3.07 
-0 .62 
0.55 
1.25 
1.26 
1972-82 
-1 .27 
-1 .37 
-1 .20 
-1 .34 
-0 .81 
0.30 
-0 .35 
-0 .05 
-0 .17 
0.12 
-0 .13 
-0 .28 
0.33 
-0 .62 
0.87 
-0 .07 
-0 .29 
-1 .06 
0.55 
-0 .19 
1.62 
0.90 
0.48 
0.87 
0.45 
0.83 
-0 .92 
-0 .42 
-0 .26 
0.94 
-0 .13 
n.a. 
1.01 
0.85 
0.41 
3.60 
1982-87 
0.26 
0.21 
-0.44 
-0 .34 
-10.22 
-0 .52 
0.36 
0.00 
-0 .14 
0.00 
-0 .16 
0.34 
0.95 
-1 .14 
0.56 
0.89 
0.00 
-1 .12 
-0.18 
0.70 
0.65 
1.33 
0.00 
0.22 
0.26 
1.37 
-1 .02 
-0 .78 
0.62 
1.37 
0.64 
n.a. 
0.00 
-0 .65 
-0 .32 
2.44 
Table 20. Demographic change in different sizes of Dutch towns and cities, 1951-87 
Size of towns/cities 
<500 000 
250-500 000 
100-250 000 
50-100 000 
1951 
2 102 
0 
1 111 
1 064 
Population ( χ 1 
1962 
2 201 
258 
1 339 
1 434 
1972 
2 202 
275 
1 576 
1 561 
000) 
1982 
1 260 
454 
1 675 
n.a. 
1987 
1 275 
444 
1 760 
n.a. 
Annual growth rate (%) 
1951-62 
0.42 
n.a. 
1.71 
2.75 
1962-72 
-0 .94 
0.64 
1.64 
0.85 
1972-82 
-4 .52 
5.14 
0.61 
n.a. 
1982-87 
0.24 
-0 .44 
0.99 
n.a. 
Note: Figures relate to the central city population, 
not the wider metropolitan area. 
Source: Census. 
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Table 21. Demographic change in principal Belgian towns and cities, 1950-88 
Town/city 
Brussels ' 
Antwerp2 
Ghent 
Liège 
Mechelen 
Bruges 
Ostend 
St. Nicholas 
Alost 
Seraing 
Courtrai 
Verviers 
Genk 
Louvain 
Mouscron 
Turnhout 
Roulers 
Tournai 
Hoboken 
Hasselt 
Merksem 
Lierre 
Vilvorde 
Herstal 
Renaix 
Lokeren 
1950 
966 
261 
166 
156 
61 
52 
51 
45 
43 
42 
40 
40 
38 
37 
36 
34 
33 
33 
32 
30 
29 
29 
27 
27 
25 
25 
Population ( χ 1 
1960 
1 019 
254 
158 
154 
65 
52 
57 
48 
46 
41 
43 
35 
48 
n.a. 
37 
34 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
32 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1970 
1 071 
227 
149 
147 
66 
51 
56 
49 
47 
41 
45 
34 
58 
32 
37 
38 
40 
33 
34 
40 
28 
28 
34 
30 
25 
27 
000) 
1982 
995 
462 
238 
212 
77 
118 
69 
68 
79 
64 
76 
55 
62 
85 
55 
38 
52 
66 
34 
42 
31 
31 
33 
38 
24 
34 
1988 
970 
476 
232 
200 
76 
118 
68 
68 
77 
61 
76 
53 
62 
84 
54 
38 
52 
67 
n.a. 
n.a. 
31 
31 
33 
37 
n.a. 
34 
Annual growth rate (%) 
1950-60 
0.54 
-0 .27 
-0 .49 
-0 .13 
0.64 
0.00 
1.12 
0.65 
0.68 
-0 .24 
0.73 
-1 .33 
2.36 
n.a. 
0.27 
0.00 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1.71 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1960-70 
0.50 
-1 .12 
-0 .58 
-0 .46 
0.15 
-0 .19 
-0 .18 
0.21 
0.22 
0.00 
0.46 
-0 .29 
1.91 
n.a. 
0.00 
1.12 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
0.61 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1970-82 
-0.61 
6.10 
3.98 
3.10 
1.29 
7.24 
1.75 
2.77 
4.42 
3.78 
4.46 
4.09 
0.56 
8.48 
3.36 
0.00 
2.21 
5.95 
0.00 
0.41 
0.85 
0.85 
-0.25 
1.99 
-0 .34 
1.94 
1982-88 
-0 .42 
0.50 
-0 .42 
-0.97 
-0 .22 
0.00 
-0 .24 
0.00 
-0 .43 
-0 .80 
0.00 
-0 .62 
0.00 
-0 .20 
-0.31 
0.00 
0.00 
0.25 
n.a. 
n.a. 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
-0 .44 
n.a. 
0.00 
Table 22. Demographic change in different sizes of Belgian towns and cities, 1950-88 
Size of towns/cities 
>500 000 
250-500 000 
100-250 000 
50-100 000 
25-50 000 
1950 
966 
261 
427 
164 
645 
Population ( χ 1 000) 
1960 
1 019 
254 
312 
174 
n.a. 
1970 
1 071 
227 
296 
231 
642 
1982 
995 
462 
450 
808 
305 
1988 
970 
476 
550 
798 
204 
Annual growth rate (%) 
1950-60 
0.54 
-0 .27 
-3 .09 
0.59 
n.a. 
1960-70 
0.50 
-1 .12 
-0 .53 
2.87 
n.a. 
1970-82 
-0 .61 
6.10 
3.55 
11.00 
-6.01 
1982-88 
-0 .42 
0.50 
3.40 
-0.21 
-6 .48 
(1) Estimated resident population on basis of census. 
(2) Brussels and Antwerp both include suburbs. 
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Table 23. Demographic change in principal Danish towns and cities, 1950-82 
Town/city 
Copenhagen1 
Copenhagen2 
Aarhus 
Odense 
Aalborg 
Esbjerg 
Randers 
Horsens 
Kolding 
Helsingør 
Herning 
1960 
923 
n.a. 
119 
111 
86 
55 
42 
37 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
Population ( χ 1 000) 
1970 
802 
1 380 
100 
137 
100 
68 
58 
44 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1982 
645 
1 377 
247 
170 
154 
80 
62 
55 
56 
56 
56 
1988 
620 
1 343 
258 
174 
155 
81 
61 
55 
57 
57 
56 
Annual growth rate (%) 
1960-70 
-1 .40 
n.a. 
-1 .72 
2.13 
1.52 
2.14 
3.28 
1.75 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1970-82 
-1 .80 
-0 .02 
7.83 
1.81 
3.66 
1.36 
0.56 
1.88 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1982-88 
-0 .66 
-0 .42 
0.73 
0.39 
0.11 
0.21 
-0 .27 
0.00 
0.30 
0.30 
0.00 
Table 24. Demographic change in different sizes of Danish towns and cities, 1960-88. 
Size of towns/cities 
>500 000 
250-500 000 
100-250 000 
50-100 000 
Population (1 000) 
1960 
923 
0 
230 
220 
1970 
802 
0 
337 
170 
1982 
645 
0 
571 
365 
1988 
620 
258 
329 
367 
Annual growth rate (%) 
1960-70 
-1 .40 ο.ω 
3.89 
-2 .55 
1970-82 
-1 .80 
n.a. 
4.49 
6.57 
1982-88 
-0 .66 
n.a. 
-8 .78 
0.09 
1 Copenhagen. Frederiksberg and Gentofte municipalities. 
2 including suburban areas. 
Source: Resident population, census data. 
from the second half of the 1980s indicates the 
process may be wider and deeper than data drawn 
from the complete decade suggests. This trend has 
been identified by the Urbinno Network in their 
research work for the FAST programme. This 
separates trends occurring during the first half of 
the 1980s from those in the second half of the 
decade. It confirms that many large cities did lose 
population in the period between 1980-85 and that 
only a modest number increased in size. However, 
in the second half of the 1980s, reurbanization 
occurred in a growing number of large cities in the 
Community. 
2.7.4. This pattern can be seen in Table 25 which 
highlights the experience of 22 of our case-study 
cities. Between 1980-85 only Seville in the 
periphery and Lyons in the new core of Europe 
increased in population. But the position changed 
dramatically in the period 1985-90. The old core 
cities of London, Paris, West and East Berlin, 
Brussels, Hamburg, Amsterdam, Dortmund, 
Rotterdam, the new core cities of Frankfurt, 
Lyons, Madrid and Barcelona, and the peripheral 
cities of Valencia and Seville all increased in 
population. 
2.7.5. This evidence supports the general 
argument of this report that demographic trends 
in many respects reflect economic trends. The 
economically dynamic cities of the new core, or 
those developing rapidly in the periphery, are 
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Table 25. Demographic change in the core and ring of selected European cities, 1970-90 
Core city 
Hamburg 
Frankfurt 
Dortmund 
Berlin (West) 
Paris 
Lyons 
Marseilles 
Milan 
Amsterdam 
Rotterdam 
Brussels 
London 
Birmingham 
Glasgow 
Dublin 
Copenhagen 
Thessaloniki 
Athens 
Madrid 
Barcelona 
Valencia 
Seville 
Berlin (East) 
1970-1975 
Core 
-0 .77 
— 
-0 .41 
-1 .14 
-1 .48 
-1 .79 
0.27 
-0 .14 
-1 .84 
-1 .99 
-1 .99 
-1 .89 
-0 .30 
-3 .38 
-0 .41 
-2 .28 
2.06 
1.09 
0.45 
-0 .07 
1.44 
1.24 
0.21 
Ring 
0.85 
— 
0.08 
0.00 
1.93 
4.25 
4.47 
1.06 
1.51 
1.10 
0.48 
-0 .37 
0.35 
-1 .47 
— 
2.00 
— 
— 
8.28 
3.40 
1.47 
-0 .02 
-0 .05 
1975-1980 
Core 
-0 .91 
— 
-0 .79 
-1 .17 
-0 .69 
-1 .23 
-0 .48 
-1 .17 
-1.11 
-1 .38 
-1 .38 
-1 .60 
-1 .01 
-1 .84 
-0 .41 
-1 .47 
1.44 
-0 .16 
-0 .20 
0.13 
1.11 
1.81 
1.14 
Ring 
0.36 
— 
-0 .27 
0.00 
0.66 
1.18 
2.91 
1.07 
0.81 
0.81 
0.15 
-0 .14 
-0 .66 
-0 .11 
— 
0.46 
— 
— 
8.19 
2.27 
1.73 
1.23 
0.14 
1980-1985 
Core 
-0 .77 
-1 .01 
-1 .15 
-0 .49 
-1 .02 
0.07 
-1 .10 
-2 .02 
-1 .18 
-0 .28 
-0 .95 
-0 .38 
-0 .33 
-1 .06 
-1 .61 
-0 .59 
0.93 
-1 .43 
-0 .63 
-0 .58 
-0 .41 
0.16 
0.90 
Ring 
0.06 
-0 .04 
-0 .56 
0.00 
0.78 
-0 .04 
1.57 
0.60 
0.57 
0.56 
0.02 
-0 .06 
0.00 
-0 .17 
— 
-0 .12 
0.54 
1.45 
3.16 
0.71 
1.26 
1.19 
0.06 
1985-1990 
Core 
0.24 
1.62 
0.54 
2.52 
1.01 
0.07 
-1 .10 
-1 .03 
0.34 
0.22 
-0 .17 
0.56 
-0 .37 
-1 .41 
— 
-0 .72 
— 
— 
0.28 
0.04 
0.60 
0.75 
1.85 
Ring 
0.06 
0.11 
0.37 
0.00 
2.06 
1.21 
2.84 
0.35 
0.47 
0.28 
0.04 
-0 .32 
0.06 
-0.32 
— 
0.14 
— 
— 
0.07 
-0.04 
-0.48 
0.52 
0.17 
N.B. Insufficient data for Athens, Thessaloniki, Dublin and Frankfurt 1970-75; Athens, Thessaloniki and Dublin, 1975-80; Athens, Thessaloniki and 
Dublin, 1980-85; and Athens and Thessaloniki, 1985-90. 
Source: Drewett et al, 1990. 
experiencing population growth. Larger cities in 
the old core which had a degree of economic 
recovery during the second half of the 1980s — 
Hamburg, Dortmund, Rotterdam, Amsterdam — 
also grew in population. However cities which are 
still experiencing the problems of economic 
restructuring continue to lose population. For 
example, Glasgow, Manchester, and Birmingham 
in the old core, Marseilles in the new core and 
Naples in the periphery lost population during the 
second half of the 1980s, even though the rate of 
loss in some cases slowed down. 
has a variety of social and economic 
consequences. It has been driven by the wider 
process of economic restructuring which has 
attracted both high value-added new service sector 
jobs into many central cities. It has also been 
encouraged by the fact that many city 
governments have undertaken initiatives to 
revitalize their city centres. The revival of urban 
cultural activities, lengthening travel-to-work 
times, public and private sector investment on 
prestigious urban regeneration schemes have also 
reinforced the appeal of living within cities. 
2.7.6. The process of reurbanization primarily 
follows the process of economic success not 
failure. Reurbanization is a complex mixture of 
economic, social and demographic trends which 
2.7.7. Reurbanization brings advantages but 
imposes many strains. One consequence is that the 
social composition of central cities changes as 
their economic functions change. The arrival of 
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higher income groups allied with property 
investment by the retail and office sectors, raises 
land and property values. In turn, low-income 
households who have lived close to the city centre 
are no longer able to afford to live in the inner city 
and are forced out. Alternatively, those who 
remain are squeezed into more restricted inner city 
areas in the least desirable housing as the 
surrounding areas experience greater levels of 
economic, social and physical redevelopment. 
These problems of 'gentrification' are increasingly 
found within European cities. Nevertheless, it 
seems likely that reurbanization, reflecting 
economic restructuring and policy efforts to 
improve living, working and leisure conditions in 
city centres, will continue in the 1990s in many 
cities. 
2.8. The future shape of the 
European urban system 
2.8.1. The forces that determine economic 
success or failure and the social forces shaping 
urbanization in Europe are complex. Nevertheless, 
some future trends are clear. The most likely 
pattern of future regional migration, in view of 
continuing economic restructuring in Europe and 
the development of the single market, is a modest 
migratory shift from urban areas with economic 
problems, especially in peripheral and old core 
regions, to economically successful urban areas. 
Rural - urban population movement will continue 
in peripheral regions, but at a much slower rate 
than in the past. 
2.8.2. Potentially more significant is migration 
from outside the EC's borders, especially from 
North Africa, Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union. This population movement is likely 
to focus on cities with greater economic potential, 
in both the old and new core, especially those 
offering similar languages and established ethnic 
communities. These cities are more likely to act as 
magnets for potential international migrants than 
those in peripheral regions. 
2.8.3. Despite their economic attractiveness to 
migrants, cities in Europe's new core often have 
low, or negative, rates of natural increase which, 
despite in-migration, will limit demographic 
growth. Equally, cities in Europe's old core which 
are still coping with economic restructuring are 
likely to continue to decline in population, 
although at a slower rate than previously. Cities in 
peripheral regions should continue to grow as 
rates of natural increase, even though declining, 
will remain relatively high for some time, and, 
although more slowly, as rural-urban migration 
continues. 
2.8.4. During the 1990s the European urban 
system will remain more balanced 
demographically than it was two decades ago, 
since the growth of smaller towns which took 
place during the 1960s and 1970s will not be 
substantially reversed. Many smaller cities with 
comparative economic advantages may grow in 
demographic terms. Nevertheless, the pattern of 
growth and decline of cities will not be determined 
by size alone. During the 1980s the growth of 
smaller cities was slower than it was during the 
previous two decades. At the same time, many 
larger cities arrested their decline and in the late 
1980s began to grow again. To simplify a complex 
process, it may be argued that the 1950s and 1960s 
were the age of the big cities. The 1970s and early 
1980s marked the expansion of smaller cities. The 
late 1980s and 1990s could mark the beginning of 
the renaissance of larger cities in Europe. 
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3. Beyond the locality: cities and 
cross-European issues 
3.1. Cross-European issues in urban 
development 
3.1.1. Varying patterns of investment, migration 
and fertility which operate at a national and 
international scale, have had a critical impact on 
urban development in Europe. The movement of 
people and money is a major factor operating 
independently of city boundaries which facilitates 
or constrains urban change. A number of other 
factors, linked to economic and demographic 
change, will assume important places on the 
agenda of all organizations concerned with the 
future of European cities into the next century. 
The most significant suggested by the city 
case-studies are discussed in this chapter. 
3.2. European transport and 
communications 
3.2.1. Transport and communications 
infrastructures are fundamental in shaping urban 
form. Improved efficiency across all modes of 
transport — road, rail, air and waterways — will 
be crucial to the effective functioning of Europe's 
cities and its overall economy. Infrastructural 
development nevertheless has its costs. Europe's 
urban areas are becoming the focus of a transport 
crisis which could undermine the primary 
objective of the single market — the free 
movement of goods and persons throughout the 
Community. As key nodes of the transport 
network, cities show increasing signs of strain as 
increased mobility, and hence growing demand, 
has outstripped the current and projected supply 
of infrastructure in Europe. Growth in global 
transportation flows — caused by a growing 
international division of labour, heavier 
international trade, reduced transport costs 
resulting from the shift from heavy to light 
commodities and relative falls in car prices — is 
likely to be boosted by the completion of the 
internal market. Additionally, the desire for 
greater personal mobility in the 1990s, by air, rail 
and particularly road, will place further demands 
upon cities as communication nodes. 
3.2.2. Moves toward a more efficient transport 
network across Europe are made difficult by 
diversity in the transport and telecommunications 
policies of individual Member States and the 
determination of investment priorities along 
sectoral lines. National differences also reflect 
different traditions and approaches to public 
intervention in transport matters. While France, 
for example, has emphasized the importance of 
investment in telecommunications, motorways, 
high-speed passenger trains and regional air links, 
Germany has focused investment in high-density 
multi-modal transport systems along corridors. 
The UK, on the other hand, has favoured 
deregulation and increased reliance upon market 
forces in transport provision. The development of 
policy at the EC level has been hampered by 
disagreements over harmonization and 
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liberalization in many transport sectors. Traffic 
bottlenecks at border cities in particular are 
exacerbated by non-standardized national 
regulations, for example in railway gauge-sizes. 
3.2.3. Future emphasis in new and old core areas 
will largely be upon reducing demand for road 
infrastructure and on upgrading existing routes. 
The latter is likely to focus significantly on 
cross-border links. There is a growing lobby, for 
example, for improved links between Bavaria and 
Lombardy. Better integration between modes of 
transport and the development of alternative 
modes are under active discussion in the more 
congested regions. Amongst the options available 
are multimodal systems offering transport 
companies greater choice in routes and transport 
modes or the development of the more 
energy-efficient water transport system. The latter 
option would be expensive but becomes more 
viable as average truck speeds continue to 
decline. 
3.2.4. In peripheral areas, a strong commercial 
and public sector lobby continues to favour the 
provision of additional infrastructure. New 
transport technologies make possible in principle, 
for example, a halving of the time it takes to 
transport goods from Thessaloniki to northern 
Italian cities, currently 36 hours. Although views 
differ on the relative contribution transportation 
infrastructure makes to the development of 
peripheral regions, reduced delivery times and 
transport costs for businesses suggest that speedier 
links to the core can play a positive role, provided 
they are linked to telecommunication investment 
and comprehensive city-regional economic 
development strategies. The latter might also help 
prevent inequalities within city-regions which are 
re-emphasized when transportation investment is 
focused on the main regional centre — a problem 
recognized in Andalusia which is increasingly 
dominated by Seville. 
3.2.5. As well as improved intra-core and 
core-periphery links, which are more likely to be 
favoured by market developments, the often poor 
links between peripheral cities and their respective 
regions will require strengthening if urban and 
regional potentials are to be exploited. This 
especially applies to links between peripheral 
European cities and those of potential future 
member countries including, for example, 
Thessaloniki—Sofia links. Most border cities in 
Europe suffer from the fact that surface transport 
networks remain orientated to serving national 
rather than European needs and intra-European 
rather than extra-European ones. The 
infrastructures around Hamburg and 
Thessaloniki, for example, are not well suited to 
current investment and trading patterns, 
particularly given any further expansion of EC 
membership in Eastern Europe. Other missing 
links exist between Copenhagen and 
Sweden/Germany, although a link between 
Copenhagen and Malmo will be completed around 
2000, between Thessaloniki and western Europe, 
and between northern Portugal and Galicia in 
Spain. 
3.2.6. Road transport congestion is particularly 
pronounced in the extended core. Eighty percent 
of intra-EC urban freight moves are concentrated 
in the area between London and Milan and 
further growth is likely to be greatest in the 
extended core. Congestion will not be confined to 
the core, however, as levels of car ownership in 
the periphery catch up with more prosperous 
areas. Automobility is set to rise 70% in northern 
Europe, 300 to 500% in southern Europe and 
1 000% in eastern Europe by the end of the 
century. Road transport is also a key factor in 
ecological and environmental damage. From 
1973-88, transport's share of total energy 
consumption in the EC grew from 20 to 30% with 
road traffic accounting for 85% of that increase. 
Although fuel consumption and vehicle figures 
improved in the 1980s, this was more than offset 
by increased traffic levels. 
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Isolation and peripherality: Thessaloniki and its communications infrastructure 
Thessaloniki, although the Community's 'gateway to the east', is, like many peripheral cities, economically disadvantaged by 
its communications infrastructure: 
Φ International and domestic flights are inadequate. The airport has a small and basic passenger terminal and most 
international flights have to go via Athens. In winter, fog often closes the airport. 
• The rail network has limited capacity and efficiency. The line eastwards to Turkey is a single track constructed about 100 
years ago and does not permit high speeds. Rail connections to the rest of Europe run via Belgrade and Bulgaria but they 
have limited efficiency and the latter is practically out of use. 
• Strategic road links are also below West European standards. The main route to Turkey carries commercial and passenger 
traffic but has only a single lane in each direction and passes through towns en route; there is no dual carriageway for most 
of the 700 kilometres between the Greek border and Belgrade, making it one of Europe's most dangerous roads. The 330 
kilometres to Sofia from Thessaloniki is a narrow single lane. 
• Telecommunicaton links are poor. Demand, even for house telephones, outstrips capacity and unreliable lines make data 
transmission impractical. 
3.2.7. The speed and reliability of European 
railways varies considerably between Member 
States and particularly between northern and 
southern Europe. The peripheral areas where 
services are poorest face severe constraints in 
overcoming the problems of peripherality. A 
major concern in peripheral cities is that recent 
investment in transportation infrastructure will 
continue to favour cities in core areas. The high 
speed train (HST) network will draw the favoured 
urban areas of the core closer together and 
disadvantage remote locations and other centres 
en route which do not get a station. The strategic 
significance of rapid train routes is readily 
apparent from the intense lobbying for TGV 
stations, for example by Bilbao and Barcelona for 
a connection on the Madrid—Paris line. Equally, 
whilst the Dutch Government is reluctant for 
planning reasons to route the TGV through 
agricultural areas of the Randstad — the fastest of 
the proposed options — decision-makers in 
Amsterdam and Rotterdam view their designated 
TGV status as of immense symbolic, as well as 
economic, importance. 
3.2.8. New rail infrastructure is of particular 
significance for current air-traffic patterns. HSTs 
are expected to dominate short- and 
medium-distance European travel — up to 600 km 
— in the future. In response, many of the major 
airport authorities in metropolitan Europe are 
already assessing the effects on business and, for 
example, planning to prioritize international trade 
or attract HST links. Loss of passengers from 
airports specializing in short- to medium-distance 
European flights may ultimately reduce their 
attractiveness as locations for high-tech and 
distribution firms in favour of HST-favoured 
localities. 
3.2.9. Despite the challenge of HSTs, air travel 
is set to continue its growth. It is estimated that 
for each 1% growth in GDP, air passenger 
volumes increase by 1.5%. On current economic 
projections, an annual increase in passenger 
numbers of 3 to 5% up to the year 2000 can be 
expected. Growth in air traffic is likely to 
reinforce the existing hierarchy of airport cities. 
Strategically positioned airports serving major 
urban areas, from which the stronger carriers 
operate longer distance flights, will continue to 
dominate those providing feeder services and 
intra-European flights, especially as some of the 
latter will suffer from competition from the HSTs. 
The concentration process has already begun. 
Frankfurt, for instance, handles nearly twice as 
much freight as its nearest rival — Heathrow. 
These two airports also top the league of air-
passenger transporters. Frankfurt airport employs 
a staggering 50 000 people and many more 
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are employed in ancillary activities, 
freight-forwarding companies and high-tech firms 
which favour locations near to international 
airports. 
3.2.10. With a growing tendency for traffic to be 
concentrated increasingly upon a few hub 
airports, these areas will remain attractive to 
distributive companies and high value-added 
exporters but will have to cope with the increasing 
flight delays and congested access routes which 
accompany such benefits. The deregulation of 
airports could mean that the economic benefits 
will be unevenly shared within the European 
urban system as cities with greater competitive 
edge gain disproportionately. If the US experience 
of deregulation is repeated in Europe, airports 
which are homes to successful carriers and act as 
international hubs, providing long-haul, 
high-quality intercontinental air services, will 
gain. Smaller airports, specializing in 
intra-European flights, will face stiff er 
competition as multitudes of routes and different 
classes of fare on particular flights appear and 
charter flights come under threat. Increased 
merger and take-over activity may result, 
depending on the degree to which member 
governments support weaker carriers on social or 
prestige grounds. 
3.3. Networks and linkages in urban 
Europe 
3.3.1. The European urban system in the 1990s 
and beyond will be increasingly shaped by the 
dynamics of economic competition. However, 
there will be countervailing pressures with 
interventions at the national, regional and city 
levels designed to achieve a more diverse 
distribution of economic growth. In this context, 
numerous networks have emerged as cities and 
regions have sought to promote cooperation 
between themselves and limit the increasing 
intensity of competition. Networking in urban 
Europe is not a new concept. In ancient times, 
cities forged informal and institutionalized 
alliances. In the 1980s, however, urban networks 
acquired a higher profile as urban policy-makers 
sought new ways of improving their cities' 
economic, political and technical capacities. The 
EC has given support to many of these initiatives 
in recent years. In particular, under Article 10 of 
the European Regional Development Fund 
(ERDF) it has financially assisted 12 
European-wide networks to contribute to 
economic and social cohesion in Europe by 
promoting solidarity and identity of purpose 
between regions and cities across the 
Community. 
3.3.2. Urban networks operate at 
European-wide, national, regional and 
cross-border levels. They can link neighbouring 
cities as well as distant ones, and cities in the new 
core with others in the old core and periphery. 
European-wide networks can provide the basis for 
extensive dissemination of knowledge and act as 
economic conduits between more and less 
successful cities and regions. They include 
networks between very different cities and regions 
and those with similar social, economic, 
environmental or geographical characteristics as 
well as networks which extend beyond the EC 
space. 
3.3.3. A wide range of networks also operate 
throughout the Community at the national and 
regional scale. For instance, in France and 
Germany, there are long-established urban and 
regional networks which promote cooperation 
between participating members and enhance their 
competitive position. At the regional level, 
networks very often have an economic rationale. 
Sub-European networks and linkages may also 
have a supranational dimension. Two categories 
of sub-European networks are prominent. First, 
cross-border linkages have developed between 
cities or regions lying on either side of a national 
border. Second, international bilateral or trilateral 
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linkages have emerged between cities further 
apart. Since they clearly transcend regional and 
national spaces, both are of wider European 
interest. 
3.3.4. Networks and linkages have three distinct 
functions. First, they act as a forum for the 
transfer of knowledge and best practice about a 
wide range of urban and regional issues, and for 
stimulating policy, projects and technological 
innovation. Second, they act as catalysts for the 
generation of inter-city economic cooperation. 
Third, they have been mechanisms for lobbying at 
national and EC level. Some networks have 
specialized in one of these functions; others have 
all three. 
3.3.5. For EC funding purposes, 'networks' are 
tightly defined. For instance, the staging of 
workshops and seminars for the exchange of 
officials and ideas is categorized as an 'exchange 
of experience'. Only when these exchanges lead to 
more concrete projects with partners formally 
agreeing to work together in a potential project 
does the Commission recognize it as a network. 
Equally, groups of cities acting as lobbying 
organizations, such as the Commission des villes, 
are regarded more as umbrella organizations than 
networks. Whereas the Community does not 
normally fund the establishment or development 
of such umbrella organizations, it does co-finance 
specific networks on identified projects promoted 
by these organizations or their member cities. 
3.3.6. Lobbying by umbrella groups of cities or 
regions takes different forms depending on the 
institution lobbied and the purpose of lobbying. 
Broadly, they lobby to influence policy or to 
attract financial resources. Umbrella groups may 
comprise cities or regions with common 
characteristics which campaign for policies or 
resources to address issues relevant to its 
members, such as the Association of Traditional 
Industrial Regions (RETI). Alternatively, their 
members are more heterogeneous and campaign 
on a range of regional or urban issues. 'Eurocities' 
falls within this latter category. Eurocities has a 
broad remit. Representing the second cities of the 
Community — large, mainly non-capital cities — 
it lobbies, exchanges best practice and fosters 
economic cooperation. In its lobbying capacity, it 
aims to influence the development of EC urban 
policy, to press for the provision of specific EC 
aid programmes in order to resolve urban 
problems, and to secure funding for joint 
projects. 
3.3.7. The Commission des villes illustrates how 
umbrella organizations can develop networks and 
provide opportunities for shared research to take 
policy beyond existing practice. Established in 
1989, it represents the small and medium-sized 
cities of the Community — membership is open to 
cities with an urban core of between 50 000 and 
500 000. It operates five networks each of which 
has developed a staged programme leading to 
concrete cooperative activities. The networks are 
charged with addressing issues of unemployment 
and local economic development (led by 
Kalamari), urban infrastructure (Nancy), the 
development of science and technology parks 
(Montpellier), development strategies for 
medium-sized towns in the context of the single 
market (Évora) and the renovation of historic 
urban centres to revitalize the local economy and 
develop tourism (Coimbra). 
3.3.8. In 1990, the Commission funded 12 
European-wide networks on a pilot basis. 
Subsequently, in July 1991, Recite (Regions and 
cities for Europe) was launched. Recite aims to 
contribute towards economic and social cohesion 
by supporting networks between regions and cities 
which undertake joint projects. While the EC may 
co-finance networks, the responsibility for the 
direction and control of the networks rests firmly 
with the participants. Networks supported by the 
Commission address a wide variety of urban 
issues. Examples include the network on public 
transport interchanges (PTI) and Quartiers en 
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crise. PTI, managed by the International Union of 
Public Transport, spreads up-to-date know-how 
and best practice on public passenger transport 
interchanges to local government, operators, 
agencies and research institutions throughout the 
Community. It is intended to pilot projects to 
develop model interchanges which can improve 
mobility, reduce traffic congestion in cities and 
reduce environmental pollution. The network 
focuses on three key topics: the location of 
transport interchanges, their functional design, 
and operational and managerial issues. Quartiers 
en crise is a network of 25 European cities which 
focuses on integrated approaches to revitalizing 
urban areas in decline. It involves cities with areas 
which have acute housing and unemployment 
problems including some with high concentrations 
of ethnic minorities. It combines training, an 
exchange of experience at the local level, and 
research. It aims to raise local knowledge of the 
reasons for urban decline, disseminate 
information about successful projects, encourage 
inter-urban cooperation in tackling problems of 
decline and generate awareness of the need for 
strategic policy responses to decline. 
3.3.9. To face the challenges of the changing 
European economic and political scene, cities are 
also cooperating to coordinate development 
strategies, launch joint ventures and develop the 
exchange of best practice. Attracting inward 
investment by national and multinational capital 
in property development, service industries and 
research and development are priorities for many 
cities. In several of them, strategies have emerged 
to forge coalitions between two or more cities. By 
pooling resources and developing joint strategies, 
they hope to expand their common economic 
base. For instance, the Languedoc-Roussillon 
cities of Montpellier and Nîmes have agreed to 
combine and integrate their resources and 
activities to enhance their capacity and 
competitiveness in the European economic space. 
The collaboration is intended to create a single 
economic focus to compete with emerging 
metropolitan groupings in other European 
States. 
3.3.10. At the macro-regional level, cross-border 
linkages can promote economic collaboration. A 
recent initiative, for instance, seeks to devise a 
route of high technology around a 'Mediterranean 
arc'. Traversing Valencia, Catalonia, Roussillon, 
Nice and linking into Italy, this network aims to 
promote a distinctive economic role for the area 
and allow it to exploit its many comparative 
advantages. The quality of life of the area is 
intended to establish it as a major European axis 
for research and development in new technologies 
and the production of high value-added products. 
International linkages on a bilateral or trilateral 
basis can also unlock economic potential. For 
instance, the innovative 'Euro-gateway' project 
has constructed an economic alliance between 
Glasgow, Dortmund and Montpellier. The project 
involves the reciprocal provision of facilities for 
small businesses, as units are made available in 
Glasgow with advice from the local development 
agencies for small businesses in the other cities. 
3.3.11. International economic exchanges and 
encouraging inter-urban cooperation can bring 
mutual benefits to cities through new economic 
activity. A distinction needs to be made here 
between economic objectives. Some networks are 
clearly geared to improve the ability of members 
to compete economically. Others simply aim to 
increase the internal efficiency of their cities 
through mutually beneficial interactions. The 
Polis network, for example, is a catalyst for the 
implementation of new technologies to solve 
problems of traffic congestion. Here, cities are 
able to cooperate with potential rivals without 
significantly mitigating their comparative strategic 
advantages. While the proliferation of networks 
throughout Europe is a recent phenomenon, it is 
possible to make some evaluation of them. First, 
networks are not simply a means to ameliorate 
competition by encouraging cooperation. While 
networks do enhance collaboration between cities, 
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in the process they can also increase their 
individual competitiveness against non-members. 
In this way, cities facing economic disadvantage 
can use networks and linkages to help improve 
their relative standing. 
dynamic and innovative cities in this study have 
particularly used networks to develop their 
'internationalization' strategies and in this way 
strengthen their presence in the European 
economic arena. 
3.3.12. Organizational efficiency and 
cost-effectiveness are a primary concern to cities 
involved in networks. However, there can be a 
tendency for networks to develop their own 
institutional logic and outlive their usefulness. The 
dynamics of urban and regional change create a 
rapidly changing policy environment. The best 
networks will have sufficient flexibility to respond 
to changing circumstances and avoid becoming 
trapped in their own organizational structures. 
The objectives of networks need to be specific. 
Networks with vague objectives not only have 
more difficulty in fulfilling them; a lack of focus 
leads to uncertainty in agreeing effective 
strategies. The most effective size of a network 
varies with its remit. There is a justification for 
lobbying organizations which represent a broad 
interest group to have a widespread membership. 
Larger 'umbrella groups' can play an important 
secondary function by enabling bilateral social, 
economic and cultural relations to develop. 
Indeed, many cities view this as a major reason 
for involvement in such networks, which they 
might otherwise not have joined. But a network 
designed to forge new economic alliances between 
cities is more likely to be effective with a few key 
members. 
3.3.13. The most effective networks are those 
directed at practical projects, with members 
capable of financing them, which achieve results 
in a relatively short time span. While there is little 
evidence that networks are a panacea for 
correcting imbalances in the European urban and 
regional system, they can make a valuable 
contribution. In particular, they can help foster 
inter-urban relations, widen cities' economic, 
social and cultural horizons and encourage locally 
based projects and policies. Many of the most 
3.4. Border and gateway cities 
3.4.1. Towns and cities situated near to existing 
internal EC national boundaries — border cities 
— will be amongst the urban areas most affected 
by the reduced importance of national boundaries 
and the abolition of customs duties and 
administration after 1992. Very few are large 
metropolitan centres. Copenhagen and, arguably, 
Dublin are the exceptions. Small border cities have 
historically been remote from national economic 
centres and relatively poorly served by national 
transport infrastructures. Nevertheless some are 
well placed to benefit from the potential 
expansion in their hinterlands and spheres of 
economic influence that greater European 
economic integration will bring. Cities like 
Aachen, Lille, Strasbourg and Nice, situated at 
the intersection of growing subregions of Member 
States in old and new core areas, are amongst the 
examples. Towns and cities on the borders of 
peripheral European countries, where 
infrastructural links tend to be particularly poor, 
will find it more difficult to develop new economic 
roles. 
3.4.2. The advent of the single market should 
offer considerable scope for new private and 
public sector economic development ventures 
between cities and towns on either side of borders. 
Aachen, for instance, currently provides export 
marketing and other business advice to small 
high-tech firms in neighbouring parts of Belgium 
and the Netherlands as well as its own hinterland. 
Such services will undoubtedly become more 
prevalent after 1993. The changing hinterlands 
and spheres of influence of border cities will, 
however, require new institutional arrangements 
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and modes of cross-border cooperation — as 
promoted, for example, by the EC's Interreg 
programme — in order to move beyond current 
linguistic, cultural and administrative barriers. 
Growing demands are also likely for new 
infrastructure in view of further increases in the 
volume of cross-border movement. 
3.4.3. Gateway cities are the main entry points 
for non-EC migrants, whether from the 
neighbouring countries of northern Africa and 
Eastern Europe, the Middle East or more remote 
ex-colonies of EC Member States. One group 
consists of the homes of major international 
airports — London, Frankfurt, Paris, Amsterdam 
and Milan — which deal with significant non-EC 
trade. The other is made up of cities, port or 
inland, located at the outer borders of the EC or 
having a history of acting as reception centres for 
migrants, for example, Thessaloniki, Marseilles, 
Trieste and Hamburg. The latter are in the more 
problematic position as they will have to absorb 
many of the social and economic costs associated 
with migratory movements from the Maghreb and 
Eastern Europe. Gateway cities which have 
traditionally dealt with large numbers of 
immigrants benefit from being customs 
administration centres for the EC. However, they 
are now responsible as a result of the 1990 
resolution of the Trevi Ad Hoc Group on 
Immigration for processing applications from 
asylum seekers, irrespective of their final 
destinations. They also have to absorb the policing 
costs of preventing illegal entry and of dealing 
with associated criminal activities such as drug 
trafficking, illegal exploitation of cheap foreign 
labour and the black market. 
3.4.4. Although major airport cities are the 
principal arrival point for economic migrants and 
refugees from the Third World, the introduction 
of stricter entry controls, plus the considerable 
resources these cities control, suggest their ability 
to cope with migration is relatively well developed. 
Other gateway cities will experience more acute 
problems. Cities along the East European border 
which have traditionally relied upon military 
functions will, for example, need to undergo 
substantial economic diversification if they are to 
deal with the negative consequences of better 
East-West relations. One way will be to develop 
economic interaction with East European 
countries. But the pace at which this might occur 
remains highly uncertain. Some gateway cities also 
suffer from poor East-West cross-national 
communication links. In Thessaloniki's case, 
problems of peripherality and the fact that 
political boundaries have restricted its hinterland, 
mean that it lacks the infrastructure to function as 
a major gateway city should the Balkan States 
become EC members. Modern, adequate facilities 
for the transfer of goods and people to the 
republics of the former Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, 
including terminals and road and rail linkages to 
international networks, are all lacking at present. 
3.5. Smaller cities and towns in the 
European Community 
3.5.1. Smaller cities are important to the 
development of a large part of the Community. 
Smaller cities were the major beneficiaries of the 
counter-urbanization which occurred in Member 
States during the 1960s and 1970s. Many 
continued to flourish in the 1980s, particularly in 
prosperous subregions such as southern Great 
Britain, France, Germany and northern Italy. The 
key dynamic in the growth and decline of smaller 
cities is migratory patterns, particularly the 
in-migration of younger age groups attracted by 
economic opportunities. 
3.5.2. The economic factors which have 
contributed to the growth of smaller cities are the 
same as those which have encouraged the selective 
economic decentralization from metropolitan 
areas. Diseconomies associated with larger cities 
— congestion, lack of space, expensive overheads 
and services, and obsolescent infrastructure — 
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have prompted decentralization of manufacturing 
industry. Improvements in transport, 
telecommunications and computer technology 
have freed some sectors from ties to sources of 
raw materials and to markets, widening locational 
choice and enabling corporate rationalization into 
smaller units of production and functional 
specialization at different sites. Smaller cities also 
possess many qualities which some larger cities 
lack: abundant space, lower development costs, 
less severe social problems and conflicts, a greater 
sense of community and identity, less 
environmental pollution and higher quality of life, 
particularly for senior corporate employees. 
Smaller cities with attractive environments, good 
schools, health and leisure facilities and efficient 
public services have proved attractive to 
employers and employees alike and are therefore 
well placed to attract inward investment. Those 
within commuting distance of major cities are 
often able to offer the best of both worlds — an 
attractive residential environment, good local 
services, a sense of community plus ready access 
to the metropolis with its higher order services and 
superior cultural facilities. 
3.5.3. Smaller cities have also become more 
attractive residential locations because 
developments in transport and 
telecommunications — high-speed trains, 
motorway networks and fax — have made them 
more accessible and diminished the disadvantages 
of remoteness. Public policies have also been 
important, for example through the designation of 
expanded towns like the 'villes moyennes' in 
France, or through restrictions upon the 
expansion of larger urban areas as in the 
designation of green spaces in the UK, the 
Netherlands and Denmark. Decentralized services, 
such as education and health in Germany, Italy 
and Denmark, and policies to encourage industrial 
development in rural areas in many EC countries, 
have also enhanced the status of smaller cities. 
3.5.4. It is nevertheless an oversimplification to 
assume that smaller cities will be the dynamic 
force of modern urban Europe. The globalization 
of economic forces, increased personal mobility, 
the separation of home from work, and the 
emergence of polycentric patterns of urbanization 
are increasingly binding together the destinies of 
large and small cities. Nor is there a simple 
relationship between the size of urban areas and 
the scale of economic development. Urban 
potential depends upon a city's local economic 
base, the strength of its subregional economy, its 
indigenous resources and quality of life. Smaller 
cities do not possess a monopoly of such 
strengths. 
3.5.5. Smaller cities as a group differ in their 
economic prospects. Some rely upon economic 
functions which are declining in importance. 
Others are becoming growth points for 
high-technology industries and other expanding 
sectors of the economy. Location within the 
European core, good communications and 
distance from competing centres are also 
influential and can either render a town peripheral 
or place it within the economic mainstream. 
Differing national contexts also affect their role. 
Decentralized systems of government enhance the 
administrative importance of smaller towns. In 
more centralized regimes there has been a loss of 
control to higher administrative tiers with a less 
intimate knowledge of the characteristics of 
smaller towns. 
3.5.6. In Germany and Italy, unlike in Great 
Britain, France, Spain and Greece, no single city 
has dominated the urban system and smaller cities 
have long enjoyed greater status, powers and 
resources and been able to develop good social 
and cultural facilities. Even within Member States 
smaller towns vary in importance because of the 
persistence of different cultural values and 
traditions and varying degrees of influence and 
patronage which key local figures — for example 
landowners, politicians and industrialists — 
mobilize for them. 
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3.5.7. In sum, it is no more accurate to argue 
that smaller cities, irrespective of location and 
economic potential, will grow in the 1990s than it 
would be to argue that larger cities, simply 
because of their size, will necessarily decline. As 
with the larger cities, the development paths of 
smaller cities need to be understood within the 
context of their economic strengths and dynamics. 
These paths inevitably vary, not least in the 
economic inter-relationships between large and 
small cities. A number of simplified 'model' 
smaller city types are examined below to give an 
impression of the range of economic fortunes 
which can characterize smaller cities. 
3.5.8 The satellite towns and cities on the fringes 
of large metropolitan areas have varied in their 
economic dependence upon their larger 
neighbours. Historically, they have performed 
dormitory and social functions for those working 
within the metropolis. With economic 
decentralization, though, towns that are 
sufficiently distant from major urban areas to 
have their own identity have increasingly 
developed as employment centres in their own 
right. More dependent cities include the growth 
centres in the Randstad, Holland, which have 
continued primarily to be residential and local 
service centres for commuters employed in the 
major cities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The 
Hague and Utrecht. Both types increasingly 
demand additional investment in orbital public 
and private transportation systems which provide 
a link to other such towns as well as the upgrading 
of radial routes into the centre. 
3.5.9. Free-standing towns and cities have also 
carved out independent economic niches, helped 
by indigenous strengths such as tourist attractions, 
educational facilities, cultural importance, a 
valuable heritage, a diverse economic base and a 
position of regional dominance because of their 
location. However, economic success has also 
brought dangers for such areas. Their 
attractiveness to footloose investment has often 
resulted in significant development and booming 
job and housing markets which destroy the 
original character of the town and provoke local 
resentment by pricing the native population out of 
the housing market. There is a sharp contrast 
between the job and promotion prospects of 
highly qualified in-migrants and relatively 
unqualified local workers. Transport corridor or 
interchange centres such as Augsburg or Swindon 
benefit from locations within strategic 
intra-metropolitan corridors of movement and 
hence are also dependent on the economic 
buoyancy of larger urban areas. Their popularity 
with modern distribution and retailing firms 
which favour efficient, less congested road 
infrastructures means that their prospects are 
generally favourable. 
3.5.10. Peripheral towns in remote rural areas 
such as southern Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain and 
Portugal are the most problematic. Most will find 
it difficult to maintain a minimum level of services 
for neighbouring areas as they cannot provide 
infrastructural support for new activities such as 
tourism, crafts or alternative technology. This 
lack of indigenous resources and low levels of 
demand for services also reduces the likelihood of 
telecommunications infrastructure and business 
support services being provided. 
3.5.11. Many smaller cities have growth 
potential because of their strategic position and 
quality-of-life advantages over many of their 
larger counterparts. They will mainly be cities 
strategically located along transport corridors or 
those with indigenous resources such as heritage 
and tourism attractions, higher education 
functions, new technology industries and good 
facilities and quality of life. Their success, 
however, will generate new regional 
infrastructural demands. Dispersed settlement 
structures lead to pressures for the upgrading of 
transportation and telecommunications 
infrastructure both between these settlements and 
with the major conurbations. Other smaller cities 
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are likely to face problems of decline. Some lack 
the resources to counter the effects of 
peripherality, depopulation and dependence upon 
declining economic activities. However, the 
problems of peripherality may be partially offset 
by the creation of networks. These can be an 
important way of disseminating good practice and 
providing smaller towns and cities with access to 
technical resources which would otherwise be 
monopolized by larger cities with their larger 
markets for advanced producer services. 
3.6. Cities in regions 
3.6.1. A final theme which merits general 
discussion here is the role which cities play in their 
regional contexts, in particular the economic 
inter-relationships between the two. Historically, 
cities have been seen as natural regional centres 
which are the motor force of regional economic 
development and homes to the key regional 
economic and political functions. Whilst this 
remains substantially true, different patterns of 
urbanization and economic development mean 
that the relationships between cities and their 
surrounding regions are no longer as simple as this 
model suggests. 
3.6.2. The model of a 'dominant' city and a 
'dependent' region is still most common in 
peripheral Europe. In this study, in the regions 
around Athens, Naples and Seville, for example, 
the city is the dominant centre for public 
administration, 'knowledge' industries, and other 
producer and consumer services, including arts, 
cultural and leisure industries. Despite some 
decentralization of economic activity to urban 
fringe areas, the metropolitan areas also capture 
much of the remaining manufacturing sector. 
These cities act as nodes in international transport 
and telecommunication networks, and effectively 
regulate the economic, legal, cultural and 
technological relations between their regions and 
the outside world. Infrastructures link the central 
city with other major centres rather than 
establishing stronger links between the city and 
regional centres or between regional centres. 
3.6.3. The dominant city-dependent region 
model also characterized the old core during the 
periods of major industrialization and 
urbanization. In the last three decades, however, 
the process of suburbanization and economic 
decentralization has meant that the metropolitan 
centres of the old core have lost some of their 
predominance in terms of population and 
economic activity. Major urban areas in the old 
core have benefited from a reconcentration 
particularly in internationally orientated business 
services which have few linkages with the regional 
economy and retain many regional consumer 
service and administrative functions. At the same 
time, the countervailing economic power of 
suburban and regional centres, based on 
high - technology industries, distribution and 
decentralized retail functions and major airports, 
means that metropolitan centres dominate less 
their regions in the old core than in the 
periphery. 
3.6.4. Regional infrastructures in the old core 
tend to favour intraregional links, whether 
radially to the city or between regional centres, 
more than in the periphery. The result has been a 
much more complex pattern of relations between 
cities and regions in the old core. Whilst the 
linkages, in terms of labour markets and economic 
interdependency, are still substantial in many old 
core cities, other regional centres are competitors 
in key economic activities. London and Paris, 
with their monopoly of international functions, 
are partial exceptions to this pattern. However, 
even in these cities, regional functions have 
increasingly grown outside the metropolitan area. 
Elsewhere, a complex mix of city - regional 
interdependence and rivalry was found in our 
study, for example, in the regions around 
Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Liverpool and 
Copenhagen, where it has been extremely difficult 
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to secure consensus on regional development 
between 'rival' administrations. The regional 
dominance of particular cities in the old core is 
limited still further where there is more than one 
metropolis within a region. This is the case, for 
example, in the Ruhr, the north-west of England, 
and the Randstad when considered as a single 
region. 
3.6.5. City - regional economic relations in the 
new core are a more integrated and 
complementary hybrid of the above models. 
Because economic development in the new core 
has largely taken place from a less industrialized 
base, there have historically been fewer dominant 
large cities within new core regions. As a result, 
smaller urban centres have found it easier to 
develop new economic niches which complement 
each other in a regional context. The most 
important example of such complementarity in 
our study was the 'Third Italy', the collection of 
industrial districts in Piedmont, Lombardy, 
Veneto, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Emilia Romagna, 
Tuscany, the Marches and Abruzzi. 
3.6.6. The small cities of the Third Italy are 
characterized by a long tradition of cultural and 
economic independence. But together they present 
a particularly balanced form of regional 
development, which reconciles strong economic 
performance with environmental sustainability, 
cultural attractiveness, social equity and cohesion. 
This has been achieved through intraregional 
networks of firms, banks, municipalities, and 
service centres for local enterprises. Regional 
development and finance agencies played a key 
role in establishing these networks. In this study 
Frankfurt provides a further example of good 
functional links in a polycentric region, with a 
complementary division of functions as the 
regional capital has finance and 'gateway' 
functions, Heidelberg-Darmstadt has R&D and 
knowledge industries, Offenbach-Hanau has 
manufacturing industry and Mainz-Wiesbaden has 
politics and administration. 
3.6.7. This study shows that a high degree of 
economic specialism within smaller, discrete urban 
centres has helped reduce competition between 
cities and encouraged the development of public 
sector and commercial networks within new core 
regions. Montpellier and Nîmes, for example, are 
attempting to establish links with other 
municipalities in the formation of Mediterranean 
France's high-tech route, while Lyons is 
promoting cooperation with Chambery, 
Chamonix and St. Etienne in the Rhone-Alpes 
region. However, this pattern of specialization 
and growing cooperation does not work to the 
advantage of all new core cities. Indeed it can 
have the opposite effect. Marseilles is a clear 
example of a city which, through its port, 
industrial, administrative and regional retail 
functions, traditionally dominated its region in the 
manner of old core cities. Modern economic 
growth in south-eastern France, however, has 
been shared between smaller urban centres — 
Montpellier, Nîmes, Avignon — which specialize 
in different functions. The result is that Marseilles 
is 'squeezed' between a host of potential regional 
competitors. 
3.6.8. Four types of economic relationships can 
be found between cities and their wider regions 
within the Community. In the first case, economic 
development occurs and is evenly shared between 
the city and the region. This presents no policy 
dilemma; the other three do. In some cases the 
economic problems of the city at the centre are 
severe enough to constrain the economic 
development of the wider region. In others the city 
at the centre of the region flourishes but the wider 
region fails to share in its prosperity and economic 
and social disparities between the two grow. 
Finally there are cases where the wider region 
develops economically but the city at the centre 
fails to share in that growth. 
3.6.9. In this study, the Frankfurt urban 
agglomeration in the new core is a good example 
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of economic growth which is relatively evenly 
shared between the city and the region. In the old 
core, Liverpool provides an example of where the 
economic, social and environmental problems of a 
city at the centre of a region constrain the 
economic performance of the wider regional 
economy. In the periphery, Seville and Rennes 
illustrate the dangers of an economically 
successful city outstripping the performance of its 
surrounding region, increasing the economic and 
social disparities between the two. The third 
problematic economic relationship is found in 
Provence Alpine Côte d'Azur in southern France 
where the city of Marseilles failed to share in the 
rapid growth and prosperity of its surrounding 
region and its relative economic performance and 
economic and social problems worsened. 
3.6.10. Each of the three problematic 
relationships and patterns of uneven development 
presents a challenge to the economic and social 
cohesion of the Community's regions. In all cases 
the challenge for decision-makers is to ensure that 
cities succeed economically and contribute to 
regional growth. In particular cases, the challenge 
is to ensure that the growth in cities is dispersed 
throughout the region so that cities do not leave 
their regions behind. In others the challenge is to 
ensure that regional prosperity filters into cities. 
Whatever the relationship between the two, the 
fates of regions and cities are closely integrated. 
This study indicates that the economic linkages 
between cities and regions, and the linkages 
between the policies of Member States and the 
Commission, which affect cities and regions, need 
to be better integrated. 
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4. The challenge of change in European cities 
4.1. Introduction 
4.1.1 The economic and demographic changes 
which were most important in transforming the 
European urban system during the past three 
decades have slowed considerably in recent years. 
Despite the continued economic restructuring 
associated with the creation of the single market 
and the uncertain impact of potentially enlarged 
EC membership, the European urban system is 
likely to be more stable in the period to 2000 than 
it has been in the last three decades. The shift 
from manufacturing to the service sector as the 
dominant employer within urban economies has 
now largely taken place. The rural—urban 
migration which characterized underdeveloped 
southern Europe and Eire has dwindled. 
Birth-rates in those regions have converged with 
those of mature industrial northern Europe, 
limiting the likelihood of rapid indigenous urban 
population growth in the medium term. 
Employment-led migration from non-European 
areas and the less-developed European regions to 
Europe's economic core is now less pronounced 
than in the boom period from the 1950s to the 
mid-1970s. 
4.1.2. With more stable patterns of employment, 
migration and fertility, the European urban 
system will be subject to less upheaval than 
elsewhere. There will not be urban growth within 
Europe on a scale comparable to the explosive 
urbanization that is still occurring in Asia, Africa 
and Latin America. Despite this degree of relative 
stability, changes which may appear marginal at 
the European-wide level will present decision-
makers in European cities with significant 
dilemmas and opportunities. The economic 
upheavals of the 1970s and 1980s have bequeathed 
a particular legacy to each European urban area 
depending on its historical development pattern, 
its functions in the public or market sectors, and 
the local effects of wider economic change. Many 
cities are still adjusting to these economic 
processes and the adjustment will be more painful 
in some European cities than in others. 
4.1.3. Other factors, in addition to those which 
are primarily the consequence of decisions about 
employment locations, will be equally important 
in generating demand for public and private urban 
services. Suburbanization and reurbanization, 
changing age structures within cities, the 
feminization of the workforce, the outmoding of 
traditional skills, changes in household structures, 
increased leisure time and purchasing power 
amongst more skilled, secure workers and growing 
concern over the urban environment will have 
complex impacts on cities. They will throw up 
challenges for the provision of services in housing, 
transport, social welfare, education, childcare, 
training and environment. The way in which the 
public and private sectors respond to these 
challenges will trigger further changes in the way 
in which the physical capital of cities is used. 
Cities will also be constrained by wider forces — 
the performance of the international and 
European economy, investment decisions of 
multinational corporations, the policies adopted 
by national governments and the European 
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Commission, developments in East European 
economies and pressures of migration from 
outside the European Community. 
4.1.4. During the 1990s the uneven impact of 
economic change will continue both between and 
within European cities. In many cities there has 
been growing economic, social and political 
dynamism which has created increased prosperity. 
In others there has been continuing economic 
decline. Equally different parts of cities, and 
different groups within them, have been affected 
differentially by change. Some have benefited; 
others have been less able to do so. During the 
1980s in many cities throughout the European 
Community there have been growing spatial 
inequities, increased social and economic 
disparities between groups and growing 
marginalization of the most vulnerable ones. This 
is especially true for ethnic minorities, where 
racial discrimination has compounded a lack of 
skills and made it difficult for them to enter 
Europe's expanding service sector economy. This 
uneven distribution of public and private goods 
and services and the segregation and 
marginalization of groups within cities, will 
remain major issues in urban Europe. 
4.1.5. This chapter reviews the range of 
economic, social and environmental problems that 
are faced within European cities. It identifies the 
major problems that are faced in the areas of 
unemployment, spatial segregation, housing, the 
position of ethnic minorities, fiscal stress, 
transport and environment. The following chapter 
examines the way in which the case-study cities 
have responded to those problems. The 
relationship between problems and strategic 
responses is not direct. During the 1980s, in 
contrast to the social concerns which characterized 
urban strategies in the 1960s and 1970s, many city 
decision-makers made their goal the pursuit of 
economic growth, often in direct competition with 
other cities, rather than the resolution of social 
problems. To guide the discussion of these two 
issues, the typology developed in Chapter 1 which 
divides Europe into three broad economic areas — 
the old core, the new core and the periphery — is 
used. This distinction is useful in identifying the 
different contexts in which cities typically operate. 
4.2. Urban unemployment 
4.2.1. The clearest evidence of the uneveness of 
economic growth and decline in cities can be 
found in urban labour markets. The major 
European trend in the 1980s was growing 
unemployment. National unemployment rates 
grew rapidly following the onset of recession in 
the mid-1970s before levelling off and beginning a 
slow decline from the mid-1980s. In the same 
period, urban unemployment shadowed the 
respective national rates but typically at a higher 
level, reflecting the uneven impact of economic 
restructuring and the continued magnetism of 
metropolitan areas for mobile labour at a time of 
economic recession (Figure 15). During the 1980s 
unemployment rates in many major cities in 
France, Italy, Greece, the Netherlands, Spain, 
Portugal and the UK reached levels of 20% or 
more, up to twice the national averages. In some 
urban neighbourhoods and among particular 
groups the figures were frequently much higher. 
4.2.2. Problems in the comparability, quality 
and availability of unemployment data make 
precise comparisons between cities in different 
Member States difficult. Differences in national 
definitions of unemployment, in the way 
boundaries of cities and metropolitan areas are 
drawn and in the frequency of data collection 
mean that care must be used in interpreting even 
the limited evidence available. To give a single 
example of the way in which data can mislead, the 
1990 unemployment rate in Brussels — a city 
which experienced enormous economic growth 
during the 1980s — was 17%, greater than that of 
the city of Liverpool — 15% — which suffered 
substantial economic decline during the period. 
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Figure 15. Unemployment trends in selected case­study cities 
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4.2.3. This apparent anomaly is explained by the 
fact that the boundaries of Brussels are drawn 
much more tightly than those of Liverpool and 
that Brussels attracts more substantial commuting 
from suburban areas. The two sets of figures 
therefore measure different things: mismatches 
between inner city labour supply and employment 
availability in Brussels, generalized urban 
economic decline in Liverpool. If not used with 
caution, such data can give a misleading 
impression of the structural health of different 
cities' economies. Nevertheless, combining the 
qualitative information from the case studies with 
available primary and secondary data, it is 
possible to overcome some of these problems and 
to look at trends over time in the old core, new 
core and periphery and the patterns of 
unemployment between different types of social 
or ethnic groups. 
4.2.4. The most serious unemployment 
problems, affecting the youth labour market in 
particular, are in peripheral cities. Here, four 
factors have combined to generate some of 
Europe's highest unemployment levels. They are: 
(i) historically higher birth-rates which, 
although recently falling rapidly, have 
created a large cohort of young people 
seeking to enter the labour market; 
(ii) the legacy of earlier rapid in-migration from 
rural areas; 
(iii) decline in traditional sectors; and 
(iv) a sluggish economic recovery from the early 
1980s recession. 
The consequences are readily apparent in two of 
our peripheral case-study cities — Dublin and 
Naples: 
• net loss of jobs in Dublin ran at 5 000 per 
annum between 1981-87, reflecting industrial 
decline and sluggish service sector growth; 
• Dublin's unemployment doubled in both 
absolute and percentage terms in the same 
period; 
• northern inner city Dublin had 27% 
unemployment in 1986; 
• local unemployment on some of Dublin's 
peripheral housing estates topped 50%; 
• unemployment in Campania, the region 
around Naples, was 13.7% in 1981, compared 
to 8.4% nationally; 
• unemployment in Naples in 1987 was 24.2% 
compared with 23.2% in Campania and 
11.9% nationally; 
• 58% of Campania's unemployed in 1987 lived 
in Naples; 
• 77.2% of Campania's unemployed in 1987 
were aged between 14 and 29; 
• estimates suggest up to 50 000 people sell 
smuggled goods in Naples' informal economy 
and that up to 33% of all Neapolitan families 
are without incomes. 
4.2.5 In Spain, strong economic growth in the 
post-recessionary period of the later 1980s has 
meant more rapid urban modernization than is 
found in Ireland or southern Italy. This has not 
been sufficient to offset the legacy of rural — 
urban migration and the large youth labour 
supply. Unemployment thus remains high in 
peripheral and new core areas of the country, as 
indicated by the examples of Seville and 
Valencia. 
• 100 000 people (32%) were unemployed in 
Seville in 1986; 
• youth unemployment in Seville stood at over 
50%; 
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• unemployment in Valencia in 1986 was 24%, 
compared to 20% for the region and 22% 
nationally; 
• unemployment rates in Valencia varied 
between 17 and 30%, with the traditional 
working-class areas suffering most. 
High unemployment, particularly among youths, 
will continue to be a key issue for the above areas 
in the 1990s. In those areas experiencing economic 
growth, youth unemployment is arguably 
exacerbated by lower standards of educational 
provision which limit the access of the young 
underqualified to newer, more skilled 
occupations. 
4.2.6. The old core area of Europe was affected 
worst by the restructuring of traditional 
manufacturing industries which was exaggerated 
by the recession of the mid-1970s and early 1980s. 
Even where there has been pronounced recovery 
from the mid-1980s, two major implications 
remain for labour markets in old core cities. 
Absolute falls in employment opportunities 
initially meant that an earlier generation of youth 
entrants to the labour market faced difficulties in 
finding employment. The less skilled of this group 
continue to do so. They have been joined by a 
later generation within which the less qualified 
have faced particular problems in gaining access 
to employment in both the growing, more modern 
and highly skilled occupations and in declining 
traditional sectors. This problem has eased slightly 
but by no means disappeared with the recovery 
from the mid-1980s and the falling number of 
young people entering the labour market as a 
result of demographic change. The other major 
dilemma in the old core has been to reintegrate 
older workers displaced from traditional 
industries into a changed labour market. Again, 
the differential effects of these factors can be 
traced in the old core cities in the study. 
Liverpool 
• half of the city's manufacturing jobs were lost 
between 1979 and 1983; 
• unemployment rose to 25% in 1985. The 1991 
figure (15%) remains well in excess of the 
national rate; 
• unemployment amongst 16 to 19-year olds is 
over 30%; 
• estimates suggest unemployment in peripheral 
social housing estates is over 40% and, for 
ethnic minorities, over 50%. 
Birmingham 
• 25% of total employment, predominantly in 
manufacturing, was lost in 1979-82; 
• unemployment reached 20.3% in 1985 before 
falling to 10.3% in the late 1980s; 
• unemployment in the inner city is double that 
of the city and three times the national 
average; 
• unemployment amongst whites was 13% in 
1986 but 32% for the black population. 
Glasgow 
• manufacturing employment fell by 45% 
between 1971 and 1983; 
• unemployment in 1990 was 19% for males and 
7.3% for females, exceeding the Strathclyde 
regional and Scottish national rates; 
• in six districts of the city unemployment 
exceeds 25%. 
Copenhagen 
• unemployment rose from 2.3% in 1973 to 
12.7% in 1984, the latter compared to 6.9% 
for the region and 10.15% nationally; 
• unemployment in 1988 ran at 11.3%, 
exceeding the regional (5.8%) and national 
(8.7%) averages. 
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Hamburg: Dortmund 
• unemployment rose consistently to 13.9% in 
1987; 
• economie recovery meant the figure fell to 
11.2% in 1990, still three times higher than 
Munich in Germany's more prosperous 
south. 
Amsterdam 
• unemployment more than tripled between 
1980 and 1985; 
• despite falling back slightly, 70 000 people 
(over 20%) remained unemployed in 1988; 
• 35 000 to 40 000 illegal immigrants, lacking 
entitlement to unemployment benefits are 
thought to be living on insecure, marginal jobs 
in the informal economy. 
Rotterdam 
• unemployment stood at 20% in 1990, with 
considerably higher rates in poorer 
neighbourhoods; 
• 50% of the unemployed have been without 
work for two years or more; 
• ethnic minorities comprise 30% of the city's 
unemployed but less than 11% of its 
population. 
Brussels 
• 42 800 people (17.4%) were unemployed in 
1990; 
• Brussels' regional unemployment is the sixth 
worst of Belgium's 26 regions; 
• 42% of Brussels' unemployed have been out 
of work for over two years. 
Berlin 
unemployment rose from 6 000 at the 
beginning of the 1970s to 30 000 in 1980 to 
96 680 (10.8%) in 1989. 
• unemployment rose from 5.7% in 1980 to 
11.9% in 1990; 
• the 1991 unemployment rate of 12.3% 
compares badly with the 11.1% in the Ruhr 
region, 8.5% in the Land and 7.2% in the 
former FRG area; 
• 50% of Dortmund's unemployed are low 
qualified and 26% have been without work for 
over a year. 
4.2.7. Cities in the new core fall into two broad 
categories: previously lightly industrialized centres 
which have grown as a result of concentrations of 
new technologies or other service industries, and 
cities, more like those in the old core, which have 
more substantial legacies of port-based and 
manufacturing industries. The nature and levels of 
unemployment are slightly different between the 
two types of cities. The latter share the 
characteristics of older industrialized north 
European cities, with comparatively high levels of 
unemployment and mismatches between the 
employment needs of older redundant workers 
and young people and new labour market realities. 
The case-study cities of Marseilles and Barcelona 
illustrate this point. 
• Marseilles lost 30 000 of its 76 000 industrial 
jobs between 1962 and 1982; 
• unemployment in Marseilles rose from 3% in 
1962 to 12% in 1982. In 1990 it stood at 15%, 
compared to 9% in France and 11 and 13% at 
the regional and departmental levels; 
• 126 185 people (16%) were unemployed in 
Barcelona in 1987 with young people being 
particularly badly affected. 
4.2.8. Even new core cities lacking a heavy 
industrial heritage can suffer considerable 
unemployment problems. This is illustrated well 
by Montpellier. It is the fastest growing city in 
France. Between 1962 and 1982 the number of 
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economically active residents grew by 62% but the 
unemployment rate also increased in the same 
period from 2.2 to 13.9%. Here, the problem is 
that local residents find difficulty in gaining access 
to increasingly high-skilled occupations. Amongst 
the faster growing new core cities which have 
experienced fewer problems are Frankfurt, where 
a more diversified economy weathered the 
recession well and where the 1990 unemployment 
rate was only 4.5%, and Milan, where 
unemployment rates remained at around 8% 
through much of the 1980s before falling to 5.5% 
in 1990. Figure 15 more fully illustrates patterns 
of unemployment in our case-study cities. 
upgrade the qualifications of many people to 
allow them to take advantage of service sector 
jobs. These problems are most intense in the cities 
of the south where both the quality and quantity 
of education and training is less well developed 
than is the case in the north. But substantial 
numbers of older, younger and migrant groups in 
northern cities are excluded from the labour 
market by their lack of skills and present a major 
policy dilemma. The problem is particularly 
intense in the case of immigrant and ethnic 
minorities where a lack of skills and training 
compounds other difficulties in entering the 
labour market. 
4.3. Labour market polarization and 
urban employment 
4.3.1. The growing influence of service sector 
employment in European economies has already 
been noted. The shift toward service sector 
employment has been particularly sharp in cities. 
The majority of cities in this study had more than 
two-thirds of total employment in the service 
sector by the end of the 1980s. Figure 16 
demonstrates the increasingly important role of 
the tertiary sector in the economies of those 
cities. 
4.3.2. Service sector growth has generated a 
large number of urban employment opportunities. 
Nevertheless the nature of the service sector has 
also posed particular employment problems in 
cities. Many service sector jobs are highly 
qualified, well trained and well rewarded. But 
many — especially in the retail, leisure and 
personal services — are relatively unskilled, 
unqualified, low paid and short term in nature. 
The bifurcated nature of the labour market in a 
service sector based economy has major 
educational and training implications for all 
European cities. In both economically growing 
and declining cities there is evidence of the need to 
4.4. Spatial segregation 
4.4.1. Economic trends are manifested spatially 
in European cities. In particular, marginal labour 
market groups are frequently concentrated in their 
own areas of the city, physically as well as 
economically separated from the mainstream. 
This problem — found in new core, old core and 
peripheral cities alike — is driven by market 
developments, often buttressed by public policies. 
It affects mostly two kinds of areas. They are the 
centres of cities which have undergone substantial 
economic and physical restructuring during the 
1980s and the peripheral areas of many major 
cities which became the sites for substantial social 
housing in the 1960s and 1970s. Spatial inequities 
and conflicts have become more common in 
European cities as the development of high 
value-added service sector activities in central 
areas has led to an upsurge in office provision, 
upmarket residential areas and high-quality 
consumer services. This process has created 
intense competition for the use of scarce city 
centre space, inducing rising land and property 
values. As a result, more marginal local 
businesses, often more geared to meeting the 
needs of lower income communities, have been 
forced into closure or relocation to less expensive 
areas of cities. 
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Figure 16. Economie restructuring in selected case-study cities 
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4.4.2. Rising land and property values have also 
forced low-income residents out of inner-city 
private rented housing as property owners develop 
for profit, speculators become active in local 
markets and new generations of inner city 
residents are unable to purchase homes. The 
process of gentrification and displacement is 
particularly familiar in European capitals — for 
example London, Paris, Madrid and Brussels — 
which experienced large-scale international 
investment during the 1980s. In these and other 
cities, provision of housing for higher income 
groups has been encouraged by public policies 
which have increasingly supported refurbishment 
rather than new building programmes, whilst also 
reducing public housing expenditure by 
encouraging private sector redevelopment. Even in 
Denmark and the Netherlands, where the State 
and State-supported non-profit social housing 
associations have long been the major force in 
urban housing provision, there was a shift during 
the later 1980s away from housing redevelopment 
for low-income groups toward more costly 
developments designed to encourage 
reurbanization by higher income groups. 
4.4.3. The London docklands is an important, if 
controversial, example of central city physical 
redevelopment which has had negative as well as 
positive spin-offs. Substantial public and private 
investment created enormous economic 
development — particularly in financial and other 
producer services — in previously underutilized 
areas. At the same time it displaced many 
marginal industrial enterprises and brought 
limited benefits in terms of employment or 
housing to local residents. In the last 20 years, 
central Madrid has become spatially divided into 
four increasingly separate quarters as office 
expansion, growth of modern industries and the 
development of high-income central city housing 
has increasingly displaced low-income groups to 
smaller, densely packed central districts where the 
provision of collective services remains 
inadequate. Physical redevelopment in Brussels 
during the 1950s and 1960s also displaced 
low-income communities and marginal businesses. 
This trend deepened in the 1980s as rising land 
values, property prices and rental levels 
encouraged more inner-city residents to leave. 
4.4.4. The development of Frankfurt into a 
highly successful international finance centre had 
similar effects as low-income groups were 
displaced to peripheral areas with inadequate 
social facilities and forced to accept higher 
travel-to-work costs. Physical restructuring in the 
1980s often overlaid and reinforced earlier 
patterns of segregation. Lyons, France's second 
largest city is, for example, divided into an 
affluent city centre dominated by the traditionally 
powerful bourgeoise, middle class suburbs to the 
west and eastern working class suburbs which 
suffered major rioting in 1981 and 1990 and are a 
symbol of the country's urban crisis. Recent 
industrial decline in Marseilles has deepened the 
long-standing divide between the poorer northern 
areas of the city and the richer south. In 1977 
Marseilles' three richest arrondissements took 
37% of household income whilst the poorest three 
took 9%. By 1986 the respective shares were 42% 
and 7%. Pockets of redevelopment occurred in 
some central cities which did not experience much 
economic growth in the 1980s. Dublin and 
Liverpool, for example, have had major 
waterfront redevelopments which transformed the 
physical appearance and, to a lesser degree, the 
economic potential of their immediate environs. 
But the surrounding areas experience physical 
decay and economic marginalization. 
4.4.5. The effect of central city redevelopment is 
felt by lower income residents in two ways. Where 
public housing is less available, low-income 
inhabitants tend to move to the nearest area where 
private rented housing is available and affordable. 
Where State provision of housing is more 
extensive, relocation to newer social rented 
housing, often on city peripheries, is more 
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common. The former process is clear in Valencia, 
where the old city has become a reception area for 
those displaced by city centre redevelopment. The 
old city, containing pockets of severe 
environmental decay and relatively high levels of 
drug use and crime, stands in stark contrast to the 
nearby city centre, renovated for public uses, 
commerce and entertainment. 
Brussels 
• Poor immigrants now occupy much of the more problematic pre-World War I inner-area housing stock. 
• Public sector housing, none of which was built in the 1980s, now accounts for less than 10% of the city's total stock. 
• Rising land and property values during the past decade have made rent increases a crucial problem. The same is true in 
Frankfurt and Hamburg. 
Birmingham 
• Of 400 000 housing units, 125 000 are public sector-owned and require UKL 1 billion investment in repairs. 
• 30% of private units are unfit or require repairs costing more than UKL 3 000 per unit. 
• The incidence of homelessness and the numbers on the council's waiting list have grown rapidly. 
Dortmund 
• 3 700 are on the social housing waiting list. 
• In 1989 the number of households receiving housing allowances rose to 32 000 (11%). 
Berlin 
• The construction of new flats fell from 20 000 a year over the 20 years before 1974 to 5 000 a year during the 1980s. 
• 23 000 new flats are needed to meet current demand. 
4.5. Social housing 
4.5.1. In many European cities social, low-cost 
housing is becoming a pressing issue. The 
problems are varied — inadequate supply, 
conditions and financing. The problems can be 
found in all cities although the three areas of 
Europe typically suffer from different problems. 
In peripheral cities the problems consist primarily 
of rapid population growth overwhelming 
provision so there are both intense shortages and 
inadequate old stock (see Figure 17). In many 
cities in the old core housing problems are found 
in the historic centres deteriorating from lack of 
investment and occupied by low-income, often 
ethnic minority, groups and in the massive 
post-war estates built on the periphery of cities. In 
the new core cities, frequently the problem is that 
economic growth has led to rising land values 
which have increased the cost and reduced the 
supply of public low-income housing provision. 
4.5.2. The housing problems of cities in the old 
core are concentrated in two sorts of areas: 
declining inner-city areas and peripheral estates. 
Social housing problems have also been 
exacerbated by a general trend for reductions in 
social housing expenditure by Member States 
during the 1980s and early 1990s. Housing tenures 
and conditions vary across Europe depending on 
traditions of State involvement in housing 
markets. In many cities, the inner-area stock, 
which is often the oldest in the city, tends 
disproportionately to be privately owned. While 
private inner-city housing is increasingly being 
gentrified, a substantial proportion is poorly 
maintained and lacking in facilities. It tends to 
accommodate the most marginal social groups 
who, because of limited finance or limited 
eligibility, cannot get access to higher standard 
private or social housing. Where Member States 
have encouraged greater public and non-profit 
intervention in housing markets, the inner-area 
stock often has a greater mix of tenures. Even 
where social housing is more available, the stock 
tends to be older and less well maintained and 
equipped. 
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Figure 17. Overcrowding of housing in selected case-study cities: average number of people 
per room 
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Housing in Milan 
• 40% of the city's population is estimated as experiencing difficulties in finding suitable accommodation. 
• At the beginning of the 1980s, 55% of residents in the outer residential ring lived in overcrowded accommodation, 12% in 
conditions described as critical. 
• Between 1971 and 1989, 133 000 rented dwellings were lost to the market by conversion to other uses. 
4.5.3. The peripheries of cities in Denmark, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, 
countries characterized by strong public 
intervention in the housing market, often provide 
large-scale social housing developments. These 
estates, often as big as towns, are often the result 
of discredited system-building methods commonly 
adopted in the 1960s and 1970s. Along with 
inner-city areas, they house many of the most 
marginalized city residents with fewest housing 
options available, and are often characterized by 
poor maintenance and the lack of social and 
cultural provisions. They present severe problems 
to policy-makers because, unlike city centres, they 
are much less 'saleable' to investors. Of our 
case-study cities, Glasgow is an important 
example where conditions on four huge peripheral 
estates are compounded by a lack of accessible 
services, poor personal health and high rates of 
unemployment. The considerable public 
investment and effort put into service sector 
development in Glasgow city centre during the 
1980s was highly successful but generated few 
benefits for tenants in peripheral estates. The 
growing polarization in social and economic 
conditions between different areas of the city is 
becoming a major political issue in the city and 
has led to growing efforts to physically and 
economically regenerate the peripheral estates. 
Affordable housing and homelessness in Frankfurt 
Affordable housing shortages in Frankfurt are a major problem. Land values have risen faster than in any other German city, 
except Berlin, and housing rents have risen sharply. 
• Households pay up to 50% of their income for accommodation, particularly in traditional residential quarters. 
• Waiting lists for affordable housing are long — in 1990, 16 000 households were registered for such housing. 
• In the 1980s, affordable housing construction by private investors, housing associations and cooperatives stagnated. 
• Homelessness in Frankfurt has risen since the early 1980s — in 1990 more than 3 200 people were registered homeless 
living in asylums and third-class hotels. 
4.5.4. Meeting the demand for social housing in 
new core cities is made more difficult by rising 
land values which displace low-income housing. 
Figure 17 highlights the prevalence of 
overcrowding in new core and peripheral cities. In 
this study, Milan is a good example of such trends 
in the new core. Despite population decline in the 
city, the scarcity of land for residential and public 
service uses has generated housing shortages. 
Public and private investment in housing in the 
central city is at a very low level and potential 
buyers find prices increasingly beyond their reach. 
Housing shortages are exaggerated by the increase 
in single person households and by the tendency to 
convert residential units into offices and shops. A 
substantial minority of the population suffers 
poor housing conditions which neither the market 
nor the public sector have addressed effectively. 
Evictions of tenants for failing to pay rents are 
rising. Finding adequate accommodation, rather 
than employment, is the major problem for the 
city's immigrants who are mainly from the 
Maghreb and Senegal. 
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Housing in Naples 
Naples suffers from some of the worst housing conditions in Europe. 
• HI 700 out of 330 600 dwellings do not meet minimum standards. 
• Owner-occupation is prevented by inflated prices. 
• Local authority building programmes are virtually at a standstill. 
• Unauthorized house building flourishes within and outside the city — for instance, the quarter of Pianura was built almost 
entirely without official permission. 
• An illegal economy thrives on renting accommodation at exhorbitant prices and on the imposition of special conditions — 
such as a whole year's rent in advance. 
• Unofficial agents charge high fees to desperate tenants. 
These factors have provoked a partial abandonment of some centre areas of the city and overcrowding in peripheral districts 
where basic infrastructure is often underdeveloped. 
4.5.5. In peripheral cities, social housing 
problems frequently result from rapid 
urbanization which overwhelmed relatively low 
levels of public provision. In Valencia, for 
example, the city's population grew by 200 000 
between 1960 and 1975. Whilst the numbers of 
housing units doubled in the same period, many 
units lacked social amenities and were inadequate 
from the time they were built. In Barcelona the 
population grew by 40% between 1950-70 but 
little provision was made for low-income housing. 
Oporto is a further example of the housing 
problems experienced in peripheral cities. Housing 
in the historic city centre has very high 
concentrations of poor people in overcrowded 
areas lacking basic sanitation. There remain many 
'barracos', areas of shanty housing occupied by 
almost 3 000 rural migrants. In the Ilhas — 
high-density 19th-century housing constructed in 
the gardens of the city's largest houses — there is 
a severe shortage of basic facilities. The city 
authority, short of finances, has a decaying 
housing stock, much of it in peripheral estates 
which lack appropriate services and experience 
substantial social problems including crime and 
drug abuse. Finally, rent controls have reduced 
landlord's profits which has led to 
underinvestment and the consequent decay of the 
private rental sector which constitutes 50% of the 
city's total stock. 
4.6. Ethnic minority disadvantage 
4.6.1. The physical segregation and labour 
market marginalization of certain social groups 
have already been discussed. These problems, 
compounded by personal and institutionalized 
racism, are experienced most dramatically by 
Europe's ethnic minority communities. Ethnic 
minorities were originally drawn to urban centres, 
mostly in the old core, by the promise of 
employment at a time of national labour 
shortages. They can be divided into four status 
groups: guestworkers, whose stays are strictly 
regulated and whose families remain in the 
country of origin; third-party nationals who have 
been guaranteed citizenship of particular 
European countries as a result of colonial links; 
refugees, who can acquire citizenship or rights of 
residence for political reasons; and illegal 
immigrants, many of whom initially entered 
Europe as visitors or guestworkers but overstayed 
their legal period of residence. Illegal immigrants, 
lacking basic employment and welfare rights, are 
subject to particularly acute exploitation in the 
informal economy. 
4.6.2. Ethnic minority workers have numerous 
countries of origin. Primarily, Afro-Caribbeans 
and Asians migrated to Britain, North Africans to 
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France, and southern Mediterraneans and Turks 
to Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands. The 
Netherlands was also the destination for migrants 
from the former Dutch colonies in Surinam and 
the Antilles. Even during the slowdown in 
immigration in the later 1970s and 1980s created 
by tightening national immigration rules — 
influxes continued from Eastern Europe and the 
Maghreb countries. Between 1987 and 1989 the 
number of migrants from the former GDR to 
Western Europe, mainly the former FRG, 
increased sixfold to 250 000 a year. Further 
estimates indicate that up to 2 million a year might 
wish to leave the former Soviet Union for the next 
six years because of political and economic 
uncertainty. Potential migration rates from the 
Maghreb to the south of the Community are 
difficult to predict but the historic links between 
these countries and the Maghreb, along with 
labour shortages and the reluctance of native 
workers to accept low status and unstable jobs 
indicates that pressures for immigration will 
continue. 
4.6.3. In 1990, according to some estimates, 
there were as many as 16 million migrants and 
refugees in Europe, more than 5 % of the total 
population, with larger percentages in Belgium, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK 
than in Spain, Italy or the Scandinavian countries. 
Many immigrants are from ethnic minority 
communities who have historically gravitated 
toward the larger cities in search of employment 
opportunities. Larger than average ethnic 
minority settlement in cities has become 
self-reinforcing as new generations have been born 
and stayed in the cities. For example, 40% of 
France's immigrant population lives in the Paris 
metropolitan region with a majority of the 
remainder in Marseilles and Lyons. In the 
Netherlands, 60% of immigrants live in the four 
largest cities — Amsterdam, The Hague, 
Rotterdam and Utrecht — where they constitute 
up to 30 % of city populations. Italian immigrants 
are concentrated in the largest cities of Rome, 
Milan, Naples, Florence, Turin and Bologna. In 
Belgium they are especially concentrated in 
Brussels and constitute 25 % of the city's 
population. 
4.6.4. From the 1950s onward, starting in the 
UK, the presence of ethnic minority immigrants 
has generated political controversy, racist 
movements and occasional disorders in many 
European cities. Tensions were particularly acute 
in some cities in the 1980s. In Britain, the urban 
riots of 1981 and 1985 were fuelled by grievances, 
long-held by the black community, about 
discrimination in employment, public services and 
policing practice. The same is true of France 
where major rioting occurred in Lyons in 1981 
and 1990 and where Marseilles, with its large 
North African community, provided the political 
base for the rise to prominence of Le Front 
National, an openly anti-immigrant party. In 1991 
there were severe disorders in the city of Brussels 
as immigrants fought in the streets with the 
police. 
In Rotterdam the ethnic minority population from Surinam and the Mediterranean countries constitutes less than 11% of 
the population but over 30% of the unemployed. 
In Amsterdam, ethnic minorities constitute 18% of the population but 24% of the unemployed. Up to 40 000 illegal 
immigrants are also estimated to be working in marginal jobs in the informal sector of the economy. 
In Brussels the relatively high unemployment rate of 17% in 1990 was partly explained by the presence of a rapidly 
growing minority population lacking skills or language qualifications. Turks and Moroccans have especially low status and 
lack democratic rights, training, housing and job opportunities. 
143 
4.6.5. Such symptoms are clear signs that there 
have been substantial problems in absorbing 
ethnic groups into the mainstream economy and 
providing the education, training and social 
support services they require. They are absorbed 
into a segmented labour market and may remain 
trapped in the unskilled sectors with limited 
prospects of mobility. Equally they are trapped in 
segmented housing markets as entry and transfer 
costs and the shortage of affordable housing 
prevent mobility. Immigrant groups frequently 
experience discrimination which may worsen as 
xenophobia and racism appear to be increasing in 
many European cities. Social disparities between 
immigrant and native populations are growing in 
many cities because of the unaffordability of 
housing and the poor collective services in less 
affluent inner-city areas and peripheral housing 
estates where many ethnic groups are 
concentrated. Systematic evidence about the 
numbers or the economic and social conditions or 
prospects of immigrant groups is not readily 
available. Nevertheless our case-studies 
demonstrate that these problems can be found in a 
wide variety of cities in the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Germany, Britain, France and Denmark. 
4.6.6. Immigrants tend to go to cities with the 
greatest economic opportunities. Frankfurt's 
successful economy has attracted a higher 
Table 26. Foreign population in Frankfurt 
compared with other cities in 
Germany 
City/region 
Frankfurt 
Offenbach 
Darmstadt 
Wiesbaden 
Hesse 
1989 (%) 
22.6 
21.4 
12.0 
13.0 
9.9 
City/region 
Hamburg 
Munich 
Cologne 
Essen 
Dortmund 
Dusseldorf 
Stuttgart 
Bremen 
Hanover 
Duisburg 
Germany 
1989 (%) 
10.8 
16.0 
16.6 
7.0 
9.8 
13.5 
19.2 
9.6 
10.2 
13.9 
7.3 (1988) 
proportion of immigrants than many other less 
economically successful German cities, especially 
in the north (see Table 26). Nevertheless, many of 
those immigrants are concentrated in areas of the 
city which lack adequate social facilities, in the 
shadow of the wealthy areas of the city. This 
contributes to the high welfare burden of the city 
which constitutes 6.7% of its budget and 
encourages tensions between the indigenous and 
migrant population. In Birmingham, which has 
the highest ethnic minority population in Britain 
— 20% — the average unemployment rate 
amongst blacks in the late 1980s was 32% 
compared to 13% for whites. 
Ethnic groups and schools in Amsterdam and Rotterdam 
Immigration to Amsterdam and Rotterdam has slowed but continuing family unification and larger household sizes for ethnic 
groups is increasing the size of the ethnic community. Ethnic groups comprise: 
• 35% of under-15 year olds in Amsterdam. 
• 40% of 0-4 year olds and 30% of primary school children in Rotterdam, 
• 50% of the 0-4 age group, on current projections, in 2000, 
• more than 70% in many schools in both cities — 18% of schools in Rotterdam fall into this category. 
4.6.7. In Lyons the city's mainly north African 
immigrant community, constituting 12% of the 
population, even discounting second and third 
generation, is heavily concentrated in the east of 
the city in large post-war estates segregated from 
the city centre and from public transport. In 
Copenhagen ethnic minorities from Turkey, 
Pakistan and Yugoslavia — who constitute 7% of 
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the city's population, 2.5 times higher than the 
national average — are primarily concentrated in 
the inner-city area where the poorest quality 
private stock is found and in a suburban 
municipality which is dominated by high-rise 
housing and is unpopular with ethnic Danes. 
4.6.8. The future pattern of immigration partly 
depends upon policy responses by Member States 
and by the European Commission. But even where 
the process of immigration has virtually ended, 
the problems of integrating existing ethnic 
minorities remain. Even with stricter immigration 
controls, urban ethnic minority communities 
continue to grow faster than indigenous ones as a 
result of continuing family unification and higher 
birth-rates. Unless European cities are more 
successful in improving the life chances of 
immigrant communities, there will be further 
pressures on collective services in housing, 
education, training, health and welfare. The 
difficulties faced by ethnic minorities can be 
found throughout the Community and are, in 
part, a result of the economic mobility that the 
expansion of the Community economy has 
encouraged. 
4.7. Fiscal stress 
4.7.1. The economic restructuring of urban 
economies has had profound spatial impacts upon 
many cities in the Community. The loss of 
economic activity and more skilled and affluent 
residents from the central city to surrounding 
suburban communities in the metropolitan area, 
or the net loss of economic activity and people 
from metropolitan areas as a whole, characterized 
many north European industrial cities during the 
1970s. The pattern has been repeated more 
recently in Mediterranean cities where urban 
development historically took a different path, 
generating different relationships between central 
cities and neighbouring areas. Madrid, Barcelona, 
Athens, Thessaloniki and Valencia have recently 
experienced decentralization and suburbanization 
observed in old core European cities. 
4.7.2. The trend toward the loss of more skilled 
and affluent workers by metropolitan centres to 
the suburbs is not universal however. In some 
cases reurbanization reflects a shift back into the 
cities by higher income groups as public policies 
which encourage low-cost housing developments 
beyond city boundaries have displaced many 
low-income groups. Paris, where the social base of 
the city has become increasingly bourgeois whilst 
many of the areas beyond the city have become 
more proletarian, is the most notable example of 
this counter-trend. 
4.7.3. Despite individual urban development 
patterns, the result of these trends has been 
marked differences in the economic and 
residential attractiveness of administrative areas. 
For the poorer communes or local authorities, 
with less economic development and affluent 
residents, this uneven pattern of development is a 
route to fiscal stress. Fiscal stress occurs when 
local administrations have difficulties in raising 
sufficient resources to cover the costs of providing 
services. It is particularly marked for urban 
governments where (a) there has been economic 
decline, (b) the proportion of poorer residents and 
demands on social and welfare services have 
grown, (c) there have not been boundary 
extensions which could 'capture' the new areas of 
economic and higher income residential growth, 
and (d) where national systems of financing local 
services rely heavily on local taxes and fail to 
compensate for declining local taxes by increased 
government grants or fiscal redistributions 
between administrations. 
4.7.4. Fiscal relations between governments vary 
within Member States. But fiscal stress can occur 
even in those countries where central governments 
provide the bulk of funding to subnational 
authorities. In the more austere public expenditure 
climate in Europe during the 1980s a second route 
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to fiscal stress has been opened up as most 
national governments have reduced, rather than 
increased, central grant support for cities, 
devolved service responsibilities to cities without 
increasing resources and failed to reform the 
structure or financing of subnational governments 
to give fiscal advantages to deprived areas. A 
measure of the pressures faced by national 
governments can be seen in the recent introduction 
by the French Government of a financial 
solidarity programme which aims to redistribute 
resources from municipalities with higher tax 
bases to ones which are fiscally poor. 
4.7.5. Fiscal stress has major implications for 
service provision. Many urban governments, 
needing to provide increasingly expensive support 
services for a less affluent population with 
declining public resources, have to reduce the 
range and quality of public services in housing, 
welfare, environment, transportation and 
infrastructure. When services have been 
maintained it has often been at the price of higher 
local taxation levels, asset sales and greater 
borrowing and municipal indebtedness. The trend 
can be found in cities whose economic fortunes in 
the 1980s were as different as Liverpool, which 
experienced extreme economic decline and 
teetered on the brink of municipal bankruptcy, 
and Hamburg which is one of the richest cities in 
Germany but whose per capita municipal 
indebtedness is the highest in Germany. In future, 
many less affluent administrations will face 
intense difficulties in maintaining their ageing 
infrastructure — social housing, schools, 
hospitals, roads, public transport, and water and 
sewage systems. 
4.8. Urban transport problems 
4.8.1. The increasing volumes of traffic in cities 
are creating a growing range of problems, 
including congestion, pollution and degradation 
of the environment. The increased scale of 
commuting which has accompanied 
decentralization and rapid increases in car 
ownership, worsens these problems. In the 
case-study city of Birmingham, for example, it is 
estimated that while general traffic flows will 
increase by 30% between 1989 and 2010, 
commuting flows will rise by as much as 50% in 
the same period. In many cities widespread car 
ownership has encouraged such a dispersed urban 
form that greater use of public transport is not a 
realistic alternative in the short term. Moreover, 
investment by Member States in urban surface 
transport infrastructures continues to fall in 
relation to Europe's GDP. Underinvestment 
results in the growing obsolescence of transport 
infrastructures, not least because their users rarely 
contribute directly to maintenance or expansion 
costs. Nevertheless, attempts to provide new 
facilities face increasing opposition and delay on 
amenity and environmental grounds. 
4.8.2. There has been a consistent rise in 
Community-wide car ownership since 1970. This 
trend is also found in Europe's cities. Figures 18, 
19 and 20 illustrate upward trends in car 
ownership in most old core, new core and 
peripheral cities. There is a clear correlation 
between rising traffic volumes and increasing 
congestion. Average traffic speeds in London, 
Paris and many other European cities have 
already fallen to a mere 10 m.p.h. Figures 21 and 
22 illustrate the impact which increased congestion 
has had on the efficiency of public transport 
services — the average speed of most urban bus 
and tram services has slowed significantly. 
4.8.3. Decisions on land and transport issues 
have imposed significant social costs in many 
cities. Underinvestment in public transport and 
the location of facilities in areas which are only 
easily accessible by private transport has 
disenfranchised the poor and elderly. In some 
cities, such as Glasgow and Lyons, poor or 
expensive public transport reinforces the 
ghettoization of the residents of outer housing 
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Figure 18. Car ownership in London and Paris 
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Figure 19. Car ownership in selected old core cities 
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Figure 20. Car ownership in selected new core and peripheral cities 
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Figure 21. Average speed (km/h) of buses in selected 
case­study cities 
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Figure 22. Average speed (km/h) of trams in selected 
case­study cities 
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estates remote from the majority of urban 
facilities. However, excessive reliance on the 
motor car reduces amenity for the more affluent 
urban population as congestion and high fuel 
prices discourage social interaction. With the 
partial, recent exception of the Netherlands, 
urban land use planning in most EC countries has 
ignored the consequences of locational 
decision-making for energy consumption. As a 
result, longer journeys to work and dispersed 
retail and leisure facilities are excessively 
car-dependent. 
Public transport in Oporto 
There are a variety of public transport problems and constraints in Oporto which are characteristic of many peripheral cities. 
Oporto suffers from: 
• an insufficient capacity at peak hours; 
• an ageing stock of buses, trolley buses and trams; 
• a multiplicity of operators — there are 38 private bus companies servicing the metropolitan area (although within the 
municipality of Oporto, the state-owned STCP is the major operator); 
• the absence of an effective system integrating different modes of transport; 
• a shortage of funds to implement improvements to the public transport infrastructure — such as a proposed light rapid 
transit system to link Matosinhos, Oporto and Gai. 
4.8.4. Internal links within many cities are 
frequently inadequate. In some cities, such as 
Milan, road and public transport networks are too 
radially oriented and more investment is needed in 
cross-metropolitan links between peripheral areas. 
In Brussels, congestion of radial routes into the 
city, particularly at the intersections with the outer 
ring motorway, has generated growing interest in 
making greater use of the rail network. Intense 
pressure upon orbital motorways around cities 
like London and Paris indicates that greater 
emphasis will have to be given in future to 
intra-metropolitan as well as inter-metropolitan 
and inner-city traffic movements, possibly with 
increased segregation of intra-urban and through 
traffic and passenger and freight traffic. 
4.8.5. Cities which have failed to devise a 
city-wide transport policy face a formidable series 
of problems. London's transport problems have 
worsened since the abolition of the strategic land 
and transportation authority, the Greater London 
Council. The absence of an authority to undertake 
land and transportation planning on a 
metropolitan-wide basis has led to poorly 
coordinated plans and a failure to integrate 
different modes of transport. Equally, Hamburg 
has no master plan for its traffic system or the 
protection of its urban environment. Its 
transportation system is at saturation point, 
traffic connections between road, rail and river 
transport systems are outmoded or non-existent 
and it lacks a ring road. Lyons requires a new 
transportation system to cope with huge traffic 
jams caused by the inappropriate planning 
solutions of the 1960s and a failure to devise a 
policy for the whole urban area. Its poor outer 
communes are particularly disadvantaged because 
they are inadequately served by the Metro 
system. 
4.8.6. To cope with congestion and pollution 
many cities have attempted a mixture of traffic 
management measures and support for public 
transport. The exact mix varies but has included 
pedestrianization to improve city-centre amenity 
and turnover, comprehensive and widely 
accessible public transport, increased taxation of 
vehicles and fuel and car-parking policies. All 
these measures have been used successfully in one 
of our case-study cities, Copenhagen. 
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4.8.7. The experience of Frankfurt in the 
provision of multimodal transport services 
indicates the way good transport planning can 
enhance the economic prospects of cities in a 
strategic position within the European urban 
system. The experience of Zurich, which is not in 
the Community, is valuable. It has a variety of 
well coordinated modes of public transport 
including trams, trolley buses, diesel buses and 
minibuses and a suburban train system. In 
contrast to the less well planned and supported 
public transport systems of many other European 
cities, they have consistently enjoyed increasing 
patronage over the last five years despite very high 
levels of car ownership. 
Strategies to alleviate traffic congestion in Milan 
To tackle traffic congestion in Milan the city council's policy proposes: 
• extending the city's pedestrian zones and its network of cycle lanes, 
• extending the areas with restricted access for cars, 
• Improving public transport by completing a third underground line, creating a radial light rapid transit system and 
developing an underground high-speed railway 'through line' (passante ferroviario) which will link three existing rail 
stations from the north-western to the south-eastern periphery of the city. 
4.8.8. In Montpellier, urban amenities have 
consciously been distributed around the city 
outskirts to alleviate congestion in the city centre 
and promote greater accessibility and balanced 
development. A high-speed underground 
through-rail line with improvements to the public 
transport system will be developed in Milan to 
decongest the city centre and encourage more 
polycentric development of the conurbation. 
Other measures which have been attempted in our 
case-study cities include computerized traffic 
control systems to maximize vehicular flows, 
planned introduction of light rail systems 
(Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Milan), 
traffic-calming measures in inner residential areas 
prone to through traffic, construction of ring 
roads to divert through traffic (Rotterdam, 
Seville, Birmingham, Oporto and Valencia) and 
policies to improve flows of goods traffic by 
transferring goods to rail and the designation of 
'goods only' stretches of highway (Amsterdam 
and Rotterdam). Longer term measures include an 
attempt to locate major traffic generators on sites 
well served by public transport (Brussels, 
Amsterdam and Rotterdam) promoting higher 
residential densities, more mixed land uses and 
facilitating healthier forms of travel such as 
cycling. 
4.9. Urban environmental issues 
4.9.1. Environmental issues have become 
increasingly important in Member States as 
industrial pollution, radiation scares, and firmer 
evidence on the depletion of the ozone layer and 
global warming have pushed environmental 
protection and sustainable development to the top 
of the policy agenda. There is a growing 
awareness amongst policy-makers that free-riding 
on. environmental resources cannot continue 
indefinitely. This has a number of implications for 
urban areas, including energy generation and 
conservation, the rationalization of urban 
transport systems and sustainable local economic 
activity and development. Directly or indirectly, 
cities are the major environmental offenders. 
They consume most of the world's dwindling 
supply of non-renewable energy resources, are the 
major source of carbon dioxide emission — the 
main greenhouse gas — and are major 
environmental polluters. The free movement of 
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water and air, however, means that the 
consequences are not necessarily restricted to their 
source — cities. They externalize the 
environmental costs of producing goods and 
services by disposing much domestic and 
industrial waste into the atmosphere or 
watercourses, causing environmental damage in 
neighbouring areas. 
4.9.2. Most air pollutants damage the health of 
people living and working in cities. Whilst the 
severity of the damage they cause depends upon 
the absolute levels of pollution concentrations, 
they are particularly harmful to the respiratory 
and cardiovascular systems. S02, N02 and 
particulate matter have adverse affects on the 
respiratory system. Carbon monoxide can slow 
reflexes and cause drowsiness and low-level ozone 
can impair breathing, irritate the eyes, nose and 
throat and lead to headaches. Concentrations of 
lead in the atmosphere can harm the liver and 
kidneys and may cause neurological damage. In 
all cases, the elderly and very young are the 
highest risk groups. 
4.9.3. During the past two decades, however, 
emission levels of many traditional air pollutants 
have generally declined in West European cities. 
Figures 23 and 24 illustrate the downward trend in 
S02 emissions in 10 case-study cities between 1975 
and 1987. Three key factors underpin this trend. 
First, the introduction of tighter regulatory 
mechanisms has reduced the average sulphur 
content of fuels. Second, energy policies based on 
conservation criteria and a general shift from 
reliance on oil to sulphur-free energy created 
alternatives such as natural gas and nuclear 
energy. Thirdly, structural economic change 
brought with it cleaner industrial production 
methods and a decline in the heavier polluting 
sectors. Significantly, concentrations of S02 have 
declined most sharply in urban areas especially in 
cities with the highest levels in the early 1970s. 
Nevertheless, many of Europe's southern cities 
exceed the EC's air-quality guidelines. 
4.9.4. Declining levels of particulate matter in 
urban areas are attributable to the reduction of 
coal burning in industry and in the home, and to 
the installation of dust removal equipment in 
coal-fired utilities (Figures 25 and 26). However, 
in many cities, lower particulate emissions are 
being offset by the increased use of diesel-powered 
vehicles. Reductions in the concentration of levels 
of lead in the atmosphere have also been most 
marked in urban areas. EC air-quality standards, 
in this context are usually met. Indeed, levels of 
lead concentrations in the air fell by about 50% 
over a five-year period in Frankfurt, Brussels and 
Paris. The continuing substitution of unleaded for 
leaded petrol should ensure that these downward 
trends continue. Trends in concentrations of N02 
in urban areas, however, display a different 
trajectory. In some cities, emissions have 
increased since the late 1970s (Figure 27). These 
trends suggest that pollution control and 
technological progress have not been sufficient to 
counteract the growth of N02 emissions, caused 
by the growth in transport use. 
4.9.5. Despite its overall decline, the extent of 
air- and water-borne industrial pollution remains 
a major problem in many European cities. Its 
consequences are felt far beyond the immediate 
locality. The newer 'clean' industrial areas of the 
new core and old core suburbs pose far fewer 
problems than traditional heavy industrial areas. 
Air pollution is particularly problematic in 
districts where pollutants from industries such as 
chemical works combine with other urban 
pollutants to produce widespread smog, for 
example in Hamburg and Rotterdam. 
Concentrations of urban areas along rivers and 
coastlines also result in downstream 
accumulations of pollutants, for example in the 
Mersey, Rhine and Danube rivers. The 
discharging of untreated or semi-treated wastes 
into the sea and rivers often means one city's 
waste becomes another city's environmental 
headache. Dutch cities which rely upon the Rhine 
for drinking water, for example, incur heavy costs 
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Figure 23. Indexed trends in concentrations of S02 in selected old core case-study cities, 1975-87 
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Figure 24. Indexed trends in concentrations of S02 in selected new core and peripheral 
case-study cities, 1975-87 
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Figure 25. Indexed trends in concentrations of particulates in selected 
old core case-study cities, 1975-87 
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Figure 26. Indexed trends in concentrations of particulates in selected new core and peripheral 
case-study cities, 1975-87 
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Figure 27. Indexed trends in concentrations of N0 2 in selected case-study cities, 1975-87 
1980 base index = 100 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Year 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Source: OECD environmental data (1989). 
in dealing with pollution upstream by German and 
French industry. Similarly Rimini, the Italian 
seaside resort, suffers from Adriatic pollution 
which is largely caused by heavy industries in the 
Po valley and other parts of northern Italy. 
4.9.6. Many cities continue to pollute 
unnecessarily because they fail to conserve energy 
or use it efficiently. Improvements here would 
have many implications for planning and building 
regulations in Member States and for the design 
and construction of houses, offices, factories and 
shops. It has been estimated, for example, that 
37.5% of emissions of carbon dioxide, the main 
greenhouse gas, is due to energy consumption in 
buildings. Measures to reduce energy consumption 
through improved conservation methods, 
reutilizing waste heat or developing renewable 
energy resources are becoming more common. 
However, only in Scandinavian countries have 
simple measures such as improved building 
insulation and the use of shelter belts and solar 
panels become widespread. 
4.9.7. Many European cities also have a poor 
record in relation to the other side of the energy 
equation — energy generation. Few measures have 
been taken to improve efficiency in energy 
generation from non-renewable resources or in 
developing renewable sources. The ecological 
consequences are considerable. British power 
stations, for instance, in pumping large quantities 
of sulphur dioxide into the atmosphere have 
contributed to the incidence of acid rain in 
Scandinavia, damaging forests and sterilizing 
lakes. Renewable energy, through solar power 
generators, tidal power and wave energy 
convertors or modern windmills, remains 
undeveloped throughout Europe. Improving the 
efficiency of non-renewable sources of energy is 
also the exception. But in some cities, particularly 
in Denmark and Sweden, there have been attempts 
to reduce the consumption of fossil fuels and to 
give energy conservation a central role in urban 
land and transport planning. Combined heat and 
power schemes in Denmark, for example, have 
facilitated the more efficient conversion of fuel 
into electricity. 
The environment and health in Naples 
The working-class quarters of Secondigliano and Fuorigrotta, with concentrated industrial activity register high incidences of 
cancer due to: 
• dangerous levels of sulphur dioxide in the air, 
• cement works provoking respiratory illnesses, 
• domestic leather working, due to inhalation of fumes from glues and solvent, contributing to the incidence of stomach 
cancer. 
The historic centre and dormitory suburbs are badly affected by other diseases. 
• Infant mortality rates are amongst the highest in Italy. 
• Rickets is widespread, in the poorest quarters, due to lack of light and ventilation. 
• Water pollution in the bay makes eating seafood hazardous and spreads hepatitis. 
• Heroin addiction has increased the incidence of hepatitis and contributed to the spread of AIDS. 
4.9.8. The rapid and continuing increase in 
motorized transport — both personal and 
commercial — also presents many challenges to 
Europe's urban areas. Dense urban traffic 
contributes significantly to emissions from the 
transport sector which account for a high 
proportion of pollution levels. Transport in 
industrialized countries emits 90% of CO 
emissions, 50% of NO and atmospheric lead 
emissions, up to 40% of C02 emissions and 
contributes to CFC emissions which deplete 
stratospheric ozone levels. In addition, city 
residents have to endure the nuisance of 
traffic-generated noise and an increasingly 
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congested urban environment. Traffic-generated 
pollution also harms the built environment. 
Vehicle emissions contribute to the erosion of 
historic buildings and the vibration produced by 
heavy traffic leads to their structural 
deterioration. Despite some success in recent years 
in reducing concentrations of an array of 
pollutants, there remains substantial problems in 
many Community cities. 
Pollution in Milan 
Rising traffic and industrial emissions have sharply increased levels of atmospheric pollution in Milan to the extent that: 
• conentrations of sulphur dioxide there are amongst the highest of Italian cities — in winter levels reach 10 times the 
national average; 
• in February 1991, the local authority issued guidelines advising the public to avoid cycling in the city and using pushchairs 
for children as their low height exposed them to a higher degree of toxicity; 
• river pollution in the metropolitan area is the worst in the country — the rivers Lambro, Seveno and Olona have become 
so polluted that they can support no life at all. 
4.9.9. While urban policy-makers have begun to 
tackle some of these environmental problems, 
pollution levels remain acute in many cities. 
Worsening pollution is most marked in south 
European cities where environmental deterioration 
continues. In Athens, vehicular and industrial 
pollution levels are so high that vehicles are now 
only allowed to enter the city on alternate days 
and not at all if levels exceed safety limits. 
Similarly, in Milan the authorities ban cars from 
the city centre on a rota basis using car number 
plates to curb traffic pollution. In Naples, toxicity 
levels in the atmosphere are particularly high due 
to a combination of car exhaust emissions, 
industrial waste and volcanic activity. Noise 
pollution caused by heavy traffic flows and the 
proximity of the airport to the city is also a major 
nuisance and even impairs hearing and produces 
nervous complaints. With car ownership in 
southern Europe set to rise at least 300% over the 
next decade, the cities of the south face 
considerable policy challenges if they are to 
successfully confront these mounting threats to 
the urban environment. 
Environmental strategies in Milan 
Milan's 1990-93 municipal programme aims to enhance the city's environmental sustainability. Its strategy includes: 
• giving a much higher profile to environmental impact considerations in the planning process, 
• setting up a comprehensive databank and monitoring structure for the urban eco-system, 
• improving systems for the recycling of domestic and industrial waste and for its partial reuse for heating and electricity 
generation. 
The 'greening' of Athens 
Under Article 10 of the ERDF, a pilot project has been established in Athens to develop a 'Regional Recreation and Training 
Centre'. The project aims to: 
• develop a major urban park, 
• create an open air museum of Attica flora, 
• provide training in gardening and environmental protection, 
• establish a permanent Green Fair. 
The project is costing ECU 7.68 million, of which ECU 5.76 million is from the ERDF, and targets ethnic minorities and low 
income groups. It is anticipated that up to 100 jobs and 200 training places will be created. 
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5. Strategie responses to change in European 
cities 
5.1 Introduction 
5.1.1. As earlier chapters of this report have 
made clear, the map of urban Europe is diverse 
and contains not only cities grappling with 
economic, social and environmental problems but 
many which appear to have coped more 
successfully with such difficulties. Part of that 
diversity has been determined by the impact upon 
cities of the major structural economic changes 
that have occurred in the international and 
European economy. Another key dynamic in the 
diversity in cities' circumstances has been the 
reactions within individual cities to those changes. 
Part of the economic recovery that occurred in 
European cities during the second part of the 
1980s can be attributed to strategic responses 
made by city leaders. 
5.1.2. This chapter explores the dynamics and 
significance of strategic policy decisions made by 
decision-makers in different European cities. It 
discusses the extent to which cities have been able 
to shape their economic trajectories or have been 
constrained by wider structural change. It 
examines the factors that encouraged the 
emergence of more activist and entrepreneurial 
European city leaderships in the 1980s. The 
chapter identifies the strategies developed by cities 
which address economic change and the 
institutional mechanisms created to implement 
them, in particular the role of public — private 
partnerships in urban regeneration. It illustrates 
this discussion with the experience of a number of 
representative cities which have had different 
degrees of success in responding to the problems 
of change. The chapter ends with a discussion of 
the factors that underlie the different economic 
potential of cities in the Community during the 
1990s. 
5.2. The rise of the 'entrepreneurial' 
European city 
5.2.1. Cities have historically been the source of 
creativity as well as tensions in Europe, generating 
much of its economic, social and cultural 
dynamism. Their economic and political 
significance has, however, varied in recent 
periods. During the 1980s cities have emerged on 
the European agenda, not only as a source of 
major problems or as recipients of substantial 
public assistance, but as important economic and 
political actors in an emerging European-wide 
economic system as they assumed greater powers 
and more interventionist roles in responding to 
change. The emergence of the entrepreneurial city 
in Europe during the 1980s was driven by many 
factors: the impact of economic restructuring; 
political and administrative decentralization; the 
limitations of national regional policies; the 
renaissance of interest in urban living and the 
awareness of increasing economic competition 
between cities after the creation of the single 
market in 1992. 
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5.2.2. The primary driving force in the 
emergence of more 'entrepreneurial' city regimes 
has been the dramatic economic change occurring 
within Europe in recent decades, as outlined in 
Chapter 1. The full impact of the international 
recessions of 1973 and 1979 left many cities facing 
severe economic and social problems. In these 
circumstances city decision-makers in many 
Member States decided that in the 1980s they 
could not rely solely on national government 
policies to alleviate the impact of economic 
restructuring but had to develop their own 
strategic responses. 
5.2.3. The development of city-based solutions 
to economic difficulties was also encouraged as 
the limits of Member State regional policies 
became increasingly obvious during the 1980s. In 
many Member States the regional policies of the 
1960s and 1970s failed to create regional 
prosperity, spread their resources too thinly or 
simply failed to address the problems and needs of 
cities which were not identical with those of their 
larger regions. 
5.2.4. The trend was often encouraged by 
national governments in the Community — not 
only those controlled by right-of-centre political 
parties — which reacted against the perceived 
failure of centralized policy making and delivery 
systems that had characterized much of the 
post-war period. In many Member States this 
resulted in reduced national intervention and 
public expenditure and a shift in the balance of 
power between national and local governments. 
This decentralization provided local institutions 
with greater policy responsibilities but also created 
new political space which gave local 
decision-makers the opportunity to play larger 
strategic roles. 
5.2.5. The process was most marked in countries 
which had traditionally been more economically, 
administratively and politically centralized. France 
and Spain were particularly visible examples of 
this trend as major decentralization reforms 
changed the traditional internal balance of power 
and encouraged the emergence of activist and 
entrepreneurial regional and local governments. 
The trend to increase regional and local discretion 
was also found in traditionally less centralized 
countries like Germany, Italy, Belgium, Denmark 
and the Netherlands. Britain, Greece and Ireland 
were exceptions to this process of 
decentralization. Nevertheless, in Britain, cities 
were encouraged by national government to 
behave in a more dynamic, entrepreneurial 
fashion and in particular to form new alliances 
with private sector interests. 
5.2.6. At the same time growing interest in cities 
in Europe was encouraged by the larger processes 
of economic restructuring as new activities in the 
service sector replaced traditional economic 
activities. Cities in the old core of Europe in 
particular continued to shed their 19th-century 
role as centres of manufacturing and reverted to 
older pre-industrial notions of cities as places of 
meeting, communication, exchange and leisure. 
This had some important demographic 
consequences. Although many cities continued to 
lose population during the early 1980s, at the same 
time in many of them a process of reurbanization 
emerged as particular groups, frequently younger 
professional people or older people whose 
children had left home, moved into city centres to 
take service sector jobs or to enjoy their cultural 
and life-style advantages. 
5.2.7. The impact of this often higher income 
group upon specific central areas created a sense 
of renaissance in many cities. Despite the conflicts 
that process often created, and despite continuing 
structural decline in many cities, the process of 
selective reurbanization contributed to the image 
of cities as assets rather than liabilities during the 
1980s and created renewed political interest in 
their role and future. 
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5.2.8. The emergence of more entrepreneurial 
urban leaderships was also encouraged by the 
challenge of the single market after 1992. By 
threatening to speed up the rate of economic 
change, it made city leaderships anxious to avoid 
falling even further behind the already 
economically successful cities in the EC and keen 
to emulate their strategies. In part this contributed 
to the growth of many kinds of networks between 
European cities during the 1980s as cities 
attempted to share their experiences of responding 
to economic change. The prospect of 1992 also 
had a major impact upon national 
decision-makers, making them increasingly 
conscious of the need to increase national 
economic competitiveness. This had an indirect 
impact upon cities, since in many States the 
response was to identify the cities with the greatest 
economic potential as the dynamos of the national 
economy and to adopt strategies which would 
favour their growth. 
5.2.9. In some cases capital cities were 
designated, implicitly or explicitly, as key 
economic players. National restrictions upon the 
growth of Paris and London were relaxed in the 
1980s and were accompanied at the end of the 
decade by demographic recovery after an earlier 
period of economic and population decline. This 
growing awareness by decision-makers of the 
national economic significance of their major 
cities and attempts to encourage their economic 
revival, can be identified in Denmark with 
Copenhagen, in Belgium with Brussels, in the 
Netherlands with Rotterdam and Amsterdam, in 
Italy with Rome, and in Spain with the cities of 
Seville and Barcelona as well as Madrid. Despite 
the degree of political and administrative 
decentralization that occurred in many Member 
States during the decade of the 1980s and the 
autonomy that provided for many entrepreneurial 
city leaders, a contradictory trend has also 
appeared. There is a growing concentration of 
economic activity in a limited number of cities 
which could lead to the emergence of an economic 
elite of powerful cities within each Member 
State. 
5.3. Public — private partnerships 
in cities 
5.3.1. These factors combined to place cities 
more centrally on the European policy agenda in 
the 1980s and 1990s. As well as a greater 
recognition of the problems cities faced, there 
emerged more activist, entrepreneurial city 
leaderships who sought new strategies and 
mechanisms to encourage local economic 
development. They were prepared not only to 
review the economic development strategies 
adopted in their cities but also the institutional 
and administrative mechanisms through which 
those strategies were developed. Many responded 
to the economic problems they faced by creating 
new institutional mechanisms — in particular 
public — private partnerships — in an effort to 
generate and implement new economic strategies. 
During the 1980s the process occurred in a variety 
of the case-study cities in the old core, new core 
and periphery of Europe — Hamburg and 
Dortmund in Germany; Rennes, Lyons and 
Montpellier in France; Glasgow, in Britain; 
Rotterdam in the Netherlands; Milan in Italy and 
Barcelona in Spain. 
5.3.2. The process of creating public—private 
partnerships in these cities was initiated by 
different institutions in different ways. Often 
elected leaders, typically powerful mayors, took 
the initiative by creating a review process 
involving a wide variety of groups in the city — 
government, business, the community and the 
universities — to reassess traditional policies and 
propose alternative ones. The specific institutional 
relations of the partnership varied in membership, 
organization and formality. In some cities, like 
Montpellier, Milan, Glasgow, Hamburg and 
Rennes, there was a more formal alliance between 
public and private sectors and an organized 
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partnership with limited membership, 
administrative capacity and specific policy goals. 
In others, like Barcelona or Dortmund, a new 
institutional framework did not emerge; rather the 
process of public consultation, policy review and 
strategic development was crucial. 
5.3.3. Underpinning all of these initiatives was 
an attempt to replace internal conflict with 
agreement over long-term goals and to generate 
local consensus amongst public and private actors 
on a development strategy for the city and the 
resources that should be devoted to it. Such 
alliances did not prevent all internal conflict. Nor 
were they a sufficient condition for economic 
success. None the less, during the 1980s, the cities 
that developed such institutional relations were 
more often associated with the generation of 
dynamic development strategies than cities which 
were unable to create such alliances. Some 
examples of different kinds of partnerships found 
in our case-study cities are contained in the boxes 
below. 
5.4. New economic development 
strategies 
5.4.1. The growth of new institutional 
arrangements was accompanied by the 
development of new economic strategies. These 
varied according to the economic and social 
problems cities faced, as well as to the resources 
that were available to city leaders. These resources 
included, for example: the strength of the city's 
public and private economic sectors; its human 
resources including their educational, skill and 
entrepreneurial levels; its social class relations; its 
environmental and locational advantages; its 
cultural assets; its leaders' access to national 
resources and their ability to influence 
policy-makers at higher levels of government. 
5.4.2. The strategies were not mutually exclusive 
but complementary. Decision-makers rarely 
adopted a single strategy, although some were 
more common in particular regions of Europe. In 
many cities like Hamburg, Dortmund, Rotterdam 
and Glasgow, the strategic focus was upon the 
diversification and restructuring of traditional 
economic sectors like steel, coal or shipbuilding. 
Although not confined to them, cities without the 
problems of that traditional inheritance like 
Montpellier, Rennes, Bari or Valencia placed a 
strategic focus upon the development and 
exploitation of high technology, where the 
development of good working links between 
government, business and the research industry 
was crucial. 
Rotterdam Development Board (Rotor) — Think-tank on city-region relations 
Rotor is funded by the municipality and Chamber of Commerce to act as a think-tank in promoting the economic 
modernization of the city. 
It was set up in 1990 and consists of a board of key representatives of leading economic sectors supported by five senior 
research staff. 
Its main achievement has been to stimulate new forms of debate about the relationship between the city and the 
surrounding Rijnmond region. It has encouraged regional industrial and political interests to focus on pollution, regional 
infrastructure, provision of family housing, allocation of sufficient land for wholesale and distribution activities and 
regional public transport services. 
It has also suggested ideas for public—private sector collaboration on social renewal schemes, the improvement of health 
and welfare systems and social return from major redevelopment projects, where the municipality has undertaken business 
development, training the unemployed and improving public open space. 
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Birmingham Heartlands — Reclamation of derelict land by a local partnership of public and private interests 
• Birmingham Heartlands Limited (BHL), a company owned by five construction compames, Birmingham City Council and 
the Chamber of Commerce, was formed in 1988 to redevelop 2 500 acres of underused and derelict land on the fringes of 
the city centre. 
• The company works to an agreed development framework to attract new economic activity to the area and improve the 
conditions of existing residents. 
• Action will include the provision of a canal-side mixed-use complex, services industrial sites, residential development and 
associated improvements in landscaping and community facilities, and a UKL 0.3 million, 3.5 milion sq. ft. retail, leisure 
and sports development. 
• A Community Trust has been established to take local residents' and businesses' views into account. The City Council also 
has recruitment training programmes so that residents will benefit from expected job creation. 
• The initiative will cost UKL 1 billion and is expected to take 10 to 15 years to complete. It aims to generate 20 000 jobs 
directly, 5.2 million sq. ft. of new business floorspace and 650 new homes. 
• BHL and the City Council have successfully lobbied government for essential investment in infrastructure and 
communications. A spine road costing UKL 117 million is under construction. 
• The Heartlands Initiative is a locally inspired alternative and the City Council retains significant control over the 
development process. 
• Although it is early to evaluate success, development interest in the area has already increased appreciably. 
Codespar in Rennes — Consensus building and deriving a future plan for the City 
• Codespar (Comité de développement économique et social du pays de Rennes) was established by the mayor to bring 
together the key representatives of the business sector, unions and local authorities to prepare strategic economic and 
social plans for the area. 
• After an extensive consultation programme, Codespar secured local agreement to an urban planning strategy containing 45 
costed initiatives. The plan argued that the town's future lay in the exploitation of its scientific research capacity and 
recommended that economic development be focused in three sectors — electronics and communications, health and 
environment and bio-industries. 
• A successful science park 'Rennes-Atalante', has been developed; 4,500 people work in the park, of which 900 are new 
jobs, and Canon have recently located their European research centre there. 
• The town's economic vitality has provided the basis for the integration of education, culture and new technology. It is 
renowned as the first city to obtain cable television and also for its music and electronic art festivals and the CCSTI, a 
cultural centre for new technology. 
Montpellier LR Technopole — Harnessing a city's economic development potential 
• Montpellier LR Technopole, which was originally based within the municipality has become a hybrid association 
comprising local politicians and professionals such as entrepreneurs, researchers and university lecturers. 
• Its role is to stimulate and promote the local economy by harnessing its assets which include the presence of IBM, 
advanced university research facilities, innovatory small and medium-sized enterprises and an attractive environment. 
• LR Technopole is structured to encourage links between research and industry in the following areas: pharmaceuticals and 
medical research, computer technology, agronomic research, communications, and tourism and leisure. 
• It offers business development advice in conjunction with other agencies, organizes annual conferences in each of the 
above sectors and promotes local firms nationally and internationally. 
• Successful research centres on each of the five themes have been established, e.g. Euromedicine, Agropolis, Antenna, 
Heliopolis and also a small business centre, Cap Alpha. 
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Tecnopolis, Bari — A partnership between public educational institutions and private interests 
• Tecnopolis, Italy's first science park was founded in 1984 in Valenze^ a small town about 15 km from Bari, by a 
non-profit-making consortium which includes the Universities of Bari, Lecce and Sassari, together with a partnership of 
local entrepreneurs, construction companies, banks and regional development bodies. 
• It has been funded mainly by the Italian Government through the Ministry of Special Interventions in the 
Mezzogiorno. 
• Its key aims are to attract new industrial plants and research centres to the area and encourage local firms to use advanced 
systems of information technology. 
• Tecnopolis performs a variety of tasks such as product development in the field of electronics, telematics and advanced 
robotics, technology transfer, modernization of information systems used by local companies, and acts as an incubator for 
new innovative companies. 
• The science park has attracted significant inward investment and major companies such as IBM, Bull and Olivetti have 
established plants there. Also, Technopolis has been successfully marketed to help Bari project an image as a high-tech 
city. 
Wavertree Technology Park, Liverpool — A successful property-based public—private partnership in a depressed local 
economy 
• Wavertree Technology Park was a company set up jointly by Plessey pic, English Estates, Merseyside County Council and 
Liverpool City Council to develop a technology park. 
• An attractive 64-acre parkland has been developed on the site of formerly derelict railway marshalling yards at the cost of 
UKL 11 million in reclamation, landscaping and infrastructural works. 
• English Estates have developed, in two phases, incubator units for new high-tech companies each of which is now fully 
let. 
• Wavertree is now the second most successful technology park in the country in terms of constituent jobs after Cambridge; 
1 500 people and 40 firms are currently based on site, including a UKL 7 million 100 000 sq. ft. development project for 
accommodating Barclaycard which will eventually create 600 new jobs. 
• The park has been so successful that it is now being considerably extended. 
Public—private partnership in Hamburg 
In July 1985, the Government of Hamburg, the Chamber of Commerce and the 10 most important banks set up the Hamburg 
Business Development Corporation (HWF). 
• Its remit was to attract new firms and to fund and support existing ones. 
• Focal points of the strategy were the media, information technology, electrotechnology, aviation industries, medical 
technologies, biotechnology, harbour-oriented services and environmental technologies. 
• HWF attracted, in its first five years 387 firms — including 81 from elsewhere in West Germany, Scandinavia (91), Taiwan 
(42), China (33), the United Kingdom (24), Japan (19), Korea (10) and the United States (9). 
• They also acted as consultants for 769 existing firms. 
• 16 000 additional jobs were created. 
• New investments totalled DM 3.7 billion — mostly in the construction sector — which fuelled a major city construction 
boom. 
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5.4.3. In some cities, for example Seville and 
Barcelona, the emphasis was upon prestige 
redevelopment projects like waterfront 
redevelopment or major events to give a strategic 
focus to economic and urban modernization. 
Successful attempts were made to develop new 
economic niches for cities, for example in cultural 
industries, tourism and leisure. In other cities — 
Montpellier, Barcelona, Birmingham, Glasgow 
and Lyons are examples — decision-makers made 
conscious efforts to develop a wider role in the 
European economy by playing leading parts in 
European-wide organizations, developing 
economic and cultural links with other European 
cities and fully exploiting European Community 
programmes and funding. 
5.4.4. In most cases the strategy attempted to 
move the focus of the city's economic strategy 
from traditional to modern sectors and to 
diversify the economic base. Not all strategies had 
the same economic potential or impact. The 
development of cultural policies, the capturing of 
prestige projects, the development of international 
strategies or city marketing were not a substitute 
for, but a complement to, the development of core 
economic activities in the high value-added sectors 
of the manufacturing and service economy. But 
the former often provided an indication of 
entrepreneurial and innovative behaviour which 
characterizes many of the most dynamic cities in 
the Community. 
5.4.5. The following section illustrates this 
discussion by examining a number of cities whose 
experiences exemplify the range of problems and 
responses found during the 1980s in the old core, 
new core and periphery of Europe. Some of the 
problems faced were common in all areas; others 
were specific to particular areas. Leaders in some 
cities were more successful than others in coping 
with change. The experience of the successful 
restructuring of urban economies in the old core 
of Europe is illustrated with a discussion of 
Hamburg, Rotterdam and Dortmund. Montpellier 
and Barcelona are examined as examples of 
economic growth in the new core. Seville and 
Rennes are examined as examples of cities where 
more successful responses to peripherality were 
made. The experience of Liverpool in the old core, 
Marseilles in the new core and Naples, Dublin and 
Thessaloniki in the periphery of Europe are also 
briefly discussed as examples of cities which 
experienced greater difficulty in responding to 
economic change. The evidence presented in the 
following sections is used selectively to illustrate a 
general argument about responses to urban 
change. It does not claim to be a comprehensive 
account of the recent experience of these or other 
cities in this study. More detail about their 
economic, social and physical circumstances and 
responses to them can be found in the longer 
individual case-studies. 
5.5. Strategic adaptation to urban 
change in the old core 
5.5.1. Cities in the old core of Europe faced 
problems as a result of the rapid decline of 
traditional sectors like manufacturing, steel and 
coal production and port-related activities, 
particularly during the international recessions of 
the mid-1970s and early 1980s. The more 
successful city strategies helped promote the 
modernization of those traditional sectors but also 
to develop new ones. The experiences of 
Rotterdam, Hamburg and Dortmund are clear 
examples of the process. In each case the 
economic crisis in the 1970s triggered a political 
response from city leaders in the 1980s, which led 
to the abandonment of existing strategies and the 
implementation of new ones, accompanied by the 
creation of a new coalition and consensus in 
favour of change. 
5.5.2. Their experiences, although different in 
detail, exemplify several important points about 
old core cities in Europe: 
(1) Those cities do have the economic and social 
resources to respond to problems by restructuring 
and diversifying their economic base. 
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(2) Their capacity to recover from the economic 
crisis of the 1980s has reasserted the traditional 
regional balance of power in Europe. The 
traditional economic dominance of northern 
Europe persists despite the economic success of 
cities in the new core or periphery of Europe. 
(3) Strategic choices made by public and private 
leadership groups can affect the economic 
trajectory of cities, and partnerships between 
these groups is an important factor in 
regeneration. 
(4) The successful restructuring of urban 
economies does not guarantee that all groups in 
the city equally share the economic benefits. 
Poverty, housing and homelessness in Hamburg 
Data from Hamburg illustrates the extent of poverty and housing problems in the city. 
• 151 000 (9.5% of the population) received social assistance in 1987, subsequently rising to 167 000 (10.5%). 
• 45 000 received housing subsidies in 1981 rising to 84 000 in 1987. 
• The number of homeless in the city grew from 8 000 to 42 000 between 1988 and 1990. 
• Public housing waiting lists extended by 9 000 in one year to reach 50 000 households in 1989. 
• Only two-thirds of those with severe housing needs are accommodated within one year. 
Hamburg 
5.5.3. During the 1970s and 1980s, Hamburg 
went through an economic crisis as its four 
traditional sectors — the port, oil refining, ship 
construction and transport and communications 
experienced the impact of restructuring and 
international recession. The city fell from being 
one of the richest in the EC in 1970 to the average 
level in 1985. Unemployment rose to 13%. 
Hamburg's economy failed to compensate for this 
decline with growth in the service sector. During 
the 1970s the city's political and business leaders 
failed to recognize the changing nature of 
international economic processes and 
unsuccessfully concentrated upon using public 
money to attract heavy industry into the city. 
5.5.4. At the peak of the crisis during the 1980s 
city leaders changed their strategy, in the process 
helping to restructure Hamburg's economy. The 
city's mayor persuaded the different groups within 
the city — business, labour, government, and 
knowledge-based sectors — to participate in the 
formation of a new economic development 
strategy. The new strategy which emerged during 
the following two years shifted the economic 
priorities of the city from the attraction and 
retention of traditional to modern economic 
sectors. Physical urban renewal was planned to 
improve the city's retail facilities, housing, tourist 
attractions, cultural facilities, sports events and 
facilities. Crucially, the ruling party's traditional 
goal of the redistribution of economic benefits 
was replaced by a policy of wealth creation, in 
particular through attracting international 
investment. 
5.5.5. To implement the new policy, in 1985 the 
City Council, the Chamber of Commerce and the 
10 largest banks created the Hamburg Business 
Development Corporation (HWF), a classic 
'public — non-profit — private partnership'. The 
focus of the strategy was to develop modern, high 
value-added industries — the media, information 
technology, electrotechnology, aviation, medical 
and environmental technologies, biotechnology 
and port-oriented services. Between 1985 and 1990 
the HWF attracted 387 new firms, many from 
overseas, contributing to the creation of 16 000 
additional jobs. It attracted investments of DM 
3.7 billion, primarily in the construction sector, 
which fuelled an enormous inner-city construction 
boom. 
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5.5.6. Technological innovation was aided by 
the creation of the new Technical University in the 
late 1970s, supported during the 1980s by the 
creation of the Hamburg Technological Institute, 
the Technological Advisory Centre, the Centre of 
Energy, Water and Environment and a 
programme on artificial intelligence. During this 
period, the port was modernized as a centre of 
logistics and distribution. The city's economic 
success was aided by a flourishing trade fair and a 
burgeoning congress industry which in 1990 
attracted 10 major international fairs. 
5.5.7. By the beginning of the 1990s, Hamburg's 
leaders had taken the necessary steps to counteract 
economic crisis. Unemployment was falling, jobs 
and investment rising. The city's economy had 
been modernized and diversified. It had a modern 
efficient port, industries geared to the future, a 
well-developed service sector, a large number of 
banks and insurance companies, and extensive 
scientific research institutions and organizations. 
The unification of Germany and the opening to 
the east had provided major commercial and 
trading opportunities. 
5.5.8. Hamburg's economic success was 
achieved at a price. The internationalization of the 
city and its transformation for higher value uses 
imposed social costs. Social housing became 
increasingly unavailable and the price of housing 
rose dramatically. The city became increasingly 
segregated into separate residential areas, with 
intense political conflicts and pressures around the 
inner-city area traditionally occupied by workers 
now experiencing urban renewal. Unemployment 
remained high at 12%. The city was rich, with the 
highest proportion of millionaires in Germany — 
two for every 1 000 inhabitants. But in 1990 it also 
had the highest proportion in any German city of 
people on social assistance — 105 in every 1 000. 
Clearly the fruits of Hamburg's economic 
recovery were unequally shared. 
Rotterdam 
5.5.9. During the 1970s and 1980s Rotterdam, 
the world's largest port, went through a similar 
crisis in its port, shipbuilding and petrochemical 
industries as unemployment rose to over 20%. 
With the recovery in world trade in the mid-1980s, 
Rotterdam experienced both an economic 
resurgence and a growth in population. It emerged 
from the recession with stronger restructured port 
and industrial sectors and benefited from the 
growth in services during the 1980s. The municipal 
port authority invested heavily in port 
reorganization and new transport logistics. 
Enormous corporate investment in the 
petrochemicals sector occurred. There was 
substantial commercial investment and expansion 
of office space. A 'Brainpark' catering for small 
highly professionalized companies was developed 
near a major university site as was a new business 
park near the airport which attracted Pacific Rim 
investment looking for a European foothold after 
1992. The service sector grew at 6 to 10% annually 
in the late 1980s and business services increased by 
almost a third between 1985-89. There was 
moderate growth in banking and insurance and 
retailing. Hotel and catering employment also 
grew, fuelled by developments in leisure and 
entertainment sectors especially near the riverside 
city centre. 
5.5.10. The economic revival of the city was at 
least in part the result of conscious changes in 
municipal policy on urban development. During 
the 1970s much renewal had concentrated upon 
renovating social housing in the city, which was 
almost entirely publicly financed. Despite the 
great success in raising housing standards, the 
strategy could not address the collapse of the 
city's economy. In 1983 the city undertook a 
major policy review which identified the need to 
create improved relations between the City 
Council and the private sector, as well as the need 
to balance the social concerns of the 1970s with 
economic strategies. Rotterdam's new strategy 
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involved support programmes for small businesses 
particularly in urban renewal areas and massive 
investment in the port's infrastructure. The City 
Council used its own land resources to make a 
number of major public — private deals for office 
and leisure-based developments which 
transformed areas of the city centre. Efforts were 
made to broaden the city's housing stock with 
private and high-income property. The city 
authorities initiated two of the largest 
redevelopment schemes in Europe, which included 
a wide range of offices, housing, retail and tourist 
services and industrial development. 
5.5.11. Relations between the public and private 
sectors were transformed during the 1980s by the 
partnership approach. The city involved financial 
institutions and developers at early stages of the 
planning process. Relations with the Chamber of 
Commerce were substantially improved. A key 
symbol of improved public — private partnership 
was the creation in 1989 of Rotor, funded by the 
city and the Chamber, to build bridges between 
the public and private sectors and generate new 
ideas for collaboration especially on social 
renewal schemes. As in Hamburg, the final point 
was crucial. Rotterdam's undoubted economic 
revival coexists with a variety of social and 
economic problems and an unemployment rate of 
20%. By 1990 the city has returned to some of its 
earlier policy concerns in an attempt to create 
social programmes which would bring the benefits 
of prosperity to those in the city it had eluded. 
Dortmund 
5.5.12. Dortmund also experienced a crisis 
during the mid-1970s and 1980s as traditional 
sectors of the city economy were threatened by 
structural change. By the 1990s strategic decisions 
taken by city politicians and business leaders had 
placed the city on a surer footing. In 1970 
Dortmund's economy, built on coal, steel and 
brewing, was booming with an unemployment 
rate of 1%. But recessions in those sectors meant 
that by 1988 it had risen to over 17%. Traditional 
industrial monopolies and entrenched attitudes 
meant few modern industries had established 
themselves in the region to compensate for the loss 
of traditional jobs. They had gone instead to the 
rapidly developing cites of southern Germany. 
The local university played no real part in the 
local political or economic debate. The influential 
unions were reluctant to accept new technology. 
Local government was completely committed to 
dealing with the problems of the declining 
traditional sectors. The political power of the 
regional coal and steel industries meant that State 
government was primarily concerned to subsidize 
those sectors. The city centre which had been 
rebuilt after the war was physically unattractive. 
By 1990 many of these difficulties had been 
overcome. Dortmund's image was considerably 
improved. Substantial environmental and physical 
renewal had taken place and the city's economic 
base had been transformed. Manufacturing had 
declined from 50% of the workforce in 1970 to 
30% in 1990; services had increased from 30 to 
70%. New high-technology industries were 
growing. Unemployment had fallen from 18% in 
1988 to 12%. 
5.5.13. As in Hamburg and Rotterdam the shift 
was aided by conscious decisions by Dortmund 
city leaders. The closure of a major industrial 
plant in 1981 led the city's Lord Mayor to call a 
conference of federal, State and local politicians 
and administrators and local industrialists to 
consider the city's future. The result was an 
expansion of the city's economic development 
machinery and budget but more importantly a 
new economic development strategy for the city. 
Since the 1960s the development strategy of the 
city had primarily been a physical planning 
strategy. To that a new goal of economic 
development was added. Its priorities were to shift 
away from traditional coal and steel sectors and to 
convert Dortmund into a regional centre for 
future-oriented manufacturing and services. By 
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accelerating technological change the city would 
be transformed economically. By improving the 
environmental, housing and leisure amenities the 
city would be made attractive to highly skilled 
labour. 
5.5.14. The strategy helped produce some 
notable successes. A series of newly created 
research and development facilities in transport 
technology and automization and robotics were 
attracted. A technology transfer system was 
established between the university, the polytechnic 
and the local Chamber of Commerce. A 
technology centre was created with a technology 
park adjacent to the university. The local banks 
and the City Council developed programmes to 
encourage new entrepreneurs. The university, 
which was created as late as 1968, with its strong 
science and engineering faculty and 20 000 
students, played a critical role in the innovation 
process with key academics playing influential 
parts in the development process. 
5.5.15. The City Council also launched job 
creation programmes and supported 
unconventional employment initiatives in the 
informal sector of the economy. Drawing upon 
EC regional and social funds the Council offered 
free management consultancy services to 
initiatives in the manufacturing sector, gave 
financial support for initiatives in the social and 
cultural sectors and converted derelict industrial 
buildings to provide premises for small firms. 
5.5.16. The City Council upgraded the 
architectural and environmental quality of the city 
with extensive pedestrianization, the creation of 
urban boulevards and attractive public places and 
the renovation of existing buildings. A financially 
successful casino was developed. A major cultural 
development project encouraged the growth of 
cultural activities in a city which had traditionally 
lacked such activities. In a major area of 
dereliction in the city, the State and city are 
developing a major international building 
exhibition, which will initially upgrade the 
environment of that area. But it will become an 
innovation centre for the regeneration of such 
areas, the creation of industrial heritage schemes, 
the promotion of new forms of social housing and 
the development of innovative approaches to 
social development at local community level. By 
1990 the city of Dortmund was seen in Germany 
not as an example of industrial failure but of 
successful urban regeneration. 
5.6. Promoting urban growth in the 
new European core 
5.6.1. The pattern of economic regeneration in 
old core cities, based on the modernization of 
traditional industries and renewal of outdated 
physical infrastructure, is different from the 
pattern of economic growth in cities in the new 
core of Europe. Such cities in northern Italy, 
southern Germany and south-east France have 
substantial assets — freedom from industrial 
dereliction, expanding higher education 
institutions and qualified personnel, attractive 
locations and environment — which have allowed 
them to be amongst the most dynamic centres of 
Europe during the 1980s. Although some cities in 
the old core recovered economically during the 
same period, the area remains an extraordinary 
success as a result of the rise of a series of 
dynamic cities and entrepreneurial leaders who 
aggressively exploited urban assets with 
sophisticated economic development strategies. 
Montpellier 
5.6.2. Montpellier in south-east France is a 
model example of economic growth in Europe's 
new core. During the 1980s Montpellier's leaders 
aggressively pursued an economic development 
strategy which emphasized modernism, 
innovation, excellence and internationalism. They 
developed a 'technopole' strategy, expanded the 
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city's cultural assets, undertook architectural and 
environmental projects of European significance, 
formed political alliances with other regional 
actors and adopted an internationalist 
pro-European strategy. 
5.6.3. In 1962 Montpellier was the 22nd largest 
city in France; in 1990 it was the eighth. Between 
1975 and 1987 it experienced the highest 
employment growth of France's 22 regional 
capitals with 23%, ahead of Rennes' 19%. During 
the 1980s it attracted 60% of all the 300 000 jobs 
created in its region, attracting immigrants not 
only from the surrounding regions but also from 
Paris. By 1990 Montpellier was one of the most 
dynamic cities in France. But in the mid-1960s this 
was unexpected. 
5.6.4. The growth of Montpellier was triggered 
by the location of a major IBM factory in the city 
in 1965 which stimulated the growth of many 
small and medium-sized companies in robotics, 
electronics and communications, pharmaceuticals, 
and agronomy linked to the university research 
sector. But growth was sustained by the conscious 
promotion of indigenous economic development. 
As in northern cities a point can be identified at 
which the changes in local strategies occurred. In 
Montpellier it was not economic crisis but a 
change in political direction in 1977 after the 
election of Mayor George Freche. 
5.6.5. Before 1977 Montpellier had doubled its 
population in 20 years but the city authority's 
strategic responses to growth had been limited. 
City redevelopment had been of poor architectural 
and environmental quality with the proliferation 
of public housing programmes, an inadequate city 
centre and extensive suburbanization. Under 
Freche, Montpellier pursued a more 
comprehensive social, architectural, cultural and 
economic renewal strategy. The city centre was 
redeveloped, collective services were provided to 
outlying areas, public transportation to the city 
was improved, public housing standards were 
upgraded and social, cultural and sporting 
facilities developed throughout the 
neighbourhoods. The city authority's programme 
of major architectural projects of offices, housing 
and public spaces was regarded as one of the most 
prestigious in France and was intended to link the 
city by river to the Mediterranean seven kilometres 
away. A conference centre and opera house 
comparable with the Bastille in Paris was opened, 
supporting an opera, a symphony orchestra, 
schools of dance and drama and contemporary 
music of national and international standing. 
5.6.6. This physical, social and cultural 
redevelopment strategy was underwritten by the 
city's economic performance during the 1980s. 
Particularly crucial was the 'technopole' strategy. 
In 1985 the city authorities helped establish a 
public — private partnership, Languedoc 
Roussillon Technopole, to guide its strategy which 
developed into a major local economic 
development agency bringing together politicians, 
entrepreneurs, researchers, and academics in one 
of the most successful local public — private 
partnerships in France. The company created five 
technopoles to commercially exploit research in 
medicine, computer technology, agronomic 
research, communications, and tourism and 
leisure. It encouraged links between industry and 
research, marketed the city nationally and 
internationally, and attracted inward investment. 
5.6.7. A coherent internationalization strategy, 
forging economic and cultural links with other 
cities in its region and beyond, was adopted. The 
city authority is an active member of the 
Eurocities group and the International 
Association of Science Parks. The City Council 
especially pursued the European theme. It was 
intimately involved in the development of the 
integrated Mediterranean programme and received 
substantial EC funding for major development 
projects and from its science and technology 
programmes. 
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5.6.8. Montpellier's attractive environment and 
climate, the major port in Marseilles-Fos, its wide 
range of tertiary and industrial activities, its 
60 000 university students in a population of 
300 000, continuing immigration and dynamic 
local leadership indicates that the city should 
remain at the centre of an increasingly successful 
urban region in Europe, linking Toulon, Avignon, 
Aix and Marseilles with strong cross-national links 
to Barcelona. The region is a model of the pattern 
of growth that can be expected in the 1990s in the 
new core of Europe. 
Barcelona 
5.6.9. Barcelona is an important example of a 
city which is located in the rapidly growing new 
core of Europe but which has the economic base 
more typical of cities found in the old core of 
Europe. Although it originally developed as an 
industrial city in the 19th century, between 1950 
and 1970 Barcelona experienced rapid 
urbanization fuelled by extensive rural 
immigration and unregulated economic and 
physical growth which overwhelmed its ability to 
provide collective services. During the 1980s 
Barcelona faced the twin dilemmas of 
modernizing a traditional economic base at the 
same time as responding to the problems of rapid 
urbanization more typically experienced in the 
peripheral regions of Europe. 
5.6.10. Barcelona responded to those two 
challenges in a dynamic fashion. The capital of 
Catalonia and the second largest city in Spain, it 
consolidated a remarkable modernization process 
with the attraction of the Olympic Games. This 
event finally put the city on the world's map and 
extended the European vocation of the early 
20th-century elite of Barcelona. The process of 
democratization and political decentralization 
which occurred in Spain at the end of the 1970s 
and the dynamism of the city's leadership were 
also crucial in achieving the social and political 
consensus needed to meet the challenge of 
economic and urban restructuring. 
5.6.11. The European economic recession hit 
Barcelona at the end of the 1970s and the 
beginning of the 1980s. However, two important 
events also occurred during this period. One was 
the 1979 democratic local elections held after 40 
years of dictatorship; the other was the 
designation of the city's general metropolitan 
plan. Both aided Barcelona's urban restructuring 
as the City Council, despite its financial 
limitations, developed a more important role in 
city planning and undertook the creation of 
facilities for industrial location and collective 
services. The City Council also undertook sectoral 
planning policies aimed at upgrading deteriorated 
parts of the city as well as sites of symbolic value 
including many which were in the central city. In 
total the programme cost PTA 146 000 million, 
46% coming from the City Council, 40% coming 
from private investors and 14% from bank loans. 
It was not confined to the inner city and the 
Council made significant efforts to spread the 
impact of regeneration spatially and socially 
across the city. 
5.6.12. After 1984 priority was given to three 
main themes: (a) the adoption of an active policy 
of economic promotion of the city; (b) the 
attraction of the Olympic Games; and (c) the 
implementation of a strategic plan for Barcelona 
as a centre of a network of cities in west 
Mediterranean Europe. The City Council adopted 
a four-pronged strategy. The first was the creation 
of municipal companies and institutions to attract 
and coordinate investment especially in new 
technology and infrastructure. The second was the 
creation of an economic and social development 
area to encourage and support the creation of 
small-scale production and service companies. 
This dealt with the promotion and management of 
training and employment programmes with the 
support of central government and European 
Commission funding. The third strand was 
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collaboration with the city's universities in the 
creation of technology parks. The fourth was the 
setting up in 1986 of a municipal/private business 
creation centre, 'Barcelona Activa SA'. This was 
the first of its kind in Spain designed to support 
new entrepreneurs by offering advice, premises, 
services and training. 
5.6.13. The turning-point for Barcelona was 
1986, the year in which it was designated to host 
the 1992 Olympic Games. The Games served as a 
catalyst for massive public and private investment 
in the city. Barcelona capitalized on the Games to 
accelerate the modernization of its urban 
infrastructure, create a more rational transport 
system and to generally improve the quality of 
urban life in the city. The broad strategy was to 
develop the city towards the sea — Barcelona had 
historically expanded towards the mountains — 
within the broader strategy of urban 
modernization. The capital investment required to 
develop sporting facilities at four major sites in 
the city was originally budgeted at PTA 51 million 
but that was anticipated to attract PTA 1 billion 
private sector investment in a five-year period. 
The organization of the Games had a distinctively 
municipal character with the mayor playing a 
leading role. He was able to gain the support of 
the Spanish national Government by portraying 
the Games as an important national event while 
retaining its image as an initiative developed by 
Barcelona in Catalonia. The Catalan government 
gave financial support to the Games on the 
proviso that one of the official languages of the 
Games would be Catalan. The Olympic Games 
created a social and political consensus in the city 
and became an important flagship for the urban 
redevelopment that Barcelona had required for 
several decades, but for which it had been unable 
to mobilize the necessary political or financial 
support. 
5.6.14. In 1988 the City Council introduced a 
strategic plan to capitalize upon and consolidate 
the economic momentum generated by the 
Olympic Games. The plan involved major public 
participation and included contributions from 
almost 200 institutions supported by over 500 
people working in the technical commissions of 
the plan. This high level of participation amongst 
a wide range of institutions, from the association 
of businessmen to workers' unions re-
presentatives, was crucial in generating support 
for the Council's strategy. The plan had three 
strategic goals designed to promote Barcelona as 
an entrepreneurial European city. The first was to 
secure the position of Barcelona at the centre of a 
macro-region by promoting internal and external 
accessibility through improvements in transport 
infrastructure. Here priority was given to the 
establishment of a TGV link with Paris and to the 
modernization of the airport. The second goal was 
to improve Barcelona as a commercial and tourist 
city. The emphasis was placed on improving 
training and cultural infrastructure, and 
introducing housing and environmental 
improvement policies. The third goal was to 
strengthen the industrial and service sectors and to 
integrate them into a business centre. This 
involved a series of projects aimed at developing a 
centre for new technologies directed at medium 
and small sized businesses. 
5.6.15. Barcelona's ambitious plan was far from 
Utopian. By 1990 over a quarter of the plans were 
in operation and all were intended to be completed 
by 1992. In 1991 Barcelona received a special 
commendation from the European Commission 
for the contribution of its strategic plan to urban 
planning in Europe. At the beginning of the 1990s 
the city continued to face a range of problems 
related to the inadequacy of its social and physical 
infrastructure and uneven economic development 
across the metropolitan region. Barcelona 
nevertheless remains an important example of a 
city which by the strategic exploitation of its 
economic and cultural resources, the development 
of a European and internationalist perspective and 
the creative use of a major prestige event has 
positioned itself as a dynamic city well placed to 
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The Community programme for the social and economic integration of less-favoured groups: the case of Oporto 
Located in the medieval core of Oporto, the Community's programme takes an integrated approach. It acts as a catalyst for 
16 organizations operating locally and its objectives are to address urban rehabilitation, skills training, and job creation, 
improve education and health standards. It targets disadvantaged groups, including the young unemployed, women, children 
and pensioners. 
The project has a budget of ECU 3.6 million between 1989 and 1994. The EC's anti-poverty programme contributes ECU 2 
million, the Portuguese Government ECU 1.5 million, with the balance resourced by local government. 
The strategy of introducing programmes specifically tailored to meet local needs, and incorporating local participation, 
displays a degree of sensitivity which enhances the chances of benefits accruing to the local population. 
benefit from the wider changes taking place in the 
developing European economy. 
5.7. Promoting economic growth in 
the periphery of Europe 
5.7.1. The cities in the periphery of Europe 
suffer different economic, social and physical 
problems from those in the old or new core. 
Located in Greece, southern Italy, southern 
Spain, Portugal, western France and Ireland they 
are often characterized by inadequate 
infrastructure, limited inward investment and 
dependence on technologically underdeveloped 
industries. Their regions lag considerably behind 
those of the European core and the cities face 
intractable problems caused by late urbanization 
— inadequate housing, education, transport, 
social services, planning and physical 
infrastructure. But during the past decade many 
cities in the periphery have begun to address 
successfully the problems of peripherality. The 
experience of case-study cities like Seville, 
Valencia, Oporto, or Bari demonstrates that 
peripherality remains a major constraint on both 
economic development and social balance. 
Nevertheless the success they have experienced 
underlines the dynamism found in many 
peripheral cities and regions. Peripheral cities, by 
adopting innovative development strategies, have 
been able to limit the impact of structural 
constraints and are a guide to potential changes 
during the 1990s. 
Seville 
5.7.2. Seville, in Andalusia, provides an 
excellent example of economic development in the 
European periphery. During the 1980s, after the 
introduction of democracy and the creation of 
regional government, Spanish city authorities in 
general developed more coherent physical, social 
and economic strategies which are beginning to 
bear fruit. The particular significance of Seville 
lies in its strategic exploitation of a prestige 
redevelopment project — the World's Fair Expo 
92 — as a way of providing a sustained focus for 
urban development. 
Development of telecommunications infrastructure in Seville 
A major investment of public expenditure is transforming Seville's telecommunications infrastructure. It intends to make 
Seville an important international communications node: 
• By 1993 a digital network and complementary fibre-optic cable routes should be in place. These will link the major urban 
centres throughout Andalusia to each other and to the international telecommunications systems beyond. 
• An International Communications Centre for voice, data and video transmissions should be in operation in 1991. It will 
incorporate an automatic international exchange, with digital technology, linked to an integrated services digital network, 
to handle continental and global traffic, a teleport and a satellite communications complex. 
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5.7.3. During the late 1980s the Seville economy 
was on an upward trajectory. Inward investment 
was growing, unemployment was falling and there 
were high rates of economic growth. The city 
nevertheless retained key characteristics of 
underdevelopment — levels of technology in 
indigenous industries were low, the skill levels of 
the workforce were underdeveloped and the 
communications systems was inadequate and 
fragmented. Decision-makers in Seville and the 
regional government of Andalusia strategically 
chose to use a major redevelopment project, the 
World's Fair Expo 92, to address those three 
problems. The event acted as a catalyst for the 
comprehensive modernization of Seville's physical 
and telecommunications infrastructure and laid 
the foundations for a major science and 
technology complex in the city, to be located on 
the Expo site after the fair ended. 
5.7.4. Expo 92 was intended to physically 
transform a major neglected area of the city, 
attract a very large number of high-quality 
architectural projects, stage a wide variety of 
international conferences on science and culture, 
develop cultural, sporting and leisure facilities, 
and host a major cultural festival which would be 
broadcast by satellite around the world. By 1990, 
Expo had helped transform the city's physical and 
telecommunications infrastructure and would 
eventually give it a regenerated city centre and 
improved road, rail and air links, integrating the 
city in the Spanish and wider European 
economy. 
5.7.5. After the fair the site will be developed 
into a science and technology park to upgrade 
technological skills and capacity in the Andalusian 
economy. The park will specialize in sectors where 
the region is already strong — agriculture, food, 
fisheries, and tourism — but also encourage 
growth in the aerospace industry, car components, 
medium-tech telecommunications equipment, 
micro-electronics and computers. It is intended to 
serve as the core of a wider regional network of 
advanced technology centres which will unite 
scientific institutions, educational and research 
centres and innovative companies. It is intended 
not only to be a source of technology transfer 
within the region but an international resource for 
technological transfer and cooperation between 
the industrialized and developing worlds. 
5.7.6. Seville is at a critical juncture. It is 
modernizing rapidly but retains many of the 
characteristics and problems of an 
underdeveloped society. The utilization of a major 
prestige project to modernize its infrastructure 
and attract international attention should allow 
the city to remain a successful regional capital and 
may attract the international investment to make 
it a more important player in the national and 
European economy. 
5.7.7. The city's experience raises important 
issues about economic development in the 
periphery of Europe. There is a danger that the 
benefits will be spatially concentrated and that 
Seville will benefit more than Andalusia from 
forthcoming economic growth. Equally there is a 
risk that the economic, social and physical costs of 
modernization will be borne by the majority of the 
local population, but that only a minority will 
benefit from employment or housing 
opportunities. The city still has an unemployment 
rate of 30% and a youth unemployment rate 
nearer 50%. Prestige redevelopment projects 
played an important strategic role in Seville's 
modernization programme but their success 
underlines the need, apparent in similar projects in 
other cities, for strategies which will improve the 
local skill base and upgrade the human capital, as 
well as the physical infrastructure of peripheral 
cities, if they are to succeed in the long term. 
Rennes 
5.7.8. Rennes in Brittany is not a classic 
peripheral city of the kind found in southern 
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Europe. Nevertheless it is in a region of France 
which experiences many features of peripherality. 
During the 1980s many of those problems were 
overcome in Rennes as new institutional 
mechanisms were created and a new economic 
strategy developed, helping the city to become a 
potent symbol of modern urban planning and a 
centre of economic and cultural innovation. As in 
many other successful cities, important changes in 
leadership strategies during the 1980s helped shape 
this success. 
5.7.9. During the 1950s and 1960s Brittany 
experienced substantial decline and population 
loss. During the 1970s Rennes itself entered a 
period of uncertainty, if not collapse, as its 
relatively modest industrial sector went into a 
recession and 10% of its jobs were lost. But major 
policy changes occurred in the 1980s. Factory 
closures created pressure for the city to develop an 
indigenous economic strategy. The election of the 
Mitterrand Government in 1981 allowed the city's 
mayor — an influential member of the majority 
party — to enter the Cabinet and get access to 
national resources. National decentralization 
reforms after 1981 gave significant additional 
impetus to the emergence of local economic 
development policies. 
5.7.10. These changes led to the adoption of a 
new strategy for the city and to the creation of a 
public — private partnership, Codespar, to 
determine strategic planning for Rennes and 
acquire government finance for development 
programmes. Under the control of the 
Mayor-Minister, Codespar developed an intensive 
consultation process with unions, businesses, 
entrepreneurs in high technology, training and 
higher education, politicians, academics and 
community groups. Attention was focused around 
eight themes: agriculture and biotechnologies, the 
building trade, electronics and computing, 
research and development, planning, training, 
finance and marketing. The new strategy that 
emerged identified the economic future of Rennes 
in research, training and in three sectors — 
electronics and communications, the health and 
environment industries, and biotechnology 
industries. 
5.7.11. By 1990 the systematic pursuit of those 
goals and the exploitation of national programmes 
and resources meant that many of the city's 
targets had been achieved. A new science park was 
successfully attracting substantial private sector 
investment, tapping the expertise of the city's 
substantial higher educational sector — 3 000 
academics and researchers and 40 000 students in 
a population of 300 000. The city became the first 
in which cable television was introduced into the 
school system and special cable provisions were 
made for low-income people. Major cultural 
institutions and initiatives in theatre, dance and 
music were developed. The city centre was 
renovated. Communications were improved with a 
new TGV station. Economic growth had been 
reconciled with balanced social development. 
Considerable resources were invested in 
renovating older low-income housing and in the 
science park major efforts were made to integrate 
jobs with housing and to diversify the housing 
tenure. Rennes' experience demonstrated that the 
handicaps of a peripheral city can be overcome, 
that peripherality need not be associated only with 
the development of low value-added economic 
sectors and that growth and equity can, to a 
significant extent, be reconciled. 
5.8. More limited responses to 
economic change 
5.8.1. Despite such examples of cities in the old 
core, new core and the periphery of Europe where 
there has been successful adjustment to and 
promotion of economic change, there remain 
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City marketing: Glasgow style 
City marketing has been a key component of Glasgow's regeneration strategy. It has enjoyed considerable success in changing 
the external image of the city. The city markets its assets and has enhanced its cultural capacity to attract tourists and inward 
investment. 
Cultural and tourist attractions, such as the Burrell Collection, the 1988 Garden Festival and the 1990 European City of 
Culture celebrations, together with major property developments, such as the Scottish Exhibition and Conference Centre, and 
the retail developments of Prince's Square — an upmarket speciality shopping complex — and the St Enoch Centre, all form 
part of an overall package of attractions that help give Glasgow a dynamic, modern and cosmopolitan image. 
cities in all of the areas which still experience acute 
economic problems. In many respects they present 
the mirror image of successful cities. Partly their 
problems reflect a lack of resources. But they also 
reflect the inability of local decision-makers to 
mobilize existing resources in a strategic fashion. 
In other words economic problems are 
exacerbated by institutional and strategic failure. 
The cities in this study which had most difficulty 
adjusting to economic change in the 1980s, for 
example Liverpool in the old core, Marseilles in 
the new core or Naples in the periphery, had 
similar difficulties in creating stable institutional 
alliances which could generate long-term political 
support for a coherent regeneration strategy. 
Liverpool 
5.8.2. Liverpool is an example of a city in the 
old core whose traditionally port-dominated 
economic structure, low skill base, location and 
internal politics prevented it from successfully 
adjusting to change during the 1980s. The city 
experienced profound economic decline in its 
port-based and manufacturing sectors without 
being able to replace them with high value-added 
service sector activities. Liverpool's 
manufacturing industry was dominated by large, 
often externally controlled, employers and the 
city's indigenous business class was relatively 
small. The city population declined by almost 
50% in 40 years, the selective outflow leading to a 
loss of skilled workers. Unemployment remained 
consistently high and a substantial minority of the 
city's population was increasingly dependent upon 
State benefits. Its peripheral location on the 
English west coast became inappropriate for trade 
with the continent of Europe after the United 
Kingdom's entry into the European Community 
and it remained distant from the economic centre 
of Europe with relatively underdeveloped air, rail 
and road links to it. 
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The Merchant City quarter in Glasgow M* 
Located centrally, the Merchant City is an impressive example of Georgian townscape. But from the mid-1960s one-third of 
property fell vacant. Land and property dereliction followed. 
In 1981, Glasgow District Council designated the Merchant City as a 'special project area' — a status acknowledging the 
area's potential to stimulate private sector activity if positive action was first taken by the public sector. 
A coincidence of factors — the relaxation of constraints on private development within the city centre by the planning 
department, policy shifts in the housing department and the availability of grant aid for housing improvement and the 
introduction of Leg-up (local enterprise grants for urban projects) from the Scottish Development Agency — all combined to 
facilitate a property-led urban renewal strategy. The District Council's extensive land and property owning interests in the area 
helped the development process. 
Area renewal has transformed obsolete warehouses into upmarket mixed-use developments which are breathing fresh life into 
a once run-down urban quarter, attracted the return of city centre residents, stimulated new service activities and created a 
well-defined mixed-use locality. 
__ 
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5.8.3. Crucially, the increasingly severe 
economic and social problems which emerged 
during the 1970s and 1980s were accompanied by 
political and administrative instability. This 
caused internal political volatility as well as severe 
conflict with national government. The 
consequence was that during the 1980s, the city 
was unable to construct the alliances between 
national and local politicians, business, labour, 
the trade unions and the universities that emerged 
to give a constructive response to the similar 
problems of economic decline in Hamburg, 
Rotterdam, Dortmund or Glasgow. 
5.8.4. The experience of Glasgow was in marked 
contrast to that of Liverpool. In many respects it 
endured very similar economic problems in recent 
decades. The crucial difference was that during 
the 1980s Glasgow had the political stability to 
construct a coalition of government and business 
interests which identified and mobilized around a 
regeneration strategy concentrating on the 
revitalization of the city centre and the 
development of its cultural assets. The consistent 
pursuit of that strategy during the 1980s meant 
that, although Glasgow continued to experience 
substantial problems associated with economic 
restructuring and peripherality, the city leaders 
achieved clear progress in decisions about 
economic strategy. Liverpool's business and 
political leaders began that process a decade later 
in the 1990s, but the initiative remained fragile. 
Much remained to be done to exploit its assets. 
Marseilles 
5.8.5. Marseilles is located in the dynamic 
Mediterranean crescent of the new core but it 
suffers many of the economic problems of old 
core cities. In addition, during the 1980s it 
experienced political instability which prevented 
the city sharing in its wider regional prosperity. 
Marseilles experienced the decline familiar in 
north European ports during the mid-1970s but 
was less successful in adjusting to changes than 
those cities. The city's economic, social and fiscal 
problems worsened during the 1980s. Political 
stability and consensus was made more difficult, 
although it was not caused by the fact that 
Marseilles — with its substantial North African 
immigrant population — became the power base 
for the divisive Le Front National party. 
5.8.6. In part Marseilles' difficulty stemmed 
from its location. The city is surrounded by the 
successful, dynamic cities of Montpellier, Aix, 
Toulon and Sophia Antipolis which offer good 
opportunities for the development of typical new 
core economic activities in less degraded 
environments. In addition much traditional 
economic activity relocated from Marseilles to 
surrounding areas, partially as a result of 
government policies, during the 1960s. Also the 
decentralization reforms of 1981 created a 
stronger regional administration whose economic 
interests often differ from those of Marseilles. 
5.8.7. During the 1970s the city's traditional 
political leadership, in contrast to that in a 
number of similar cities, failed to identify the 
nature of Marseilles' decline. While in the 1980s 
leading decision-makers in cities like Hamburg, 
Rotterdam or Dortmund began the process of 
strategic rethinking for their cities, Marseilles' 
political institutions went into crisis. The 
emergence of Le Front National in Marseilles 
politics initially deflected debate about the city's 
underlying economic problems. The death of the 
city's mayor in 1986 undermined the traditional 
machine which had governed the city for 40 years. 
It created the political instability which prevented 
the emergence of a coherent redevelopment 
strategy. Marseilles has a number of assets as a 
port and as a centre of technological institutions. 
But in contrast, for example, to Barcelona which 
occupies a similar location, the city lacks 
sufficient political and wider consensus to help 
capitalize on some of its advantages. Marseilles 
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risks becoming an extreme case of regional 
inequality, an economic failure isolated at the 
centre of one of Europe's most dynamic regions. 
Dublin, Naples and Thessaloniki 
5.8.8. Peripheral cities in the Community suffer 
from particular locational, economic, and social 
disadvantages. Although some cities in this study 
have adjusted to those difficulties, others, like 
Naples, Dublin and Thessaloniki illustrate the 
constraints of peripherality. Thessaloniki's 
inadequate road, rail, sea, air and 
telecommunications facilities and links to the 
outside world are a major barrier to integration in 
the European Community, especially as it is 
divided from the Community by non-member 
States which do not provide reliable or growing 
markets for its products. Its economic future is 
highly dependent upon the Balkan region, which is 
neither economically nor politically stable. Dublin 
is separated from the mainland of Europe by two 
seas and is severely disadvantaged by the quality 
of rail links through England and Wales to the 
ports of southern and eastern England and, 
eventually, the Channel Tunnel. Naples airport is 
inadequate for large aeroplanes, as well as being 
dangerously near to the city. Its ports have fallen 
behind their Mediterranean and Middle Eastern 
competitors and are in a critical state because of 
lack of investment, poor strategic planning and 
managerial inefficiencies. Naples' road links are 
inadequate and the rail network slow; trains take 
10 hours to reach the economically dynamic 
Milan. 
The Custom House Docks Development Authority (CHDDA), Dublin. 
• The Custom House Docks site — a redundant port facility — lies in the north bank of the River Liffey, and is close to the 
city centre. Recognizing its redevelopment potential, the government estabablished the CHDDA in 1986. 
• The Authority's remit is to secure the redevelopment of the site and so spearhead the regeneration of other decaying, 
derelict and obsolete quayside areas along the river. 
• The site was earmarked for the development of an International Financial Services Centre (IFSC) and accorded financial 
incentives including a favourable rate of corporation tax for international financial services. 
• The high-profile project also includes office, residential and retail accommodation and a museum, hotel and conference 
centre. 
• Total estimated development costs are IRL 300 million. 
• The key actors in the funding, developing and marketing of the scheme are the developers — a consortium of three private 
sector property developers — and the CHDDA. Direct marketing of the IFSC is performed by Ireland's Industrial 
Development Authority. 
• By 1990, 76 companies had confirmed they would trade in the Centre with a projected workforce of 1 500. Amongst them 
were some of the world's leading financial institutions including Chase Manhattan, Dresdner Bank, Sumitomo Bank and 
Banque Bruxelles Lambert. 
5.8.9. Such locational problems compound the 
economic problems of these cities, in which the 
skills and traditions needed to sustain successful, 
indigenous economies in the high value-added 
sectors are absent or undeveloped. Dublin, for 
example, attracts considerable external investment 
by international corporations which tend to 
transfer profits back to the parent company rather 
than feeding them into the local economy. It also 
suffers from problems of human capital as it 
copes with the legacy of high rural migration to 
the city and the loss of a high proportion of its 
substantial number of university graduates who 
tend to migrate to successful economies within the 
EC and beyond. 
5.8.10. In Thessaloniki, the traditional 
food-processing and textile industries are unable 
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to sustain their share of the market as they 
compete with more sophisticated goods from 
richer countries or more cheaply produced goods 
from poorer ones. Naples suffers from a historic 
legacy of underdevelopment which reflects the 
particular history of the Italian state. Its economy 
is deindustrializing. It is dominated by an inflated, 
unproductive service sector, a massive but 
unstable public construction sector, a myriad of 
unskilled small firms and externally controlled 
large firms. It lacks medium-sized manufacturing 
firms. All three cities, but especially Naples and 
Thessaloniki, experience inadequate physical and 
social infrastructure because of their legacy of 
unregulated development. They indicate the gap 
that exists within Europe between leading and 
lagging cities. 
5.9. City choices — city futures 
5.9.1. This review of the experience of a range of 
cities examined in detail in this study has made it 
clear that there is no single route to economic 
success in the 1990s. Decision-makers in different 
cities have pursued different strategies 
incorporating high technology, research and 
development, financial services, modern 
manufacturing, transport distribution and 
communications, public sector services, retail, 
tourism, leisure and culture. Equally location in 
the three areas of the Community — old core, new 
core or periphery — is neither a guarantee of 
success nor failure. Cities in all three areas have 
experienced different economic trajectories during 
the past decade. Some have been more successful 
than their regional location might have suggested. 
Others have been less successful than might have 
been anticipated. 
5.9.2. The evidence from this study indicates 
that the cities with the greatest economic potential 
in the 1990s will be those which have: 
(a) a diverse economic base in a range of service 
and manufacturing sectors, particularly the 
high value-added sectors; 
(b) the human capital to develop, and 
commercially exploit, advances in 
high-technology sectors; 
(c) the knowledge-based institutions to provide a 
flow of skilled workers for those advanced 
sectors of the economy; 
(d) the quality of life — cultural and 
environmental — to attract and retain a highly 
skilled and potentially mobile workforce; 
(e) good economic, physical and 
telecommunications links with the most 
dynamic areas of the Community's economy; 
(f) the local institutional capacity to identify a 
development strategy and generate the 
political, financial and personnel resources 
needed for successful implementation. 
5.9.3. The point about institutional capacity and 
decision-making is important. Cities differ in the 
extent to which they possess the characteristics 
associated with high economic potential. The 
problems of cities which suffer from peripheral 
location, a degraded physical environment, 
dependence upon declining sectors of the 
economy, an under-skilled workforce or a legacy 
of local conflict cannot be understated. Nor can 
they be overcome without difficulty or in a short 
time scale. The challenge for city decision-makers 
seeking economic growth is to attempt to develop 
those conditions, given their own cities' social, 
economic and physical resources. 
5.9.4. Nevertheless, this study has demonstrated 
that decision-makers in cities which face common 
problems have responded to them differently. 
Some have developed strategies designed to 
minimize their problems and exploit their 
strengths. The creation of local coalitions and 
alliances between different sectors, and the 
development of a strategic economic development 
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plan, characterized the most successful and 
dynamic cities of Europe during the second part 
of the 1980s. Decision-makers in cities as diverse 
as Glasgow, Birmingham, Rotterdam, Hamburg, 
Dortmund, Lyons, Rennes, Montpellier, Milan, 
Valencia, Seville and Barcelona in the old core, 
new core and periphery of the community have 
adopted remarkably similar approaches in 
response to the problems created by economic 
change and restructuring. Although such cities 
stand at different points on their economic 
trajectories with different degrees of economic 
potential, they appear to be moving in the same 
forward direction. By contrast, in cities where the 
mobilization of political and financial resources to 
address economic decline has occurred less, 
economic recovery has been restricted. The 
internal institutional, cultural and political 
dynamics of cities remain a crucial dimension of 
their potential economic development. Cities are 
constrained by structural forces — but not 
completely. City leaders do have choices to make 
about their futures. 
5.9.5. The choices faced by urban leaders during 
the next decade and beyond are complex. Much of 
the energy of city leaders during the past decade 
has been invested in seeking economic growth. 
However, many of the problems faced in cities 
remain essentially social in nature. The successful, 
city-based pursuit of economic growth has rarely 
addressed the interconnections and contradictions 
between these two sets of issues. In our case-study 
cities, economic growth has not resolved the many 
social problems identified earlier in this report. 
Indeed, with limited exceptions, the politics of 
growth have increased inequalities within those 
cities. The pursuit of growth has also brought 
environmental problems and a loss of 
architectural and environmental amenity. There is 
evidence from this study that many city 
decision-makers, under pressure from a growing 
range of groups, are now questioning the virtue of 
a development strategy which seeks economic 
growth at all costs. The costs of 
internationalization strategies now inform much 
of the public debate in cities as diverse as 
Copenhagen, Hamburg, Lyons, Brussels and 
Glasgow. City leaders will face difficult dilemmas 
in reconciling growth with environmental balance 
and social equity during the 1990s. Cities are 
important to Europe not only as engines of 
economic growth but as examples of civilized 
living. In many cities there is a developing belief 
that the pursuit of the former may threaten the 
realization of the latter. 
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6. National stratégies for cities 
6.1. Introduction 
6.1.1. The local development strategies described 
in Chapter 5 illustrate the increasing importance 
of decision-making at urban level during the 
1980s. However, these strategies were developed 
within specific national contexts which differ 
substantially within Europe. It is essential to 
understand these differences in order to place the 
trend toward 'urban entrepreneurialism' in 
perspective. Altough EC member governments 
cannot implement self-contained macroeconomic 
strategies in an era of increased globalization and 
economic interdependence, their decisions still 
continue to play a critical role in shaping the 
social, economic and political conditions of the 
Community's cities. 
6.1.2. This chapter explores governmental 
structures and national policies which impact on 
urban areas. Governmental arrangements, 
particularly the division of responsibilities 
between national and subnational governments 
are crucial because they determine which public 
organizations have the power to develop urban 
development strategies. The discussion of 
government structures concentrates on central — 
local relations and on the powers and discretion 
given to subnational decision-makers. In 
particular it examines the growth of 
administrative and policy decentralization in the 
Member States which promises increased 
discretion to urban governments. 
6.1.3. The discussion of national policies for 
urban development focuses on the distinction 
between implicit and explicit urban policies. Most 
national policies affect urban development. 
Policies in the fields of housing, industry, the 
environment, transport, telecommunications or 
land-use planning have an impact on urban 
fortunes. But they are rarely focused specifically 
on, or designed solely to meet the needs of, urban 
areas. They can be described as 'implicit' urban 
policies. 'Explicit' national urban policies are 
specifically targeted at selected urban areas. 
Regional policies of Member States, which target 
areas invariably containing major centres, occupy 
an intermediate position between these two policy 
types. Regional policies and implicit and explicit 
urban policies are therefore discussed separately. 
The final section examines whether Member States 
are converging in the priority they attach to urban 
development policies. 
6.2. Intergovernmental relations and 
structures in European States 
6.2.1. Government structures have played an 
important role in the development of national 
urban systems. Countries with traditionally 
powerful central governments, such as France, the 
United Kingdom, Denmark, Ireland and Greece, 
have developed urban systems and hierarchies 
with at their apex economically and politically 
strong powerful cities — Paris, London, 
Copenhagen, Dublin and Athens. In countries 
with established traditions of regional autonomy, 
such as Germany and the Netherlands, the 
creation of regional capitals — Hamburg, 
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Munich, Rotterdam and Amsterdam — has 
encouraged the emergence of more decentralized 
economic and political urban systems. 
6.2.2. The existence of regional governments has 
enabled regional capitals to become the focus of 
the local government machinery and 
infrastructural development which accompany 
regional capital status. In many cases, regional 
economic development strategies explicitly 
identify cities as engines of economic growth. 
Such policies often produce a bias of resources to 
the regions' larger urban areas on the assumption 
that economic growth will be greater if it begins in 
the cities and will subsequently flow to the 
remainder of the region. These policies are not 
without their critics. Undue emphasis on urban 
economic growth is sometimes viewed as 
exacerbating existing intraregional social and 
economic inequalities. Nevertheless, they have 
been pursued in many European city-regions. 
6.2.3. European cities have had varying powers 
and financial discretion in different eras and in 
different countries. At one extreme, some 
countries have a long tradition of local autonomy, 
sometimes in tandem with traditions of local 
democracy. Italy, for instance, prior to 
unification in 1860, had a traditionally 
decentralized system of powerful city-states. In 
other countries — like Portugal, Spain and France 
— national governments for many years resisted 
pressures to extend local discretion and continued 
to exercise central control. 
6.2.4. The structure and financing of the 
national political and administrative systems have 
far-reaching implications for cities. They 
determine the level at which explicit urban policies 
are initiated and administered. They also establish 
the financial context which determines the extent 
of discretion that cities possess. The relative 
balance of powers between national, regional and 
city government is constantly shifting as dynamic, 
economic and political processes continue to 
shape intergovernmental relations. Despite the 
diversity of intergovernmental relations 
throughout Europe, a number of common trends 
have emerged in recent years. 
6.2.5. Although it has emerged at different 
times, there has been a trend towards 
decentralization in most European countries 
during the past 20 years. It should be noted, 
however, that constitutional and political 
autonomy has not always been accompanied by 
matching financial resources. Regional and city 
governments have often acquired powers and 
responsibilities formerly the preserve of national 
government, but levels of government expenditure 
have often been reduced. At the same time the 
capacity of subnational government to raise local 
income has been constrained in a number of 
Member States. As a result, many local 
authorities, given their statutory responsibility to 
perform a minimum of functions, have become 
fiscally stressed. 
6.2.6. The process of decentralization is 
apparent in a number of European countries. 
During the 1980s a decentralized system of 
government, with strong regional tiers, has 
developed and been consolidated in Germany, 
France, Spain, Italy and Belgium. In the 
Netherlands and Denmark there is a 
counterbalance to central government, but it is at 
the city rather than the regional level. This 
position contrasts with other Member States 
where traditionally centralized systems of 
government have been retained. Pressures for 
decentralization have been resisted in Portugal, 
Ireland and Greece. All have strong central 
governments with extensive powers, no regional 
tiers, and local governments which have relatively 
fewer powers and financial independence and little 
room for policy discretion. In Britain during the 
last decade there has been recentralization of 
power and reductions in local financial 
autonomy. 
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6.2.7. Germany has a system of decentralized 
government which dates from the federal system 
created by the 1949 constitution. Under the 
constitution, 11 Länder, including the three 
city-states of Berlin, Hamburg and Bremen, form 
the base of extensive regional autonomy. This 
remains important despite the constitutional 
reforms of 1969 which gave the federal 
government an enhanced role in areas which were 
previously the sole domain of the Länder, 
including regional economic and urban policy. 
The 1969 reform ushered in an era of 'cooperative 
federalism' where policy issues were addressed 
through 'joint-venture' programmes by the two 
tiers of government under a complex set of rules 
for decision-making and financing. In the late 
1980s, however, the federal government began to 
withdraw from direct involvement in a number of 
key policy areas for cities. For instance, it 
disengaged in 1986 from financial responsibility 
for social housing assistance. In its place are a 
series of individual State programmes. In an era 
of relative financial austerity, compensation by 
the federal government for its withdrawal does not 
match funds received under the joint financing 
procedures. 
6.2.8. In 1970, Italy took an important step 
towards more regional autonomy with the 
creation of 14 regional authorities with Ordinary 
statutory powers'. This reform created a more 
comprehensive regional system of government. 
Before 1970 only five regions with 'special 
statutory powers' had been set up in areas of 
particular political and ethnic sensitivity — Sicily, 
Sardinia, Val d'Aosta, Trentino-Alto Adige and 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia. Despite extensive formal 
powers, effective regional autonomy is limited by 
the degree of funding available to regional 
authorities. Municipal government in Italy is 
characterized by relatively low levels of statutory 
power and discretionary finance although some 
cities — such as Bologna and Milan — have 
creatively exploited their statutory and financial 
resources to good effect. The need to increase 
fiscal autonomy was implicitly recognized in the 
1990 reform of local government. 
6.2.9. The reform did have wide-ranging 
implications for the future development of Italian 
urban policy and continues the process of 
decentralization. There will be seven new 
provincial councils — the third tier of government 
under the State and the regions. The powers of the 
new councils in the urban policy field will be 
considerably strengthened — new powers include 
the formulation of provincial land-use plans to 
coordinate municipal master plans. Most 
significantly for Italian cities, the 1990 reform also 
creates nine new metropolitan cities. These will 
incorporate the municipalities of Turin, Milan, 
Venice, Genoa, Bologna, Florence, Rome, Naples 
and Bari and other municipalities which have a 
close relationship with these cities in terms of 
economic activities and essential services. The new 
metropolitan councils will perform the range of 
functions currently carried out by municipalities 
and provincial councils, including the provision of 
transport and traffic infrastructure, land-use 
planning, preservation and responsible 
exploitation of environmental and heritage 
resources, waste disposal, economic development, 
and the coordination of health, education and 
training provision. 
6.2.10. Spain, France and Belgium also 
witnessed increased regional autonomy during the 
past decade. Following the restoration of 
democracy in Spain, political pressure to replace 
pre-existing, highly centralized, State structures 
was intense. The new constitution of 1978 firmly 
placed Spain on the road to decentralization. 
Recognizing the country's regional diversity, the 
constitution created 17 autonomous communities 
with varying degrees of autonomy. In place of a 
unitary State, divided into 50 provinces which 
administered central government services, the 
country now has a semi-federal structure with 
each of the autonomous communities having its 
own president, parliament, executive and high 
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court of justice. The degree of self-government 
achieved so far varies. The most independent 
regions are those with the strongest ethnic 
identities — the Basque country, Catalonia, 
Galicia and Andalusia, where there was 
widespread popular support for full autonomy. 
The autonomous communities have powers to 
address virtually the entire range of government 
responsibilities — excepting defence and foreign 
policy. However, even in the latter case, many 
regions are developing their own policies towards 
other European regions and the EC. The 
provincial tier of government is leftover services 
from pre-democracy days. It survived the 
constitutional transformation of 1978 but its 
comparative local government weight is 
diminishing. 
6.2.11. The powers and autonomy of municipal 
government have widened and strengthened since 
1979, primarily in urban planning, transportation, 
local infrastructure, parks, culture and social 
services. The 1988 'Local Finance Bill' envisaged 
the creation of a self-sufficient system of finance 
which would allow greater local discretion. But 
this remains largely unrealized due to the 
new-found strength of regional governments 
which play an increasingly important role in urban 
areas. Local government has also become more 
complex as a result of the division of functions 
between the different tiers of government. The 
result is that the expanded role of local councils in 
planning, education, culture, health and social 
services requires increased coordination with the 
regional administration. This has led to 
difficulties where local and regional tiers are 
controlled by different political parties. 
6.2.12. In some major Spanish cities, for 
instance Valencia, a metropolitan tier of 
government provides an important coordinating 
and strategic perspective on a number of 
metropolitan-wide issues such as transportation, 
sewage and water infrastructures, and urban 
planning. Under agreements with the respective 
autonomous communities, the metropolitan 
government receives finance to carry out these 
functions. The metropolitan tier acts on the one 
hand as a coordinating instrument of the local 
municipalities and for the development of 
metropolitan policies. On the other hand, it is an 
instrument for decentralizing the activities and 
responsibilities of the autonomous communities. 
6.2.13. In France the political and administrative 
system has traditionally been centralized and 
hierarchical. Prior to the local government 
reforms of 1982, each of the 95 départements was 
headed by a prefect who was the government's 
representative. The 1982 reforms reflected 
growing demands for local autonomy in France 
and represented the first fundamental reform of 
local government for a century. In line with trends 
in Germany, Spain and Italy, the reform fostered 
a decentralization of power from prefect to 
authority communes and départements and 
democratized each of France's 22 regions. As a 
result, the mayors of cities with large financial and 
technical resources at their disposal became even 
more powerful political operators. Budget 
increases were especially marked at the 
département level in comparison to that for 
smaller cities, suburbs, remote rural areas and the 
regions. The départements were also endowed 
with many important new functions. 
6.2.14. Decentralization in Belgium, following a 
series of State reforms in 1970, 1980 and 1988 led 
to the creation of three regional entities — 
Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels. Prior to 1970, 
most policies relating to urban areas were highly 
centralized whilst housing and land-use planning 
functions were the responsibility of a fragmented 
system of local governance. Following the 
reforms, each region was given substantial 
socioeconomic powers and most functions 
impacted on urban areas. Urban renewal, public 
transport, economic policy, industrial location, 
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environmental protection, regional planning, 
housing policy and energy and water policies are 
now handled by the regional tier of government. 
The land-use planning system was rationalized 
and the regions now concurrently administer local 
planning with the municipalities, enabling more 
coherent urban development and management 
policies to emerge. 
6.2.15. In the Netherlands and Denmark, there 
are long-standing traditions of strong local 
government in the largest urban areas. In the 
Netherlands, a heavy financial dependence on the 
national government by local authorities coexists 
with sometimes significant discretion over the 
local use of central government grants. A gradual 
decentralization of decision-making from the 
national to the municipal or provincial level 
continued through the 1980s, although at a slower 
pace than that desired by large urban authorities. 
Trends in Denmark are different. It has a 
three-tier system of administration: central 
government, 14 counties and 275 municipalities. A 
special indirectly elected authority also 
represented the Copenhagen metropolitan region 
from its inception in 1974 until its abolition in 
1989, following pressure from provincial interests 
in central government. Throughout the 1980s, in a 
climate of fiscal austerity, successive Danish 
governments have reduced local authorities' room 
for financial manoeuvre, imposing a system of 
penalties for some authorities which budgeted 
over government-set limits and reducing grant 
support. As a result, local authorities have become 
more reliant on local taxes which are a particular 
problem for poorer areas where the loss of 
economic activity and higher income residents has 
reduced the local tax base. 
6.2.16. In Britain, a combination of central 
grant reduction, privatization of local services and 
the reduction of local government responsibilities 
has seen local autonomy reduced. During the 
1980s national government enhanced its 
dominance since, except in Scotland, there are no 
regional authorities, and local government became 
weaker. Moreover, in constrast to established 
trends elsewhere in Europe where metropolitan 
and regional government structures were being 
created or strengthened, national government 
abolished the metropolitan councils of the six 
largest urban areas in England. In these major 
conurbations strategic planning has become more 
difficult and intra-metropolitan area relations 
more complex. UK national governments have 
also assumed a high profile in urban renewal and 
economic development initiatives. In many cases 
this involved the creation of new vehicles for 
policy implementation which is not part of the 
local political process and encouraged the erosion 
of local authority powers over the development 
process. 
6.2.17. Central — local relations, and the 
balance of powers between tiers of government, 
vary across Europe. However, there is a broad 
trend towards decentralized government and 
especially increased regional autonomy. At the 
urban level, the picture of autonomy is more 
uneven as many urban authorities face fiscal 
difficulties and depend on central or regional 
government for finance. Financial constraints 
have provoked budget crises in some cities. In 
others, local administrations have exploited their 
discretionary powers and resources to promote 
substantially independent social, economic and 
physical development projects and policies. 
Decentralization, promoting regional, 
metropolitan or local autonomy, has enhanced the 
trend towards urban entrepreneurialism where 
statutory powers have been backed up. Without 
the financial resources to back up these new 
powers, the practical effects of decentralization 
can be muted. Indeed urban decision-makers are 
often faced wth difficult decisions about 
priorities, particularly in the trade-off between 
economic and social policies. 
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6.3. 'Implicit' national urban policies 
6.3.1. Throughout Europe national governments 
pursue an array of transport, telecommunications, 
housing and sectoral economic policies which have 
widespread social, physical, economic and 
environmental impacts on cities. A comprehensive 
analysis of the impact of all such policies goes 
beyond the remit of this study. Nevertheless, these 
policies have important consequences and no 
analysis of policies influencing urban areas would 
be complete without considering them. This 
section highlights the range of policies pursued in 
Member States and illustrates their diverse 
impacts with some examples. 
6.3.2. Sectoral economic policies have 
significant spatial implications. Whether integral 
to, or separate from, regional policies and whether 
they provide incentives to restructure the economy 
or support declining sectors, their impact can be 
profound. Sectoral policies have varied in 
northern and southern Europe. In Germany, for 
instance, massive programmes of federal 
government subsidies and support for the steel, 
coalmining and shipbuilding industries — all of 
which primarily benefited city-regions — have had 
funding far in excess of any specifically urban 
programmes. Subsidies to the coal industry in 
1985 alone were over DM 5 billion. Indeed, it 
could be argued that the coal programme was the 
largest urban programme in the Federal Republic. 
Massive public investment helped cities dependent 
on coalmining to weather the storm of economic 
decline while their productive bases were 
restructured. Essen, for instance, whose economy 
previously depended on coal and steel, is now 
bereft of mines. In their place are a university and 
a strong service sector. Although major economic 
problems remain in many former coal cities, 
public intervention has effectively mitigated the 
costs of decline. Federal aid also cushioned the 
effects of decline in the steel and shipbuilding 
sectors and eased the transition to new markets. It 
assisted the cities affected by crises in those 
industries to cope with decline, improve the 
prospects of surviving firms and encourage 
job-creation in other economic sectors. In 
Luxembourg, since the mid-1970s, national 
economic policies to promote diversification and 
attract foreign investment have had a major 
impact on the capital's economy. The financial 
sector, in particular, expanded rapidly throughout 
the 1970s and 1980s and now accounts for about 
one-third of the city's wealth as the number of 
banks in the city increased from 37 in 1970 to 177 
in 1990. 
6.3.3. In south European countries — for 
example, Portugal, Greece and Spain — sectoral 
policies have sought to smooth the transition from 
agricultural and low-technology manufacturing 
bases to modern economies which are able to 
compete in European markets in the 1990s. In 
Portugal, national policies recognize the 
imperative to continue restructuring the economy. 
An extensive development programme 
incorporates the reprivatization of many 
companies nationalized in the aftermath of the 
1974 revolution; it continues investment in the 
transport and communications infrastructure, 
developing internal links and lines with west 
European States; it raises levels of education and 
professional training, and enhances the levels of 
technology to increase the value-added content of 
production; and it raises raise productivity and 
promotes the competitiveness of firms in 
European markets. 
6.3.4. A substantial programme of road, rail 
and air transport modernization is under way, 
with an annual budget in the order of ESC 20 
billion. Between 1985 and 1995 the road 
development programme alone will upgrade an 
estimated 2 700 kilometres of inter-city links. The 
rail network will be made more efficient and the 
airports expanded. Pedip (programme to 
modernize Portuguese industry), begun in 1989 
with EC support, provides funding to modernise 
industry and to facilitate professional training. 
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These programmes, along with the Portuguese 
Government's macroeconomic policies, have 
important implications for urban areas. It is likely 
that the major beneficiaries of these programmes 
will be the country's two major conurbations, 
Lisbon and Oporto. 
6.3.5. Transport policies, implanted through 
indirect subsidies or direct public investments, 
have major implications for urban areas. In 
Belgium, for instance, transport incentives have 
consistently prioritized suburban areas. A long 
succession of policies have subsidized 
long-distance commuting and encouraged 
residential decentralization. Subsidy mechanisms 
include tax-deductible expenses for car journeys to 
work, employer subsidies to lower income workers 
and heavily subsidized public transport, especially 
for long-distance rail commuting. Belgium's 
extensive and free motorway system has also 
bolstered dispersal trends. 
6.3.6. Social policies also influence urban 
development. Social welfare, housing and cultural 
development policies affect the quality of life in 
cities, the urban form, land use and urbanization 
trends. Housing policies can be integral parts of 
national urban policies and programmes, as for 
example in the Netherlands. In others, for 
instance Belgium and Denmark, they are not 
specifically urban in intent but have clear urban 
consequences. 
6.3.7. In Denmark, as in many north European 
countries, national funds for social housing, an 
important component of the housing stock in 
urban areas, particularly in Copenhagen, are 
channelled through local authorities to non-profit 
housing associations. The various phases of social 
rented housing in Denmark are similar to its north 
European neighbours. The smaller scale 
developments of the post-war era gave way in the 
1960s and 1970s to large-scale, often peripheral, 
high-rise system-built developments which proved 
unpopular with residents. The lessons of this 
phase were duly learnt. The Urban Renewal Act 
of 1983 replaced the 1969 Slum Clearances Act 
and ushered in a policy of rehabilitation and 
refurbishment in place of the comprehensive 
demolition and rebuilding which characterized the 
earlier phase. 
6.3.8. National housing policies can be an 
equally important influence on urban land use and 
development. In Belgium, housing policies which 
subsidize mortgage interest payments and the 
construction of private housing, as well as 
constructing social housing on cheaper outlying 
sites for single family houses, have reinforced 
decentralization, suburbanization and urban 
sprawl. Similar results are evident in Ireland, 
where grant and mortgage subsidy systems have 
favoured new housing and so encouraged 
development in peripheral areas on greenfield sites 
where costs are lowest. At the same time, such 
incentives have made it less likely that decaying 
housing stock in inner-city areas will be 
refurbished. 
6.3.9. Social renewal and cultural policies will be 
increasingly important to cities in the 1990s. For 
example, in the Netherlands, national expenditure 
on cultural institutions and services has risen 
sharply over the last four decades. The 
development of cultural facilities plays a 
particularly important role in current plans to 
enhance the ambience and quality of life and the 
international attractiveness for investment 
purposes, of the Randstad cities. Social renewal is 
a new developing national programme. Based on a 
pioneering programme in Rotterdam, social 
renewal is intended to improve the welfare system 
by enhancing individual and community self-help 
rather than create dependence. It aims to develop 
mechanisms to allow the urban underprivileged to 
benefit directly from redevelopment schemes. The 
programme is an important test of how far the 
pursuit of competition and internationalization 
which are a key feature of many national policies 
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can be reconciled with wider social goals and 
avoid widening social disparities within cities. 
6.3.10. Implicit urban policies have far-reaching 
impacts on European cities. The impact of the 
battery of national programmes' policies which 
are not spatially targeted is not easy to assess. It is 
clear that the cumulative impact of such 
programmes is greater than that of explicit 
national urban policies more recently developed 
and whose funds, in relation to other 
governmental expenditures, are modest. 
6.4. 'Explicit' national urban policies 
6.4.1. Explicit national urban policies are 
becoming increasingly common in Member States. 
Because they developed in response to urban 
decline, they were initially the preserve of Member 
States whose urban areas suffered earliest and 
most seriously from industrial restructuring. Local 
economic crisis, declining population, expanding 
tracts of derelict land, environmental 
deterioration and physical decay created a spiral 
of social, economic and environmental problems 
demanding policy responses from national 
governments. Thus the UK, France and Germany 
were the first to develop national urban policies. 
The equivalent policies in Italy and the 
Netherlands are more narrowly defined. In 
Portugal, Spain, Greece, Belgium, Luxembourg 
and Denmark, there are no explicit urban policies. 
But there is a perceptible trend towards policies 
targeted at urban areas in those States. The Irish 
Government launched its first explicit national 
policies for urban areas in 1986. Legislation has 
been introduced in Portugal which will give a 
greater urban orientation to national policies in 
future. 
6.4.2. Current national urban policies vary in 
terms of their strategic objectives and the 
mechanisms employed to achieve them. Policies 
include grants and subsidies for specific 
developments, site-specific comprehensive urban 
renewal schemes, financial incentives for land 
reclamation, the waiving of local planning 
restrictions and the stimulation of local economic 
growth through development agencies. Project 
delivery can involve intergovernmental 
cooperation, government-appointed agencies, the 
participation of the private sector and a range of 
other non-governmental organizations. 
6.4.3. National urban policy in the United 
Kingdom, where many urban areas have suffered 
acute industrial decline, provides the most 
extensive array of policy instruments and 
initiatives. Central government in the 1980s played 
an important role in urban development as its 
policies had a significant impact on the physical 
form and economic activity of many inner-city 
areas. These policies have a different emphasis 
from those in the 1960s and 1970s. Those earlier 
policies had a social welfare focus and placed the 
public sector in the lead role. Recent policies have 
placed greater emphasis upon economic 
development and the use of incentives to involve 
the private sector in urban regeneration. 
6.4.4. A variety of initiatives have been 
introduced aimed mainly at promoting physical 
redevelopment in selected urban areas. Fifty-seven 
English local authority areas, concentrated in 
declining regions but including the inner areas of 
more economically buoyant regions — notably 
Greater London — provide the spatial focus for 
urban policies, along with the urban centres of 
Scotland and Wales. National priorities have been 
to provide 'pump-priming' incentives to tackle 
obstacles to physical development and to assist in 
the development of small businesses. English 
initiatives have been developed largely through 
government departments or centrally appointed 
agencies. Scotland and Wales rely substantially on 
regional development agencies — the Scottish 
Development Agency, now 'Scottish Enterprise', 
and the Welsh Development Agency. 
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6.4.5. A number of initiatives have been 
introduced on the assumption that local planning 
authorities are too restrictive in permitting new 
development. Initiatives such as enterprise zones, 
freeports and simplified planning zones and 
changes in national planning legislation, have 
encouraged local authorities to favour new 
development. The government-appointed urban 
development corporations (UDCs), have led to the 
removal of development control powers from 
local authorities. Central government officials 
have also become more active in urban 
development programmes through initiatives like 
task forces and city action teams. Both aim to 
increase the involvement of private businesses and 
to co-ordinate the urban development work of 
government departments. 
6.4.6. Public sector 'pump-priming', the 
absorption of that proportion of costs which is 
necessary to facilitate private development, 
underpins initiatives such as the city grant, the 
derelict land grant and garden festivals. It also 
dominates the approach of UDCs. Twelve UDCs 
now exist to regenerate derelict areas of industrial 
and former port land. With some of the largest 
government grants under urban programmes, 
UDCs have undertaken substantial property 
development for service industries, often highly 
visible 'flagship' schemes and private housing. 
Criticism of the lack of benefit to local residents, 
particularly those on low incomes, have recently 
led UDCs to expand into local training, enterprise 
development and local community initiatives. 
6.4.7. In France, the economic basis of urban 
problems was recognized earlier than in the UK. It 
might be argued, indeed, that French urban 
policies in the 1960s prevented, or at least delayed, 
the crises which occurred in many British cities in 
the 1970s and 1980s. An explicit urban focus to 
French regional policy emerged in the late 1960s 
through 'la politique des métropoles d'équilibre' 
and 'la politique des métropoles de recherche'. 
Eight urban areas were initially selected as growth 
centres; a further four were added in 1970. Within 
these areas, government support was provided for 
the development of new towns, universities, new 
neighbourhoods, infrastructural improvements 
and the renovation of city centres. Research and 
higher education institutes, banks, public services, 
hospitals and cultural centres were also developed 
in city centres. Public investments were reinforced 
by private investments and industrial 
déconcentration. Such policies contributed 
significantly to urban modernization and helped 
prevent the decay of the urban infrastructure and 
environment. The map of the most dynamic 
French cities in the 1980s — Rennes, Toulouse, 
Montpellier, Nîmes, Nice, Grenoble, Lyons — 
correlates with the targets of 1960s national 
policies. It can also be argued that earlier 
investments were crucial to cities like Lille and 
Saint-Etienne to enable them to emerge from 
economic crisis. 
6.4.8. In the 1980s, national resources were 
focused on urban areas facing industrial decline 
and economic modernization policies were given 
an explicitly urban remit. In 1984, the government 
launched 15 Pôles de conversion' to support urban 
areas disadvantaged by industrial restructuring 
whilst continuing to channel resources to less 
problematic cities to enhance their competitiveness 
on the European stage. The 'Banlieue 1989' and 
the 'Development social des quartiers' (DSQ) 
programmes were also introduced to address 
social and physical decay in the suburbs of some 
cities. DSQ committees, chaired by a mayor, 
prioritized housing renovation, improving the 
environment and developing social and cultural 
initiatives. Although the scale of the programmes 
was limited in terms of the number of 
neighbourhoods selected and the size of budgets, 
policy assessments were generally positive. 
'Banlieue 1989' was a smaller, architecturally-led 
programme aimed at transforming the physical 
environment of some of the worst estates. 
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6.4.9. However, many French urban areas failed 
to benefit from these programmes. Smaller urban 
areas lost State support but lacked the political or 
administrative clout to compete with regional 
capitals in attracting other public or private 
investment. Because of their size, they were not 
designated as 'pôles de conversion' and to further 
compound their problems, State support for them 
steadily waned. In addition to the Banlieue and 
DSQ programmes, 'les missions locales pour 
l'emploi', headed by local actors and jointly 
funded by national and local governments, were 
launched to assist young people to obtain skills 
training, secure jobs and housing. 
6.4.10. In recent years, a new wave of national 
urban policy initiatives has emerged, reflecting the 
increasing political importance attached to urban 
issues in France. New initiatives include: the 
setting-up of the 'Délégation interministérielle à la 
Ville' in 1988, attached to the newly created 
Ministère de la Ville; the 1990 Housing Act which 
allowed prefects to limit rent increases in urban 
areas, the 'loi antighetto' which allows the 
imposition of social housing developments on 
reluctant municipalities and the financial 
solidarity law which provides for a redistribution 
of resources between rich and poor municipalities. 
As integrated and well-funded urban policies 
developed at the end of the 1980s, cooperation 
between the State and local authorities took on a 
new importance. These partnerships were the 
hallmark of national urban policy in the 1990s and 
complement the decentralization of France's 
administrative system. 
6.4.11. In contrast to the UK and France, 
national urban policies in Germany were initially 
formulated to help cities cope with the problems 
of growth. The urban development assistance 
programme, derived from the 1971 Urban 
Development Assistance Act, gave local 
governments special administrative and planning 
powers in designated urban renewal areas and 
provided a legal framework for federal matching 
grants for local renewal and development 
projects. The programme led to the completion of 
many such projects throughout Germany. In the 
1970s, the programme's emphasis shifted. 
Responding to the need to renovate ageing 
neighbourhoods and to meet the challenge of 
industrial decline, the programme was redirected 
to develop industrial wasteland and improve 
mixed residential and industrial neighbourhoods. 
6.4.12. Nevertheless, explicit urban policy in 
Germany remained limited in scope. Programme 
improvements were available only for improving 
the physical urban infrastructure. Projects with 
explicit economic development objectives claimed 
only about 7% of the programme. Moreover, the 
system of intragovernmental negotiations between 
the federal State and the 11 Länder on the 
distribution of federal funds prevented resources 
from being targeted to those cities most affected 
by urban industrial decline. Instead, distribution 
was organized on the basis of population alone. 
6.4.13. In recent years the federal government 
has retreated from direct engagement in many 
welfare policies, with responsibilities shifting to 
the Länder. But its involvement in urban policy 
continues. Inner-city renewal projects, commonly 
targeted at housing, environmental and traffic 
schemes, are supported through cooperative 
funding divided equally between the federal 
government, the Länder and the Commune. The 
division of federal finance for urban areas on the 
basis of population has met with considerable 
criticism. In the mid-1980s, for instance, it seemed 
that federal government financial support for 
urban renewal would lapse. 
6.4.14. A major factor in the proposed 
devolution of urban policy to the Länder was the 
lobbying by a coalition of States willing to absorb 
a reduction in federal funds in return for gaining 
full control over urban policies. In view of 
the targeting problems experienced by 
intergovernmental coordination, the devolution of 
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responsibility was welcomed by some groups. 
Nevertheless, not all States favoured the change. 
The city-states of Berlin, Hamburg and Bremen all 
argued against the transfer since they wanted the 
federal government to maintain their involvement 
and earmark urban funding. In an era of fiscal 
abundance, German cities benefited from 
cooperation between the federal State and the 
Länder. In the more fiscally constrained late 
1980s, despite the retention of an explicit federal 
urban policy, cities in Germany with limited 
sources of alternative revenues were less able to 
address their problems and exploit their 
potential. 
6.4.15. The UK Government's UDC model and 
focus on area-specific, property-led urban renewal 
has been shadowed in Ireland. The 1986 Urban 
Renewal Act was the first explicit national urban 
policy launched by the government. Led by the 
Department of the Environment, the policy 
applied to many urban areas in the country. 
However, its flagship was the establishment of a 
free-standing Development Authority for the 
Custom House Docks in Dublin. Equipped with 
streamlined planning powers and an array of tax 
and rating incentives, the Development Authority 
was charged with regenerating the Custom House 
Docks site and spearheading the redevelopment of 
other decaying, derelict and obsolete quaysides 
along the river Liffey. The development of a 
prestigious International Financial Services Centre 
is central to its strategy. 
6.4.16. Under this legislation, a number of other 
urban areas were designated and enjoy fiscal 
incentives similar to those given to the Custom 
House Docks area. Encouraging signs of 
development in these urban renewal areas led the 
Minister for the Environment to extend the 
designations further. Although development 
activity in the original designated areas shows 
promise, its extent remains limited. It is uncertain 
whether these fiscal incentives of the legislation 
are enough to stimulate private sector-led 
regeneration. Despite the high profile afforded to 
the renewal areas, public expenditure within them 
is small, the incentives are largely tax-related. In 
1990 only IRL 2.5 million was provided by the 
government. These limited resources were made 
available to local authorities to carry out 
environmental improvements in designated areas 
but had to be shared by many areas throughout 
the country. 
6.4.17. In Italy and the Netherlands explicit 
urban policies remain narrowly defined and 
limited in scope. In the Netherlands there are 
occasional structure sketches for urban areas 
which set out government guidelines and 
priorities. But these statements are derived from 
the highly integrated system of national land-use 
planning. The same is true of Dutch expenditure 
programmes. Whilst some are designated as 
'urban', most of the government resources 
channelled to urban areas are rarely distinguished 
from the larger programmes of which they form a 
part. The limited scope of explicit urban policies 
in the Netherlands thus obscures the fact that 
there is a very strong implicit national urban 
strategy. 
6.4.18. Explicit Dutch urban programmes 
concentrate on the provision of social housing. 
The urban renewal programme of the mid-1970s 
was a response to demands for policy changes 
from the larger cities. They pressed for the need to 
stem migration from cities and reduce the social 
imbalance within cities that resulted by exploiting 
existing housing stock rather than encouraging the 
development of growth centres and comprehensive 
redevelopment projects which demolished older 
housing and developed peripheral high-rise 
estates. The urban renewal programme vastly 
improved the quality and quantity of urban 
housing. The programme escaped public 
expenditure cuts for much of the 1980s. But it was 
seen as vulnerable in the early 1990s as the Dutch 
Government continued a strategic shift toward the 
provision of private urban housing. 
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6.4.19. No coherent explicit urban policy has yet 
emerged in Italy but the national government has 
initiated a series of important, if fragmented and 
time-limited, urban renewal projects. These 
national policy responses fall into three categories. 
Firstly, national urban policies have emerged in 
response to particular emergencies. For instance, a 
major reconstruction programme was launched in 
the aftermath of the 1980 earthquake in 
Campania. Secondly, policies have been 
introduced to overcome particular implementation 
problems. For instance, 'Roma Capitale', 
launched in 1989 by the Prime Minister's office, 
was designed to ensure the implementation of key 
projects — such as the creation of better 
communications and an advanced services district 
in the eastern part of the city to relieve city-centre 
congestion — which had remained blocked for 
many years in the administrative system. Thirdly, 
specific national urban policies have been 
implemented by the State to enhance Italy's 
national image abroad. For instance, the Ministry 
of Tourism, Sports and Entertainment initiated a 
major programme of infrastructural renewal 
associated with the 12 cities hosting the 1990 
Football World Cup. 
6.4.20. These urban renewal projects shared a 
number of characteristics. Implementation 
procedures in different cities were left to local 
actors — usually municipalities and public — 
private partnerships. The result was considerable 
variation in policy reflecting local circumstances. 
In each project, final expenditures also greatly 
exceeded original estimates. In addition to 
launching ad hoc projects, the Italian Government 
established a Ministry of the Problems of Urban 
Areas. However, its political status is relatively 
low. The Ministry has failed to attract substantial 
responsibilities from other central government 
departments. The Ministry of Public Works, for 
example, continues to be responsible for public 
housing, but it has no full-time specialist staff and 
a very limited budget. Its only significant 
legislation to date has been the 1989 Act outlining 
a new national policy for car parking in urban 
areas. Although Italy does not have a 
comprehensive urban policy, the establishment of 
the Ministry for the Problems of Urban Areas and 
the introduction of legislation creating nine 
metropolitan city councils indicates that national 
government increasingly recognizes the need for 
better integrated interventions to address the most 
pressing problems of large conurbations. 
6.5. Trends in national urban 
policies 
6.5.1. The emergence and development of 
national urban policies in many Member States in 
recent years marks a recognition of the acute 
problems which many cities experience and the 
limitations of traditional regional policies in 
dealing with them. Nevertheless national policies 
for industrial location, sectoral economic policies, 
infrastructural development and macroeconomic 
strategies exert the greatest influence on urban 
areas throughout Europe. Explicit urban policies 
remain limited in their scope and their resources. 
This will be increasingly recognized in those 
countries which have not yet formulated national 
urban policies but which have cities facing 
growing urban problems. Effective national urban 
strategies will be vital in the 1990s if the cities are 
to compete on the European stage. Whatever 
national urban policies emerge this study indicates 
that they will be most effective where partnerships 
between central and local government, the private 
sector and local communities are encouraged. 
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7. Community policies and urban Europe 
7.1. Introduction 
7.1.1. As with a number of Member States, the 
EC has not formulated an explicit urban policy. 
Nevertheless there has long been an implicit urban 
strand to many Community policy instruments, 
programmes and initiatives, augmented recently 
by an embryonic explicit programme for urban 
areas. Taken together, these programmes have a 
significant impact upon cities. Directorate-General 
XVI (DG XVI), with its regional development 
policy responsibilities, is most deeply involved in 
such work but other directorates in the fields of 
employment, social affairs, education, transport, 
information and culture, environment, science 
and research, telecommunications, and energy 
play important supporting roles. The Treaty of 
Rome does not prescribe an urban policy for the 
Community. Nevertheless, many of the 
Community's policies impact on urban areas. The 
Commission proposed to add the words 'urban 
decline' to the Treaty in 1991 at Maastricht but 
this phrase was deleted by Member States. 
7.1.2. This chapter, drawing on the case-study 
research, assesses the ways in which Commission 
policies have — or have not been — utilized 
within European cities and their usefulness in 
urban or urban — regional development 
strategies. First, there is a brief résumé of the key 
EC policies which most obviously impact upon 
cities. There follows a discussion of the principal 
ways in which urban decision-makers have used 
EC programmes and of the conditions which 
encourage successful use of EC funds. There 
follows a summary of the broad urban impact of 
EC programmes, with an assessment of the 
strengths and weaknesses of current policies, in 
the view of local decision-makers, in relation to 
strategic priorities, targeting, funding, 
implementation and organization. 
7.2. EC programmes and urban 
development 
7.2.1. EC programmes with an explicit spatial 
dimension have grown since the introduction of 
the European Regional Development Fund 
(ERDF) and specifically the reform of the 
structural Funds in 1988. Since the Single 
European Act amended the Treaty of Rome, 
regional policy has aimed to promote economic 
and social cohesion and support 'harmonious 
development' within the Community, by 
encouraging economic growth in the least 
favoured regions, thus reducing interregional 
disparities. The Act also led to reform of the two 
structural Funds — the ERDF and the European 
Social Fund 03SF) — that are most relevant to 
urban areas and through which much of the 
Commission's spatial interventions are organized. 
Whilst neither of these funds are targeted 
explicitly at urban areas, a significant proportion 
of expenditure is incurred in Europe's cities and 
towns. 
7.2.2. The structural Funds are applied through 
a series of objectives, some of which have a 
specific spatial focus. Those of greatest relevance 
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to cities are Objectives 1 to 4. Objective 1 regions 
broadly match the European periphery as 
described in this report whilst Objective 2 regions 
are concentrated in the old core but can be found 
in all Member States (see Map 1). In Objective 1 
regions, EC funding aims to boost the 
competitiveness of regional economies mainly 
through assistance with the development of 
physical and telecommunications infrastructures, 
vocational training, advanced research and 
technology, and renewable energy sources. 
unemployment. Programmes supporting these two 
objectives are administered by DG V 
(Employment, Industrial Relations and Social 
Affairs), largely using the ESF. Besides 
administering the ESF, DG V is responsible for 
the Poverty III programme which finances 
projects addressing the poverty issue in all its 
aspects — housing, health, education, 
employment, training, and leisure — and involves 
actors from the public, private and voluntary 
sectors. 
7.2.3. In Objective 2 regions, the aim is to 
promote economic restructuring in declining 
industrial areas defined jointly by Member States 
and the Commission. Here, the emphasis is on 
productive investment and job creation, 
particularly through the development and 
application of R&D, the physical regeneration of 
declining inner-city areas and environmental 
improvements to enhance an area's appeal to 
tourists, investors and skilled personnel. Discrete 
programmes within the ERDF framework are 
devoted to one or more of the priorities noted 
above. 
7.2.4. In the last two years, DG XVI has 
developed a pilot urban component of the ERDF 
under Article 10 of the Regulation. Aiming to 
enhance the functioning and economic well-being 
of cities and boost their contributions to regional 
development, Article 10 pilot actions, covering a 
wide range of economic, environmental and social 
projects, are currently running in 21 cities. No 
spatial constraints are applied: the cities are found 
in the periphery, the old core and the new core. 
The programmes have developed three types of 
action — the development of economic activities 
in deprived housing areas, the restoration of 
historic city centres and the emergence of closer 
ties between economic and environmental goals. 
7.2.5. Objectives 3 and 4 apply across the EC. 
The former seeks to combat long-term 
unemployment and the latter youth 
7.2.6. The activities of DG XI (Environment, 
Nuclear Safety and Civil Protection) are 
increasingly relevant to urban areas. The 1990 
Green Paper on the urban environment, although 
a discussion document, proposes a series of 
actions which have significant implications for 
cities. These include: guidelines for the 
incorporation of environmental considerations 
into town-planning strategies within Members 
States; pilot projects for revitalizing 
disadvantaged urban areas by introducing a 
greater mix of uses and by widening access to 
urban facilities; innovative approaches to the 
provision of public transport and the 
environmental management of urban traffic; more 
assistance for the conservation of historic 
buildings and areas of European significance; 
pilot projects for 'green' planning; and the 
establishment of systems of urban energy planning 
and management. 
7.2.7. Important changes in the EC's spatial 
programmes followed the Single European Act. 
Since then attempts have been made, using higher 
regional fund resources, to increase the efficiency 
of EC intervention by achieving a greater synergy 
between the funds, allocating ERDF resources 
more evenly between basic infrastructure and 
productive investments, concentrating resources 
on fewer priorities and creating a better balance in 
resource distribution between central and regional 
authorities. There has been a move away from 
support for individual, unrelated projects, 
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towards groups of projects drawing on more than 
one structural Fund. The national programmes of 
Community interest (NPCIs), the integrated 
development operations (IDOs), the integrated 
Mediterranean programmes (IMPs) and the 
Community programmes (CPs) in particular aim 
to increase the coherence and cost-effectiveness of 
Community-funded schemes, to ensure genuine 
additionality of EC expenditure and to improve 
coordination delivery. 
7.3. Individual cities' use of EC 
programmes 
7.3.1. There have been major differences in the 
degree to which cities in the Community have 
taken advantage of the opportunities provided by 
EC policies and programmes. The performance of 
city administrations in this respect is affected by a 
number of factors, including: the eligibility 
criteria applied to programmes; the presence of 
well-developed internationalization strategies; 
cooperation between national and local 
government; the dynamism of public sector 
leaders and the support of specialist units of staff; 
strategic awareness of the potential of 'playing in 
Europe'; an entrepreneurial culture of openness to 
the outside world; a private sector ready to enter 
into transnational cooperative agreements, and 
also linkages with the Commission's 
administration in Brussels. 
7.3.2. The case-study cities revealed a range of 
experiences. In the cases of Glasgow, 
Birmingham, Rennes, Lyons, Montpellier, Seville, 
Valencia and Barcelona, for instance, a growing 
interest in fostering relations with the EC was part 
of a broader internationalization strategy 
developed by the municipality. Many of the cities 
which have successfully exploited EC resources 
have set up units of officers specialising in liaison 
with the Commission. Amongst the many 
examples, Glasgow District Council has a 
full-time European Affairs Officer and an 
Economic Policy Group in the Town Clerk's 
Department responsible for monitoring EC 
developments affecting Council activities and for 
securing Community resources. Birmingham City 
Council has a European Liaison Unit within its 
Economic Development Unit, to advise all 
Council departments about how to take advantage 
of EC funding, and to inform them of 
developments in Community policy. The unit is 
headed by a senior European advisor, who is the 
main link between the City Council and the 
Commission. The City Council also has a 1992 
Planning Group of Chief Officers, chaired by the 
Chief Executive, whose main task is to prepare the 
local authority for 1992 in terms of recruitment 
practices, and public procurement. 
7.3.3. The municipalities of Rotterdam and 
Amsterdam have created a single coordination 
point through which all EC-related information is 
channelled. Amsterdam City Council provides a 
'Eurolink' service producing regular bulletins 
which are distributed to key public and private 
sector organizations. City governments which 
maximize EC urban development initiatives also 
tend to have representatives in Brussels for liaison, 
information and lobbying purposes. For example, 
Rotterdam Port Authority, jointly with 
port-based companies and the Chamber of 
Commerce, have had a representative in Brussels 
since 1971 performing a two-way information 
channelling function. Amsterdam City Council 
has employed a consultant to act as an 
intermediary between the municipality and the 
Commission since 1989, while the Comunidad 
Autonoma Valenciana in 1990 opened a Brussels 
office, which is financed 50% by the Generalidad 
and 50% by the region's chambers of commerce 
and other private sector institutions. Many cities 
participate in urban network organizations, 
another important channel of influence. 
7.3.4. In some case-study cities, the local private 
sector rather than the public sector has taken the 
lead in developing relations with the EC. This has 
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been particularly important for those programmes 
aiming to promote technological innovation, 
where the primary recipients of funds are firms or 
independent research organizations rather than 
subnational government authorities. The private 
sector has consistently shown greater awareness of 
the importance of more general liaison with the 
Commission and other EC institutions in cities 
such as Milan, Thessaloniki, Bari and Brussels. 
7.3.5. The EC programmes most exploited by 
cities are the integrated development operations 
and the integrated Mediterranean programmes, 
although other programmes have also been 
important. In a period of fiscal restraint and 
uncertainty, EC help in developing rolling annual 
programmes through the infusion of additional 
resources has been particularly important in a 
number of cities. The experience and expertise of 
city and regional administrations in generating 
metropolitan­wide solutions to urban problems 
meant they were sometimes better suited than 
national governments to developing the corporate 
and strategic planning dimension necessary for 
many EC programmes. Cities also appreciate the 
greater role they have been given in the 
development and bidding process, including the 
possibility of lobbying direct to Brussels — a 
process traditionally dominated by national 
governments. 
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Integrated Mediterranean-programmes (IMPs) 
Of the cities we have studied, Montpellier has taken most advantage of IMPs. The Languedoc­Roussillon IMP from 1986­88 
received EC contributions amounting to FF 620 million — more than any other French IMP. FF 317 million were spent on 
agriculture, 53 million on fisheries, 200 million on manufacturing, crafts and advanced services, and 44 million on tourism. 
Montpellier performed a key role in negotiating with Brussels about the content of the Languedoc­Roussillon IMP. The 
negotiations conducted by the municipality led to modification of the terms of the regional IMP which were favourable to 
Montpellier. The city, for instance, obtained support for the enlargement of its airport, the construction of a conference 
centre, and the development of various technological poles. The experience of Montpellier shows how entrepreneurial 
municipalities, endowed with a coherent internationalization strategy and with good links with Brussels, can exploit 
successfully even Community programmes which at first sight would appear not to be directly related to urban 
development. 
Integrated development operations (IDOs) ■:&<■­ * 
The Naples integrated operation (ΝΙΟ) was the first IDO to be launched on a pilot basis in 1980. It covered more or less the 
whole Naples metropolitan area. The Commission, in conjunction with the Casser per il Mezzogiorno, the Regione Campania 
and the local authorities of the metropolitan area, defined the NIO's objectives: infrastructural renewal; improvements in 
public transport systems and interprovincial road links; provision of training and 'structural services' for small and 
medium­sized firms; provision of technological services and creation of new business districts situated outside the most 
congested areas of the Neapolitan conurbation. The relative success of the ΝΙΟ in its first period of operation (1980­84) 
induced the Community and the Italian Government to extend it for a further three years and again in 1987 for a similar 
period. Partly as a result of the earthquake which hit Naples and surrounding areas in November 1980, the NIO's original 
objectives were somewhat reshaped, and higher priority was given to infrastructural interventions. 
The ΝΙΟ has, however, failed to balance expenditure for infrastructural renewal with investment aimed at strengthening the 
local production system, for instance by improving human capital and technological resources. As for the 1985­87 
programme, 58.3% of total resources were spent on transport infrastructure, and 14.3% on sanitation and water supply. 
Non­infrastructural projects — such as initiatives in the fields of training, technological innovation and industrial 
development — accounted for 12.6% of total expenditure; three times more than in 1980­84, but still relatively small. 
The ΝΙΟ did succeed in achieving a higher degree of coordination between the actions of different levels of government than 
previously deemed possible. Moreover, projects funded under the ΝΙΟ generally had a better completion rate than projects 
funded by the Italian Government and they left the city a legacy of much needed new infrastructure. 
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The Strathclyde IDO (SIDO) was built on an earlier NCPI. The Glasgow NPCI (1985-87) was organized mainly by officials in 
the Industry Department of the Scottish Office, in collaboration with the Chief Executive's Department of Strathclyde 
Regional Council. It received UKL 64 million mainly for the Glasgow District Council area, and focused on eight 
subprogrammes: roads, public transport; water and sewage; industrial development; vocational training; energy; 
environmental improvements; tourism. While inner-city areas benefited considerably from these interventions, they left largely 
untouched the city's seriously deprived peripheral housing estates. 
SIDO was approved in 1988 and is the largest IDO in an Objective 2' region with a total budget of UKL 1 billion. It is 
managed by representatives from the Industry Department of the Scottish Office, Strathclyde Regional Council, the Scottish 
Development Agency, the Training Agency, relevant district councils and the private sector. The four principal components of 
SIDO in terms of Community contributions are NPCI (UKL 232 million), ESF (UKL 42 million), and loans from the EIB and 
the ECSC for a total of UKL 104 million. The operation consists of eight action programmes, which largely coincide with 
those of Birmingham. The main strategic objectives of SIDO are to develop the tourism industry, to reconstruct the region's 
image and to exploit the potential of Glasgow as an engine for regional growth. 
The Birmingham IDO (BIDO) included the Birmingham NPCI. It was a strategy for the regeneration of the city, with nine 
broad objectives: job preservation and creation; improved training; provision of industrial sities; new transport infrastructure; 
technological development; the creation of conference facilities; the expansion of tourism; the improvement of the city's 
environmental quality. The total EC contribution for the NPCI (1987-91) was UKL 113 million. In addition to the NPCI, the 
IDO comprised UKL 30.6 million from ESF, and UKL 44.5 million loans from the EIB and the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC). BIDO was articulated in six action programmes, related to economic development, communications, 
business development, environment, tourism and manpower. 
Birmingham is a good example of a city which during the 1980s systematically targeted and obtained EC funding for many of 
its major projects. Many of its new EC supported facilities such as the International Convention Centre, coupled with the way 
in which they are marketed now reflect its wider ambition of becoming a European city. 
• Seville, through the Comunidad Autonoma of Andalusia, obtained substantial resources from the EC which played a 
crucial part in the modernization and upgrading of the city's communications infrastructure. Andalusia in 1988 was allocated 
the largest proportion of both ERDF and ESF funds for Spain: 26.5% of ERDF, and 23.3% of ESF. Within Andalusia, the 
province of Seville received the largest share of these funds. A considerable proportion of EC funds was spent on 
infrastructural renewal projects, such as the building of a new motorway linking Seville with Granada and Baza. Under the 
agreed Community support framework for 1989-93 Seville will also benefit from EC contributions for projects which are not 
related to physical infrastructure. They will include the strengthening of the agro-alimentary sector, the introduction of 
innovative technologies in the local economy and the development of artisan firms. Infrastructural projects such as the 
building of a motorway system linking Seville with Madrid and Barcelona (under the Spanish Government's NCPI for 
motorways) will, however, continue to be very important, and will attract the lion's share of Community funding under the 
NPCI. 
Oporto, in addition to benefiting from EC support for massive infrastructural programmes of strategic significance, received 
ECU 153 million through the Proramp scheme (operational programme for the metropolitan area of Oporto). The vast 
majority of the funding (ECU 148 million) is devoted to infrastructural development, including sanitation and the building of 
a new hospital. Oporto also received Poverty III programme funding. A project in the Se e Baredo district of the city has been 
funded under this programme. The EC contributed ECU 2 million to a total budget of ECU 3.6 million. The scheme has been 
praised for its sensitivity to local needs and its efforts to maximize grassroots participation. 
Barcelona used ERDF funds to finance the widening and improvement of various highways, the extension of the underground 
line and the establishment of the Valles Technology Park. 
Valencia used EC funds for 41 road and water engineering infrastructure projects. 
In Dublin, the 1987-91 STAR programme contributed to the development of a sophisticated digital telecommunications 
system. This played an important part in the development of a major renewal initiative on the waterfront: The Customs House 
Dock Development Corporation is providing the city with major financial services facilities. 
Dortmund successfully used ERDF and ESF within various job-creation schemes, including the provision of management 
consultancy services to local manufacturing firms and premises for small businesses. 
201 
7.3.6. Most case-study cities can point to a 
number of benefits that have flowed from the 
move towards more integrated intervention by the 
Commission in recent years. IDOs encouraged the 
development of coherent programmes rather than 
the project-based approach to urban and regional 
problems which typified past approaches. The 
five-year planning horizon of these programmes 
has also allowed more flexible organization of 
implementation and the development of packages 
of smaller projects which, by their nature, take 
longer to plan. The integration of ERDF and ESF 
funds within IDOs has also resulted in the better 
handling of economic development issues such as 
the compatibility of training and business 
development and infrastructural improvements. 
IDOs in particular have succeeded in generating 
greater cooperation between different public 
sector agencies and between public and private 
sector organizations. 
7.4 EC programmes and urban 
development: an evaluation 
7.4.1. EC policies form part of a wider range of 
national and international, public and private 
decisions and policies. Nevertheless, this study has 
demonstrated that the EC's programmes have 
played an influential part in shaping urban 
development in many of the Community's cities. 
Most importantly, the EC has made a substantial 
contribution towards the modernization of the 
economic base and the infrastructure of cities. 
Cities in both Objective 1 and 2 regions have been 
most directly affected by infrastructural projects 
— subsidized by the EC — which have had 
substantial impacts on the physical form of cities 
and important consequences for the urban 
environment. In the countries with the weakest 
inter-urban and intra-urban communications 
networks — Portugal, Spain, Ireland and Greece 
— European finances have exerted considerable 
influence on the upgrading of the road, rail and 
air transport infrastructure and on national 
telecommunications systems. 
7.4.2. EC investments in airports and 
international and national road and rail links are 
assisting cities in peripheral and old core regions 
of Europe. EC investments in telecommunications 
systems are especially vital to cities in the 
European periphery. Whilst developing 
transportation and telecommunications 
infrastructure alone is no guarantee of 
overcoming the economic constraints of 
peripherality, without an efficient and modern 
infrastructural system, cities and regions will not 
be able to compete in European markets. Of the 
cities in the study, Dublin, Belfast, Glasgow, 
Birmingham, Dortmund, Montpellier, Oporto, 
Seville, Barcelona, Valencia, Naples and 
Thessaloniki have all benefited in this way. 
7.4.3. Community programmes have also 
encouraged the growth of collaboration and links 
between cities in Europe. Such links were often 
initially made in order to achieve EC funding for 
specific projects but those efforts often led to 
more permanent working relationships. Equally, 
EC programmes have encouraged cities like 
Montpellier, Barcelona, Lyons, Glasgow and 
Birmingham to become more engaged in the wider 
European economy and to play a more 
entrepreneurial role in Europe. 
7.4.4. The operational effectiveness of EC 
regional policy undoubtedly improved during the 
1980s, bringing improvements for urban areas. As 
indicated by the Article 10 pilot projects and other 
recent actions, there is a growing awareness of the 
urban dimension of regional development 
problems and potential policy responses within the 
Commission. The increased resources allocated to 
regional development policy are envisaged to 
double by 1992 as the regional policy share of the 
EC budget increases from 18% in 1988 to 30%. 
Cities in Objective 1 regions, which command 
80% of ERDF expenditure, stand to gain most. 
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The adoption of multiannual rolling programmes 
of intervention has added further to local 
discretion. 
7.4.5. As a result of these changes, the structural 
Funds are being deployed more efficiently. The 
quality of applications has improved although this 
is also due in part to the growing competition for 
funds in the late 1980s which resulted from the 
accession of Greece and Portugal as well as 
increasing awareness of EC programmes. The 
level of cooperation between the Commission and 
national, regional and local governments in 
Member States has also improved. Nevertheless, 
the study has revealed that urban policy-makers 
have a variety of concerns about the criteria, 
organization, priorities, funding and 
implementation of current programmes. Some are 
strategic concerns, others are operational 
matters. 
7.4.6. The EC resources devoted to regional 
policy, whilst increasing, remain small in 
comparison with national government expenditure 
upon regions and cities and with the EC budget. 
Overall, the ERDF represented 0.1% of total 
Community GDP in 1989 and the three structural 
Funds represented 0.2% of GDP. Their 
percentage contribution in designated areas is 
higher. In Objective 1 regions, structural Funds 
represented 1.2% of GDP in 1989, increasing to 
1.6% in 1993. For Member States defined entirely 
as Objective 1 regions, the rates rise to 2.5% and 
3.3% respectively. ERDF financed about 3% of 
total investment in all the less developed regions 
during 1989 and nearer 7% in the States entirely 
defined as Objective 1 regions — Portugal, 
Ireland and Greece. The relatively modest funding 
of EC programmes, particularly for cities which 
are not eligible for the most substantial structural 
Funds, has discouraged some urban 
decision-makers from seeking EC programmes. 
7.4.7. One of the most common criticisms 
relating to the urban dimension of the 
Community's regional policies concerns the 
emphasis placed on infrastructural projects rather 
than investment in human capital, technology and 
other factors directly affecting local economic 
development and job creation. Only 13% of 
ERDF investment in the 1981-86 period went to 
projects promoting productive investment in the 
industrial, crafts and services sectors, arguably a 
key reason why the employment impact of EC 
interventions has been relatively small. The 
Commission has recognized this problem, and has 
set a target specifying that ERDF expenditure for 
infrastructural projects should in future account 
for no more than 60% of total ERDF 
contributions in Objective 1 regions and 25% in 
Objective 2 regions where support for productive 
sectors is the priority. The effect of this policy 
change on cities will be positive, since the 
development of new infrastructures, rather than 
smaller scale modification to existing ones, is a 
lesser priority than training and enterprise 
development in urban areas, particularly in the old 
core. The EC's intention to negotiate with 
national governments about the prioritization of 
vocational training, productive investment, R&D, 
telecommunications, and the protection of the 
environment within the Community support 
frameworks (CSfs) should further help eligible 
urban areas. 
7.4.8. There is a need for a balance between 
infrastructural and other forms of investment if 
regions, and the cities within them, are to achieve 
sustainable development. The development of 
urban and regional infrastructure, unless it is 
accompanied by the building-up of productive 
capacity, could mean that future economic growth 
will be biased to relatively successful areas. 
Equally, stimulating economic growth without 
improving the employment prospects of those 
with most difficulty in securing jobs in the labour 
market will create wider disparities between social 
groups. It is important, too, that infrastructural 
investment strategies emphasize links within 
regions as much as those which go beyond 
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regions. Regional capitals will be the hubs of 
strategic communications networks and will be 
most likely to benefit from infrastructural 
developments. Whilst cities may be very effective 
as engines of regional economic growth, if the 
region is not well integrated, disparities between 
the regional centre and outlying areas may widen. 
Even with initiatives to improve accessibility to 
less favourable areas, physical and 
telecommunications infrastructural development 
is still likely to favour its regional capital. Many 
of these factors are increasingly recognized by the 
Commission and have played an important role in 
the formulation of many CSFs. 
7.4.11. Levels of administrative capacity at the 
national and subnational level also have 
implications for the effectiveness of EC 
programmes. City governments in the least 
prosperous, often peripheral, regions compare 
badly to their richer counterparts in preparing and 
part-funding ERDF programmes. The case-studies 
suggest that the better-resourced cities, with 
superior technical expertise and lobbying capacity, 
are well placed to take a disproportionate share of 
programmes which are administratively and 
financially demanding, unless some form of 
technical assistance is given to less powerful 
administrations. 
7.4.9. The fact that the ERDF in the past 
primarily supported major projects has also been 
criticized. Whilst this strategy may have a logic in 
terms of major regional development 
programmes, revitalization or improvement in 
schemes in urban areas often require smaller scale 
interventions. Moreover, the exclusion of smaller 
projects could jeopardize progress where 
initiatives rely on matching funding from fiscally 
pressed urban authorities. Financial packages of 
interlinked small schemes are often not only more 
feasible in the urban context but also more 
desirable. 
7.4.10. The fact that many directorates other 
than DG XVI administer programmes which 
impact upon cities means that, despite the 
improvements mentioned above, the EC's 'urban 
policy' remains the sum of many individual, 
weakly integrated parts. This administrative 
fragmentation creates problems for cities, since no 
single part of the organization is responsible for 
providing overall strategic guidance on urban 
issues. The common criticism made even by those 
case-study cities which benefited from EC 
programmes is that they attempted to plan their 
development in a strategically and 
administratively integrated manner but were 
forced, by the Commission's administrative 
structure, to disaggregate their strategies. 
7.4.12. Many urban decision-makers in the study 
point out that the majority of projects for which 
EC assistance is requested are still determined at 
national government level and do not reflect 
sufficiently urban, regional, or European strategic 
interests. In this context additionality remains a 
major issue. There is a great temptation for 
national governments to use ERDF and ESF 
contributions as a way of limiting public 
expenditure. For ESF especially, most projects 
submitted by Member States form part of existing 
government programmes for training and job 
creation. For some, this is seen as leading to the 
appropriation of EC resources by Member States 
in order to offset national exchequer contributions 
and transfers. 
7.4.13. For many cities the most problematic 
aspect of regional policy is the extent to which it 
fails to target many areas which experience severe 
economic, social and environmental problems or 
particularly acute urban problems within eligible 
areas. The eligibility criteria for current EC 
programmes, whilst consistent with the aim of 
reducing inter regional imbalances across Europe, 
mean that urban areas experiencing similar 
problems are treated differently according to their 
geographical location. Cities in Objective 1 and 2 
regions clearly benefit from Community 
programmes. But others which experience similar 
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problems, occasionally with greater intensity, but 
lie outside regions eligible for Community 
support, can only draw on Objective 4 and 5 
funds. The map of Objective 2 regions, in 
particular, does not include a number of cities 
which suffered from the decline of port-related 
activities and 'heavy' manufacturing sectors and 
the economic, social and environmental problems 
which went with it. Of our case-study cities 
Rotterdam, Copenhagen, Hamburg, Marseilles 
and London, for example, fall into this category. 
7.4.14. Whilst some urban areas are ignored by 
EC programmes due to eligibility rules, others 
derive little benefit despite the location of a city 
within an Objective 1 or 2 region. As with 
Member State regional policies, cities can benefit 
from EC regional policies but they do not do so 
automatically. Indeed, if regional policy 
expenditures are concentrated in areas beyond 
metropolitan boundaries, cities can be 
disadvantaged by loss of population and 
employment, and the development of productive 
capacity outside the city which is encouraged. 
7.4.15. It was clear in many case-study cities that 
a number of pressing urban issues were not 
addressed by regional policies. Some of the most 
serious urban problems highlighted earlier in this 
report are not the subject of support from EC 
resources. For instance, accommodation problems 
relating to the supply and condition of low-income 
rented housing, which are acute in many cities 
throughout Europe, are excluded. Eligibility 
critiera are particularly harsh on peripheral 
housing areas which lack any local employment 
base or economic infrastructure and are amongst 
the most economically and socially disadvantaged 
parts of European cities. EC criteria require 
finances to be linked to transport, industrial or 
tourism development projects, making it difficult 
for such areas to qualify for assistance. Support 
for environmental improvement projects is very 
difficult to divert to such areas for similar 
reasons. On the human capital front, many cities 
contain major immigrant populations which 
experience severe economic and social difficulties. 
With the exception of a handful of Article 10 
projects, this problem is not specifically addressed 
by current programmes. 
7.4.16. This chapter has evaluated the impact of 
regional policy upon cities in Europe. It has 
shown the beneficial impact that the growing 
resources devoted to regional policy has had, 
especially upon cities in Objective 1 but also on 
many in Objective 2 regions. It has demonstrated 
the merits of the greater integration of 
Community programmes created by the IDO 
system. The chapter has also identified the factors 
which have encouraged different cities in the 
Community to take advantage of available 
programmes and resources and the implications 
for less 'entrepreneurial' cities. However, the 
review has also identified a number of worries 
about current policy. These include concerns 
about the failure to integrate different 
Commission policies which impact upon cities, its 
limited spatial targeting, its failure to address 
some crucial urban problems and the anomalies 
created by its eligibility criteria. Regional policy 
should address these issues in future if it is to 
develop a greater urban dimension and improve 
the circumstances of cities in the search for 
increased regional cohesion. 
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8. Urban challenges towards 2000 — 
implications for spatial policy in Europe 
8.1. Introduction 
8.1.1. The European urban system will become 
more stable during the 1990s than it has been 
during the past three decades as the major 
economic, demographic and migratory trends 
which transformed the face of Europe in the 
post-war period slow down. Nevertheless new 
challenges will emerge during the next decade. The 
changes that may occur in membership of the 
Community will affect trading patterns within 
Europe and the economic potential of different 
cities. The migration from Eastern Europe and the 
Maghreb will exert economic and social pressures 
upon many cities. The revolution in work 
practices and occupational structures which 
characterized manufacturing in recent decades will 
affect service industries during the 1990s.· The 
restructuring of the service sector and its impact 
upon employment, incomes and urban land use 
will affect the economic potential of cities and 
groups within them. The cities which have been 
the major beneficiaries of recent service sector 
growth, currently Europe's urban success stories, 
could experience economic dislocation. 
time for the more fortunate sections of the urban 
workforce will create demand for new 
consumption services in cities and for the 
opportunity to move freely both within and 
between urban areas. The process of 
reurbanization will also bring demands for 
different services. 
8.1.3. This chapter discusses two issues which 
will be important factors in the urban debate in 
Europe during the 1990s. First it identifies the 
dynamic force which underlies many of the 
changes taking place in Europe — the process of 
competition between cities which has created a 
search for economic growth with a series of 
negative social and environmental consequences. 
Competition has driven many of the changes 
taking place in European cities — economic 
marginalization, social polarization and physical 
segregation. Second, the chapter discusses the 
implications of those processes for urban policy at 
the European level and the contribution which the 
EC could make to it. 
8.1.2. Changing life-styles with fewer marriages, 
more divorces, fewer children, more working 
women and more older people, will present new 
challenges for the provision and financing of 
public and private urban services. Despite 
consistently high levels of unemployment in many 
cities, increased affluence and growing leisure 
8.2. Urban competition and the 
search for economic growth 
8.2.1. The process of competition will be critical 
to urban development in Europe. This study has 
demonstrated that the importance of cities in the 
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competition for investment and economic 
development grew considerably during the 1980s 
and early 1990s. Although policy-makers in cities 
do not focus exclusively on economic growth, a 
concern with growth as opposed to equity 
distinguishes current policy debates from those of 
earlier periods. The search for enhanced urban 
competitiveness can be found at all levels of 
decision-making, driven by the negative effects of 
economic restructuring, pressures on economies 
and budgets and the anticipated effects of the 
single market. 
8.2.2. At a European level, the competitive 
strengths of its cities in the global economy are 
seen as important in maintaining the strength of 
the European economy in relation to other trading 
blocks. At national level, cities are regarded as 
increasingly important elements in the search for 
national economic competitiveness, a process 
which has already been encouraged by the 
decentralization of powers in many Member 
States. At local and regional levels, 
decision-makers focus on the advantage that cities 
can gain over their economic 'competitors' in their 
metroplitan area, surrounding region, or at 
national and international level. 
8.2.3. The attempt to increase urban 
competitiveness presents different challenges in 
the old core, the new core and the periphery of the 
Community. Decision-makers in old core cities, 
particularly where the recovery from structural 
economic changes has been weak, will continue to 
face the challenge of modernizing economic, 
social and physical infrastructures. Those in 
growing cities, particularly in the new core, will 
face the problems of managing the social and 
environmental costs of economic growth. Those in 
peripheral cities will face problems in modernizing 
indigenous economies, developing physical and 
social infrastructure, and improving transport and 
communications systems. 
8.3. Economic growth versus social 
and environmental balance 
8.3.1. The search to improve competitiveness of 
cities has meant that strategies to achieve 
economic growth have dominated the policy 
agendas of many European cities. The promotion 
of economic growth, often in response to acute 
economic crisis, has also been seen as a way of 
resolving physical and social problems. However, 
although economic development may support 
social and environmental goals, there is now a 
growing recognition that the two can be 
antagonistic. One of the most crucial findings of 
this study is that economic growth strategies have 
not only been unable to prevent social polarization 
and segregation and the deterioration of the 
environment but they have actually deepened 
these processes in some cases. The responsibility 
does not lie entirely with city strategies themselves 
but with the nature of modern occupational 
structures as well as the limited links between 
economic, social and environmental policies. The 
redrawing of national welfare strategies, which in 
many Member States has led to reductions in 
social and welfare expenditures, has further 
deepened the division in opportunities between 
different social groups in cities. 
8.3.2. Where urban economic restructuring and 
the growth of the service sector have encouraged 
the physical restructuring of city centres, creating 
new demands from more affluent service sector 
workers for offices, accommodation, retail and 
leisure services, social polarization and 
segregation have grown. One consequence is that 
the goals of social balance, environmental 
sustainability and architectural and cultural 
diversity are increasingly being counterposed to 
the pursuit of physical and economic expansion. 
Signs of a new social and environmental agenda 
have emerged in many cities in the light of 
growing evidence of the uneven distribution of 
economic and social benefits, deterioration in the 
social housing stock, industrial and domestic 
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pollution of the environment and the declining 
efficiency of transport infrastructures. 
8.3.3. A less direct economic rationale for a new 
agenda in cities is also emerging. The 
enhancement of the physical, cultural and natural 
urban environment will be crucial for cities in 
future since these factors increasingly affect the 
locational decisions of both firms and individuals. 
To attract investment and retain the skilled 
workforce that modern industry requires, urban 
decision-makers will increasingly need to provide 
liveable, socially balanced environments. The 
major dilemma facing European urban 
decision-makers in the 1990s will be to reconcile 
increasing competition and the pursuit of growth 
with wider social and environmental goals, so that 
short-term economic success does not destroy the 
attraction of living in cities nor create longer term 
economic vulnerability. 
8.4. Responding to urban change in 
Europe 
8.4.1. The forces and trends discussed above will 
present a series of continuing challenges to 
decision-makers in Europe during the coming 
decade. Private decisions by individuals, groups 
and firms will inevitably play a major part in 
shaping responses to those challenges. But so must 
the public sector. Public authorities at local, 
regional and national level already play major 
roles in shaping urban development in Europe. 
That responsibility will not decrease during the 
coming decade, nor will it be replaced by the 
Commission. 
8.4.2. The precise role that each level will play in 
responding to urban change and the strategies they 
may adopt is in many ways a matter for debate 
within Member States. As this study has shown, 
despite a growing common concern with urban 
issues across the Member States, Member States' 
responses to them vary substantially. Those 
national differences in institutions and policies 
will inevitably remain. Even though many of the 
urban opportunities and problems identified in 
this report are experienced on a European-wide 
scale, it cannot be assumed that the European 
Commission could, or should, accept 
responsibility for addressing them. The principle 
of subsidiarity means that national and urban 
governments in the Member States will play the 
major, and the Commission a more limited, role 
in responding to urban problems. 
8.5. Urban problems in a regional 
policy context 
8.5.1. However, the Commission already makes 
a substantial contribution to urban development 
through its regional policies. This report suggests 
that to achieve its goal of increased regional 
economic and social cohesion the Commission 
could develop further the urban dimension of its 
current regional policies. The economic fates of 
cities and their surrounding regions are 
inextricably connected as are urban and regional 
policies. One affects the other. In some areas 
development occurs evenly across the cities and 
regions. This presents no policy dilemma. But 
there are three kinds of problems in the economic 
relations between cities and regions that restrict 
regional economic growth or limit social cohesion. 
In each case the implication is that there should be 
greater concern for the economic linkages that 
exist between cities and their wider regions as well 
as the linkages between different policies which 
are aimed at urban areas and regions. 
8.5.2. The first type of problem emerges when 
the economic, social and environmental problems 
of cities not only restrict their own economic 
development, but also constrain the economic and 
social development of the wider region. In this 
case, in order to increase regional competitiveness 
the primary challenge is to develop urban policy 
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instruments which prevent cities being a drain 
upon regional growth. The second problem 
emerges when development takes place in the city 
at the centre of the region but it is not shared by 
its surrounding region. Here the policy task is to 
connect urban to regional growth and prevent 
growing disparities between prosperous cities and 
declining regions. The third problematic 
relationship occurs when the region develops but 
the city at its centre does not and economic and 
social disparities develop between a prosperous 
region and more deprived central cities. 
8.5.3. Although this analysis intentionally 
simplifies the nature of the relationship, this study 
has found evidence of all three problematic 
relations in many areas in Europe. These 
dysfunctions within regional economies suggest 
there is a clear rationale for greater intervention 
through the Community's regional policy in the 
range of urban problems identified in this study. 
Despite considerable expenditure on infrastructure 
which has benefited both regions and cities in 
eligible areas, Community support frameworks 
have not fully addressed some of the intractable 
problems of economic and social marginalization 
and deteriorating physical environments which 
prevent some urban areas from playing a major 
role in the economic development of their 
regions. 
8.5.4. Article 10 pilot projects have developed 
some creative, albeit limited, actions by 
promoting economic opportunities in housing 
estates with high unemployment, improving the 
urban environment and encouraging the 
restoration of historic centres. These kinds of 
actions could be developed as a valuable adjunct 
to those traditionally supported by the European 
Regional Development Fund. This might require 
adjustment in future priorities unless extra 
resources are made available. While major 
infrastructures supported by the ERDF have 
clearly benefited many cities, actions targeted at 
marginal groups within cities can be undertaken 
with more modest sums of money. Flexibility in 
packaging projects and uniting the efforts of 
government, private and non-government or 
voluntary sectors is often the key. 
8.6. Developing an urban policy 
8.6.1. A wide range of questions arise about the 
nature of urban policy. These include questions 
about the principles, levels and instruments of 
intervention, the choice of policy priorities, the 
scale and targeting of resources and the 
contributions of and relations within and between 
public, private, non-profit and government 
institutions. 
8.6.2. The urban-policy challenges identified in 
this report could be met at national, regional, 
local or Commission level which have different 
authority and capacity to act in urban areas. 
Nevertheless, two broad principles especially 
justify intervention in some policy arenas by the 
Commission. The first concerns issues which 
affect the wider European urban system, the other 
concerns the encouragement of excellence and 
innovation in Europe. In the first case there are a 
variety of issues which are not confined to a single 
city or Member State. Initiatives in this case can 
be seen as attempting to strengthen the 
European-wide urban system by increasing the 
flow of information, expertise, exchange and 
interaction between the cities of the Community. 
They include, for example, the communication of 
information about best practice, the 
encouragement of networks, the creation of 
physical and information links within Europe, the 
encouragement of joint ventures, and the transfer 
of urban technology and skills. 
8.6.3. There are other policy problems or 
initiatives that occur in individual cities that the 
Commission might wish to further address or 
support. Here the intention is not to provide 
policy solutions for all instances of the problem 
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but to support best practice in specific projects 
and by doing so encourage the improvement of 
policy standards at a European level. Such 
initiatives can occur in a variety of sectors. The 
Article 10 pilot projects are a good example of this 
approach in developing new ideas and delivery 
mechanisms which both the Community and 
Member States can pursue. 
8.6.4. Governments in Member States currently 
have rather different urban policy targets. Some 
focus upon the creation of wealth in cities; others 
focus more on the creation of equity and increased 
welfare through social housing or programmes to 
redress ethnic disadvantage. Some prioritize 
investment in physical capital — property and 
infrastructure — while others focus more upon 
human capital and investment in people through, 
for example, training programmes. Some target 
resources upon places, others upon institutions, 
others upon particular groups or individuals. 
More generally the focus of some policies is upon 
alleviating the problems of urban decline; in 
others the focus is more upon the development of 
urban potential. These are not mutually exclusive 
strategies. But they do have different implications 
for how urban issues are tackled and the 
development of policy responses. 
8.6.5. Across many areas of the Community 
there are deepening patterns of economic 
marginalization, social polarization, physical 
segregation and environmental deterioration 
which are reflected in a variety of policy arenas — 
labour and housing markets, ethnic minority 
disadvantages, fiscal relations, transport and 
environment. This study has indicated that the 
problems faced by ethnic minorities and tenants in 
social housing in many European cities are 
particularly acute and limit the contribution that 
cities can make to balanced regional economic 
growth. 
8.6.6. The Commission, like governments in 
Member States, would need to identify the way in 
which urban policy instruments can best target 
such problems. Inevitably, the nature, range and 
depth of intervention in these different policy 
sectors will be shaped by the level of resources 
available. In addition the Commission would need 
to decide the appropriate contribution of, and 
working relations between, the variety of public 
and private actors in urban areas, especially types 
of partnership arrangements. As this study has 
revealed, the integration and coordination by all 
governments, including the Commission, of their 
different policies impacting upon urban areas is a 
crucial issue. An urban policy — whether it is at a 
Community, national or more local level — 
should integrate economic development, 
employment, environment, transport and housing 
policies along with continuing investment in 
human capital both to create wealth in cities and 
to allow for its equitable distribution. 
8.7 Urban problems, spatial levels 
and eligibility criteria 
8.7.1. The spatial level at which policy operates 
is important. This study has identified three 
spatial levels at which problems of urban 
development can be found: European, regional 
and city level. There are great differences in 
economic and social performance and prospects 
of different cities within the Community with 
substantial inequalities between them. Equally, 
there are problems in the relations between cities 
and their surrounding regions and growing 
economic and social disparities between many of 
them. Finally, within all cities there are substantial 
economic, social and physical inequalities between 
different social, occupational and ethnic groups. 
8.7.2. A successful policy would recognize that 
these different spatial levels are not separate but 
interact in crucial ways. For example, the 
economic and social problems found within 
specific parts of individual cities are frequently 
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caused by decisions and processes of change which 
take place at wider regional, national or European 
levels. A policy which focused on narrowly 
defined spatial consequences of broader trends — 
for example, unemployment or housing problems 
within the 'inner cities' and peripheral housing 
estates, or the exclusion or ghettoization of ethnic 
minorities — while ignoring wider regional, 
national and European labour and housing 
markets, and investment trends, is likely to be 
ineffective. The spatial level and administrative 
boundaries for which policies are created should 
vary according to the nature of the problem faced. 
Concentrated effort within narrow boundaries for 
spatially specific problems is required for some 
problems. For others it misses the target. This 
raises policy questions about geographic 
boundaries. 
8.7.3. The problem of boundary definition 
clearly connects with indicators and data issues. If 
a policy uses indicators of economic or social 
problems across a whole urban agglomeration or 
wider region, it can overlook examples of urban 
problems which are more spatially concentrated. 
For example data drawn from the wider 
conurbations of London, Paris, Hamburg, 
Brussels or Rotterdam may not indicate specific 
and severe problems which we identify in the 
case-studies carried out for this study. 
8.7.4. Issues of boundaries and spatial eligibility 
are already important for the Commission's 
regional policies. In particular, the eligibility 
criteria used to determine which regions qualify 
for EC programmes are consistent with the aim of 
reducing interregional imbalances. Cities in 
Objective 1 and 2 regions benefit most from 
Community programmes while those outside can 
only draw upon Objective 4 and 5 regions. But 
eligible regions do not include a number of cities 
in this study which experienced substantial decline 
in their port-related and 'heavy' manufacturing 
sectors and suffered a variety of economic, social 
and environmental problems. These include, for 
example, Rotterdam, Copenhagen, Hamburg, 
Marseilles and London. The use of indicators of 
regional problems does not adequately identify 
examples of severe urban problems within more 
prosperous regions. This is an issue which has not 
so far been addressed except for some limited pilot 
projects. 
8.8. Urban policy, data needs and 
problems 
8.8.1. There is enormous variation between and 
within Members States on definitions of cities and 
the administrative units which constitute urban 
areas, the type and volume of data which is 
routinely kept on these areas and the frequency 
with which they are gathered. The data which is 
available usually measures different things and is 
invariably incomplete and out of date. The 
Commission collects substantial amounts of data 
on a regional basis but relatively little on 
administrative levels below that. Combined with 
national and local variation in definitions and 
data-collection practices, it is extremely difficult 
to assemble reliable, comparative data about 
cities, or groups and areas within them, which 
measures changes over time in crucial areas where 
an urban policy might operate. We found this to 
be a major problem in assembling good 
comparable data for this study. 
8.8.2. The current lack of accessible, 
comparative data extends, for example, to sectoral 
economic change, patterns of employment and 
unemployment, income distribution and levels of 
affluence or poverty, educational and skill levels, 
housing conditions, the socioeconomic 
circumstances of ethnic minority communities, the 
quality of environmental, health and transport 
services or degrees of fiscal health or stress. 
Inevitably this means that policy-makers at all 
levels of government lack the appropriate 
databases to allow them to understand and 
respond in policy terms to the changes that are 
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taking place in urban Europe. Substantial efforts 
are required to improve the European database 
and thus help decision-makers at all levels to 
devise and implement effective policies. 
8.9. Conclusion 
8.9.1. The range and variety of urban problems 
and issues faced in urban Europe is large and 
complex. Responsibility for responding to many 
of them will inevitably remain with national, 
regional and local government in the Member 
States. This study identifies many of the problems 
and opportunities which will need to be addressed 
by decision-makers. Some of these impact at the 
European level. Thus, the wider search for a more 
economically dynamic and socially balanced 
Europe suggests that, in future, support for cities 
should become a greater priority for, and make a 
greater claim upon the resources of, the European 
Community. 
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